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
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Abstract 
 
 
War exerts an undeniably significant influence on the values, norms, behaviour and 
attitudes which constitute the shared culture of the society. During prolonged armed 
conflicts, the exposure to extreme violence creates a ‘culture of violence’ in which violence 
becomes embedded in the values system of the society and is therefore permitted and 
condoned, making violence resilient to peace-building efforts and therefore likely to recur. 
In order to understand how a ‘culture of violence’ persists long after the official end of war, 
it is necessary to understand how it is transmitted to younger generations and through 
them is carried over into peace time. This thesis aims to explore and understand the 
phenomenon of transmission of a ‘culture of violence’ focusing on youths as carriers of 
such transmission. To analyse the phenomenon, an integrative and comprehensive 
analytical framework was developed and a case study was chosen to which to apply the 
framework. The case study is Sierra Leone. The analytical framework is constituted by 
four ‘spaces’ of transmission which have emerged from the preliminary research. The four 
‘spaces’ are: poverty, family, peers and social groups. The analytical framework was then 
utilised during the fieldwork stage of the project in order to identify the relevance of each 
‘space’ as well as the interactions at work among the various ‘spaces’. From the material 
collected during fieldwork, poverty and family emerged as structural factors of the process 
of transmission while peers and social groups emerged as immediate factors. As a result 
of the fieldwork political factionalism was added to the analytical framework as a fifth 
‘space’. The analysis of the fieldwork material revealed how the different ‘spaces’ are 
inextricably connected with one another and how they support each other while creating a 
network of forces that supports and perpetuates the transmission of a ‘culture of violence’. 
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Introduction 
 
War comes and devastates. Officially it ends with the signing of a peace agreement after 
having caused widespread death and destruction. It is over; no more violence. However, 
the transition from war to peace does not happen in a moment, it is a long difficult process 
that involves the reconstruction of the state institutions, of the economy, as well as the 
reconstruction of society, its bonds and its structures. War leaves deep scars and wounds, 
to the landscape and the material properties, to the social fabric and societal institutions, 
and to the individual both in the body and in the mind. The day the peace accord is signed 
might represent the end of the war but often it does not translate into the end of violence. 
Violence seems to be resistant to peace agreements, it does not disappear after the 
official end of the war, instead it is reshaped. Post-war societies are characterised by high 
levels of violence even many years after the official end of the armed conflict, and a 
society characterised by violence cannot be considered a society at peace. Therefore in 
order to build a sustainable and long-lasting peace it is essential to identify why and how 
violence survives as part of the system within a society. This resilience is often at the root 
of so-called ‘cycles of violence’ which refers to the resumption of old or new hostilities 
among the fighting parties and sometimes the resumption of armed conflict (Lumsden, 
1997). How is that made possible? Why is violence so hard to eradicate? Steenkamp, 
among others, argued that war “has impacted on society’s norms and values in such a 
way as to foster a great social tolerance of individuals’ violent behaviour. This tolerance 
has become so embedded in society that it survives the peace accords and can be helpful 
in understanding continuing high levels of violence” (Steenkamp, 2005: 254). This thesis 
is based on this understanding of the impact of war on societies and communities.  
Violence is normalised during armed conflict, it becomes part of the everyday 
functioning of a society torn apart. It is not even perceived as violence any more, it is 
simply part of how things work. Violence is also internalised by those who experience it as 


an everyday occurrence; it becomes part of the way of thinking, the way of living, the way 
of surviving. It becomes an element of the culture shared by the community or society and 
as such is transmitted in the form of values and norms regulating accepted and deviant 
behaviour. This has been referred to as a ‘culture of violence’ that emerges as a 
consequence of a prolonged war. ‘Cycles of violence’ and ‘culture of violence’ are two 
different concepts, the first referring to a temporal phenomenon of return to violent conflict 
and the second referring to the condition of many post-war societies in which violence is 
normalised also during peace time. However the two are not completely foreign to one 
other. The resilience of a ‘culture of violence’ in post-war countries can leave them 
vulnerable to future ‘cycles of violence’ representing a threat for the stability of peace. So 
the question that needs to be answered, and that this paper attempts to answer, is: how 
does the transmission of a ‘culture of violence’ take place? In this paper I will explore this 
phenomenon and try to explain its mechanisms and dynamics by focusing on the role of 
youth.  
I choose to focus my attention on youth for several reasons. Firstly because youth 
are the group most deeply affected by exposure to the extreme violence of war to the 
point that violence shapes the system of norms and values that children and young people 
learn to be normal. The literature on the impact of war on children and youth has 
broadened greatly in the past two decades, with a special focus on their psychological 
well-being and on post-traumatic stress disorder syndrome. Children are often depicted as 
passive and vulnerable a priori, and because of this their agency and their role as active 
participants within their environment, both during and after the war, is often missed. This 
paper aims to put youth at the centre of the stage both as recipients and as agents of 
transmission of ideas, values and behaviour. Secondly, I choose to focus on youth 
because they represent the unintentional vehicle of transmission of violence into future 
years as they embody the new and future generation. In fact once the war ends, and 
youth become young adults, they bring their understanding and perception of violence into 
the time of peace, creating a continuum, a bridge between war and peace. This is 

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especially evident in the case of the phenomenon of child soldiers who experience military 
life and military roles at a very early age. As a consequence, after the war, they 
experience serious difficulties in shifting from military roles to civilian roles. These ex-
combatants re-enter society and can exert some level of influence on its members. Third, 
the choice of focusing on youth stems from the fact that in many post-war societies 
children and youth represent a numerically important proportion of society, often above 
50% of it. The aim of this research project is to investigate how youth can function as 
carriers in the process of the transmission of a culture of violence, thus ensuring the 
survival of violence within a post-war society, in an attempt to explain how the 
transmission of a ‘culture of violence’ takes place. 
In general, literature about the process of transmission of violence is scarce. When 
the variable 'youth' is added, then the gap becomes even wider. Each discipline looks at a 
small aspect of it, but a more comprehensive account of the process of transmission of 
violence is hard to find. Psychologists focus on the consequences of trauma and its 
transmission between generations, mainly between parents and their offspring (Leavitt 
and Fox, 1993; Thabet and Vostanis, 1999; Papageorgiou et al., 2000; McIntyre and 
Ventura, 2003; among others), which is rarely shared as a concept by non-Western 
societies and which tell very little about the transmission of violence. Sociologists focus on 
violent behaviour mainly in Western societies and even more specifically on metropolitan 
suburbs which do not share the same traumatic experience of post-war societies (Kendal, 
Murray and Linden, 1997; Côté and Allahar, 1994; Marquardt, 1998 and Carrigan, 1998, 
among others). Nevertheless some interesting insights about peer relations can be drawn 
from these studies.  
Considering the lack of a comprehensive theoretical framework that can account 
for the many aspects of the phenomenon of transmission, I have put together my 
analytical framework through which to analyse the phenomenon.  Using the existing 
literature from various disciplines, I have identified the possible ‘spaces’ in which this 
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transmission can take place. These are four: family, peers, poverty and social groups. 
These ‘spaces’ constitute the analytical framework which acted as a guiding structure 
within which to explore the process at work in a real situation. First, the family (and 
parents in particular) as demonstrated in the experience of Holocaust survivors and their 
offspring. Secondly, peer groups represent a space in which attitudes, beliefs, values and 
norms are created, recreated and transmitted. The third space is to be found in the 
context of poverty, lack of opportunities and marginalisation. The economic and political 
stagnation that often follow long-lasting wars can support the perpetuation of violence as 
the only means of survival. The fourth space is social groups and social identity. As 
explained in the case of Mozambique and South African youth (Errante, 1999) as well as 
in many cases of youth soldiers, the systems of meaning and templates of socialisation 
constructed during the time of war become inextricably part of the way in which youth read 
and understand the world and social relations. In this way violence comes to sit at the 
foundation of youth identity, defining who they are in relation to others and the outside 
world.  
The use of a case study became necessary to scrutinise the validity of the 
identified ‘spaces’ and the way they interact with each other. The case study I will focus 
on in this paper is Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone has experienced a brutal civil war that has 
plagued the country for 10 years. Almost 10 years after the signing of the peace 
agreement, Sierra Leonean society still experiences extremely high levels of violence. 
Children and youth represent the majority of the population and they played a crucial role 
before, during, as well as after, the conflict. For all these reasons, Sierra Leone seemed to 
be a relevant case study within which to apply the analytical framework in the attempt to 
identify the mechanisms of transmission that make violence an ordinary fact of everyday 
life in Sierra Leone. 
Fundamental to this study was the contribution of fieldwork. In fact a simple 
research project based on secondary sources was unable to provide a satisfactory 


explanation of the phenomenon. The very nature of the subject demanded direct research 
in the field in order to prove the validity of the analytical framework and truly account for 
the complexities of the process of transmission. Only through the fieldwork have I been 
able to identify the way violence manifests itself in each of the various ‘spaces’ that 
constitute the analytical framework, as well as the interactions between them, and the way 
they support each other. Through the interviews the picture has acquired a third 
dimension that would have been missed otherwise. Crucial elements that were not part of 
the analytical framework emerged through the interviews conducted during fieldwork, 
adding an unexpected ‘space’ in which the transmission of ideas and behaviours takes 
place. 
The study and analysis carried out for this paper revealed how the transmission of 
violence takes the shape of a system in which youth retain a crucial position. The spaces 
of transmission interact with one another to create a network that can reach all levels of 
Sierra Leonean society. This system can support and perpetuate violence, even in time of 
peace, and the implications for the stability of Sierra Leonean society are extremely 
serious. 
 
The organisation of the paper will reflect the progression of the research project. In 
Chapter One I will discuss the concepts of culture and violence in order to define the idea 
of a ‘culture of violence’ which represents what it is that is transmitted, the object of the 
process of transmission. Considering the lack of consensus about what both culture and 
violence are, it becomes essential to make clear how culture and violence are understood 
in this paper. In Chapter Two the discussion will move to the process of transmission. 
Various disciplines focus on different aspects of this phenomenon and each of them 
conceptualises the transmission of ideas, values and behaviour from a different 
perspective. There is no single comprehensive theory of transmission that includes every 
aspect of the process, nevertheless all the theories discussed in this chapter are relevant 
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to understanding how the transmission takes place. Each perspective on the process 
identifies a ‘space’ in which the transmission takes place. In the belief that the study of this 
phenomenon needs a more integrative approach, the ‘spaces’ identified in this chapter will 
combine to form the analytical framework used to carry out this study. How the analytical 
framework will be utilised is outlined in Chapter Three, together with the rationale behind 
the fieldwork and the research methods that I used on the ground. The fieldwork findings 
need to be understood in the specific context of the recent history of Sierra Leone, hence 
Chapter Four will provide the reader with a background on the country’s history with a 
special focus on the civil war and on the role of youth with regard to the war and to Sierra 
Leonean society in general. Keeping in the background the events of the past two 
decades, Chapter Five will take the reader in today’s Sierra Leone through the voices of 
those who participated in the fieldwork interviews. The fieldwork findings will be reported 
in this chapter without engaging in any sort of discussion on my part. The intention is to 
maintain the voices of the people interviewed as genuinely as possible, letting them 
‘speak’ directly to the reader about their lives, the society, the reality of youth in Sierra 
Leone and the process of transmission of violence. In Chapter Six I will discuss what has 
emerged through the fieldwork, what trends and dynamics were highlighted by the 
interviews and how the analytical framework proved relevant and appropriate to the 
understanding of the process or not. Both chapters Five and Six are structured following 
the ‘spaces’ composing the analytical framework in order to maintain a clear pattern 
throughout the paper. Finally, in the concluding chapter, I will draw some broader 
conclusions about the process of transmission in its entirety, its nature and its 
consequences with regard to the Sierra Leonean case. 
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Chapter 1: A culture of violence 
 
The objective of this thesis is to try to understand how a culture of violence is transmitted, 
with a particular focus on the role of youth in the process. The crucial objective of this first 
chapter is to fix the starting points of the paper and it will do so by defining the object of 
the process of transmission. First of all we need to know what it is that is transmitted. So 
as a point of departure I will aim to answer the question ‘what is a culture of violence?’ 
Thus in this chapter I will discuss the concept of what I call a ‘culture of violence’. It does 
not have a single, fixed interpretation. It is, therefore, necessary to clarify what is meant by 
the phrase ‘culture of violence’ as it sets the foundations upon which the rest of the 
research is based.  
Both culture and violence are highly debated terms and complex ideas. When we 
speak of culture, as well as of violence, we do not refer to monolithic meanings. Attached 
to the words are sets of meanings, which are highly subjective. Culture brings up ideas of 
identity, of belonging, of beliefs and so on. It is a difficult term to define, and it has been 
the subject of heated debates within numerous disciplines. The same can be said for the 
word violence. Violence is not a word with a single clear definition. The concept of 
violence encompasses many and diverse aspects, ways of understanding it, conflicting 
definitions. Violence reaches into various spheres of life and has multiple dimensions. 
Similarly to culture, violence has been at the centre of debates across many different 
disciplines. The two concepts do not belong to one discipline or the other but rather cross 
over among Sociology, Anthropology, International Relations and more. Hence the need 
to clarify the position of the researcher regarding the meanings and definitions of these 
two words. 
The chapter will therefore start with a discussion of the concept of culture, and this 
will be followed by a discussion about what violence is or is not. In the third part, I will 
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attempt a definition of what combination of the two words creates, namely a ‘culture of 
violence’; what this combined concept means and what it entails.  
Special attention will be given to the concept of a ‘culture of violence’ within post-
war settings. In fact post-war societies have specificities of their own as the disruption 
caused by the war creates a context especially vulnerable to the perpetuation of violence, 
as Steenkamp explains “The conflict thus created a culture of violence, which produces a 
socially permissive environment within which the use of violence continues, even though 
violent politics has officially ended” (2005: 254). The high level of violence that post-war 
societies often experience has been widely reported, and more and more studies have 
focused their effort on trying to explain the persistence of violence after the end of a war 
(Borer, Darby and McEvoy-Levy, 2006; Darby, 2001; Steenkamp, 2005; Lumsden, 1997, 
among others).  
Most importantly, the resilience of high levels of violence has also been identified 
as a dangerous destabilising factor for peace processes (Darby, 2006). Scholars of Peace 
and Conflict studies have focused more and more on the problematic survival of high 
levels of violence in post-peace accord societies, identifying in it a cause for the possible 
failure of peacebuilding efforts. Hence the importance of understanding the perpetuation 
and transmission of a culture of violence. However, in this chapter the focus will be limited 
to defining the concept of a ‘culture of violence’. 
 
Defining Culture 
 
The term culture is understood in a variety of ways and from many different perspectives. 
The multifaceted nature of the term culture stems from its intangibility. Culture is not 
something concrete that can be seen with the eyes and explained objectively. As a 
generic definition, culture has been understood as the ensemble of norms, values and 
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beliefs shared by the members of a group or society “as socially inherited, shared, and 
learned ways of living possessed by persons by virtue of their membership in social 
groups” (Avruch, 2002). From this perspective culture does not consist of the symbols, 
the rituals, music, literature or the arts, as often referred to in everyday speech. Distancing 
his understanding from this everyday use of the word culture, Geertz defines it as “not 
cults and costumes but the structures of meaning through which men give shape to their 
experience” (Geertz, 1993: 25). Through a “web of significance” (Geertz, 1993: 5) the 
individual interprets the external world around him/her and relates to it accordingly. This 
web determines the values and norms shared by the community, with which the individual 
needs to comply. Culture is the context, the connective tissue within which social 
behaviours, institutions and social processes are inscribed and thus expressed. The 
individual is immersed in the system of meanings specific to his society every day and as 
a consequence the images, codes and schemas are “deeply internalised and affectively 
loaded” in the individual (Avruch, 1998: 19). Culture is transmitted within a community 
from one generation to the next, it is produced and reproduced “through socialisation and 
sanctioning of deviant behaviour” (Steenkamp, 2005: 245). 
The comprehension of culture as a frame of meanings allows the meanings 
themselves to be accessible and intelligible for the individual (Depkat, 2004). In turn the 
expression and articulation of culture takes place within people’s behaviours and social 
action. In this way culture becomes a cause, a source of motivation for social dynamics. 
“[…] First, culture is a system of meaning that people use to manage their daily worlds, 
large and small; second, culture is the basis of the social and political identity that affects 
how people line up and how they act on a wide range of matters” (Chabal and Daloz, 
2006: 22). It is a two-way process, on one side culture provides those templates of 
meaning that are necessary to the individual to orientate himself within the society, its 
values and norms, and on the other side those same templates are enacted, produced 
and reproduced through people’s behaviour and actions. When this process leads to 


action then it can be said that culture has causal potentiality (Avruch, 1998). For this 
reason culture has always had a main role in political agendas because it holds the 
potentiality to drive people into action. 
Culture can be considered a map of the world constituted by images and schemas. 
“Mental maps actually produce entities like nation-state and notions of the other; […] As 
such a system of meaning, culture refers to a complex circle: a community produces 
certain perceptions and imaginations about the self and the other, and in turn, these 
perceptions and imaginations produce and sustain these ‘imagined communities’” (Depkat, 
2004: 179). This map is the means through which individuals translate the external world 
and make sense of it. Since maps of the worlds are socially constructed they become the 
expression of the differences between different communities. Through these culturally 
constructed maps the individual organises the data and the perception of the world but 
also determines accepted behaviours and attitudes within the social system, what is right 
and what is wrong.  It should be noted that culture is not fixed and timeless. Culture is 
highly dynamic as it is not only received by the individual and passively learned but it is 
changed through the individual’s performance of it. Since culture is bound to the 
individual’s experience of the world then it is to be expected that it will adapt to the 
situation and the environment in which the individual enacts it, or as Avruch has put it, 
“Culture, the ‘derivative of experience’, is rooted deeply in ongoing or past social practices. 
This means (contrary to the reified or stable or homogeneous view of culture) that culture 
is to some extent always situational, flexible, and responsive to the exigencies of the 
worlds that individuals confront” (1998: 20).  
Crucial to the understanding of the way in which violence survives in post-conflict 
societies is the link between culture and identity. In fact culture is strongly involved in the 
creation of a sense of identity. Avruch considers culture and identity are linked in two 
ways:  


“Culture is connected to identity in two main ways. First, culture makes available 
a reservoir of shared symbols able to constitute collective or group identity. 
Secondly, because many of these symbols are invested with great affect or 
emotion, and since membership in certain groups is emotionally binding for 
individuals, such collective identity anchors individual identity. Culture, in short, 
links individual and collective identities, at the same time defining potential 
boundaries between social groups.” (Avruch, 2002) 
 
The individual recognises him/herself in the norms and values sustaining the societal 
system he/she operates in, conforms his/her behaviour to them and defines categories 
such as what is right and wrong, normal and deviant. Through this structure of meanings 
the individual identifies him/herself with the community in which those same norms and 
values are shared, building his/her sense of identity. Vayrynen too described this link 
between culture and identity: “The identity of a person is created through the social groups 
and in accordance with the cultural patterns which prevail in the groups the person 
belongs to” (2001, 110). If during armed conflict systems of meanings are constructed 
within a highly violent environment, these templates will most likely be shaped by the 
reality of war and will account accordingly for the presence of violence in the everyday life. 
These templates of meaning that emerged during war time will represent the source of 
identity for the individual. It follows that not only is a ‘culture of violence’ created during the 
time of conflict and maintained after the end of it, but also that it becomes the social 
environment in which identity is created. This dynamic allows us to understand how deep 
and internalised violence can become. In the case of youth it becomes evident that this 
process can have a major impact on their sense of identity, especially when their identity 
is formed in times of extreme violence. However identities, as well as culture, are not fixed. 
On the contrary they are constructed and reconstructed, renegotiated and changed over 
time. Therefore, what needs to be understood is how the perception and understanding of 
violence is transformed, accepted and reproduced or rejected and substituted by the 
young members of society in the years following the peace agreements.  


Chabal and Daloz in their Culture Troubles stress the tight bond between culture 
and the political sphere to the extent of considering culture “the coordinates, the mapping, 
or the very blueprint of politics” (2006: 21). In their study, culture is considered 
foundational to the social system and discourse not only synchronically, but also in the 
long term (diachronically) as culture is an environment in constant movement and 
evolution. Culture formation is not static, but a fluid evolutionary process of society. 
Considering the crucial role that culture plays in the life of the individual and of 
society, especially with regard to the formation of values and norms that regulate 
accepted and deviant behaviours and attitudes, it becomes necessary to understand how 
culture is influenced by the reality of war, armed conflict and prolonged and extreme 
violence. The persistent exposure to high levels of violence is likely to have a deep impact 
on a societal system of meanings and structure. Hence it is vital to understand this impact 
and its consequences for the transition of a society from war to peace. 
 
Violence in post-peace accord societies 
 
As pointed out in the introduction, the question that needs to be addressed is how high 
levels of violence survive in society even after a peace accord is signed. In this thesis I 
explore how this happens, that is how violence survives in post-war societies through the 
process of transmission of ideas, values, norms and beliefs that support and accept 
violent attitudes and behaviours. In the same way that culture as a concept was discussed 
in the previous section, in this section I will proceed by discussing the concept of violence. 
Like the concept of culture, violence too has multiple dimensions depending on the 
context and who is defining it. It is both a specific term used by scholars to describe 
specific phenomena and a word used in every day speech with many different nuances.  


Bufacchi identifies two main kinds of violence within the philosophical debate about 
what violence is, namely violence as excessive force and violence as violation (2005: 197). 
Defining violence as the use and abuse of physical force to intentionally harm somebody 
is a rather limited approach to the study of violence as it “misses out on too many other 
important dimensions of the phenomenon of violence” (Buffacchi, 2005: 197), for example 
on the psychological dimension of violence, the structural, or the institutional dimension 
which all can be more pervasive and devastating than physical violence. On the other 
hand Bufacchi warns that the use of a broader understanding of the concept of violence 
seen generically as a physical or psychological violation “offer only a more obscure and 
less precise definition of violence” (2005: 198). The conclusion of Bufacchi’s paper is that 
there is no agreement among scholars on a single definition of violence and what 
accounts as violence and what does not. 
Others have divided violence into direct and indirect violence. Galtung 
differentiates between these two categories of violence in his paper ‘Violence, Peace, and 
Peace Research’ (1969). If direct violence consists of one person harming another, which 
is a rather immediate and obvious description of violence, indirect violence is much more 
subtle and dangerous as it is often hard to detect. In Galtung’s categorisation, indirect 
violence can be structural or cultural. Both are vicious dimensions of violence as they are 
deeply embedded in a society’s structure and culture. A clear description of structural 
violence is given by Du Nann Winter and Leighton:  
“Structural violence, however, is almost always invisible, embedded in 
ubiquitous social structures, normalised by stable institutions and regular 
experience. Structural violence occurs whenever people are disadvantaged by 
political, legal, economic, or cultural traditions. Because they are longstanding, 
structural inequities usually seem ordinary – the way things have always been. 
But structural violence produces suffering and death as often as direct violence 
does, though the damage is slower, more subtle, more common, and more 
difficult to repair” (2001: 159). 
 


The effects of structural violence are more damaging to the social fabric and human well-
being than is direct violence. Also, this dimension of violence goes unnoticed and 
therefore lasts for long periods of time. However, the systematic exclusion of a certain 
group from resources, education, or politics, and the inequalities experienced by a certain 
group, tend to slowly wear out the capacity of that group to accept exclusion and 
inequalities, which often leads it to resort to direct violence to escape a no longer tolerable 
status quo.  
 The next level of violence that Galtung identifies is cultural violence. This 
dimension of violence refers to those elements of culture that “legitimise and justify 
structural and direct violence” (Galtung, 1990: 291). Through cultural violence direct and 
structural violence become acceptable, even normal to members of society and also to 
the victims of the violence. Violence is internalised by members of society. Violence is 
made invisible, so embedded in the structures of society and in the way things work that it 
is not perceived as violence at all. According to Galtung cultural violence provides the 
nourishment, the fuel for structural and direct violence. He also points out how the 
combination of cultural and structural violence creates the environment for direct violence 
to erupt in the effort of breaking the cycle. But then the cycles of violence starts again 
(Galtung, 1990). Since culture provides the templates of meaning that are necessary to 
the individual to orientate himself within the society, its values and norms, when the 
templates themselves contain elements that justify and legitimise violence, as the concept 
of cultural violence suggests, they become entrenched in the very systems of meanings 
through which the individual understand the world and his own existence in it.  
This classification of the different dimensions of violence reflects a broad 
understanding of what to consider constitutes violence. For the purposes of this paper 
violence will be considered in a broad sense, as the very concept of a ‘culture of violence’ 
implies more than simply direct violence; instead it refers to a more complex and 
multilayered phenomenon in line with the categorisation outlined by Galtung. 


Violence can also be categorised by the point of view of who experiences the 
violence, namely perpetrators or victims. The perceptions of the two groups about what 
constitutes an act of violence and what doesn’t are clearly diametrically opposite. Often 
perpetrators do not perceive their action as violent and they would not call themselves 
perpetrators, instead they might consider themselves as victims in the first place which in 
turns legitimises their actions (Eller, 2006). Also perpetrators tend to either minimise the 
nature of their actions and the impact of them on the victims or de-value the victims’ 
humanity. Hence there are no neutral or objective perspectives on violence since victims, 
perpetrators and observers would interpret the event through their personal set of 
meanings and evaluation (Schroder and Schmidt, 2001). From this perspective violence is 
a “social construction” in that “people have their reasons for their actions, which are not 
abstract or purely conceptual; that these actors are at least partially aware of their actions 
and their reasons; and that the entire context of the violent episode must be considered in 
a full and useful account of the violence” (Eller, 2006: 13). The social and cultural context 
in which violence occurs is vital to the understanding of violence itself. 
Post-war societies represent one of the many contexts in which violence has been 
studied.  As many scholars have pointed out, the end of direct fighting and the signing of a 
peace accord does not signify the disappearance of violence (Borer, Darby and McEvoy-
Levy, 2006; Steenkamp, 2005; Darby, 2006). The attention of scholars of International 
Relations, Political Science and Peace and Conflict studies focused on the different faces 
of violence in post-accord society derives from the acknowledgement that the persistence 
of violence can undermine the stability of the peace process and put at risk the 
peacebuilding effort which follows the peace agreement. For this very reason, numerous 
research studies have investigated the continuum of violence that characterises post-
accord societies and the impact of the persistence of violence on the stability of the peace 
accord, its implementation and success. Particular attention has been paid to how 
peacebuilding projects should reflect the resilience of violence within society, aiming 
specifically to create policies that address violence in its different shapes and within the 


various sectors of society. What has been underlined is the threat that violence can 
represent, and did represent, to the sustainability of the peace accord. In fact the 
persistence of violence within society has led in some cases to the resumption of fighting 
and of a state of war.  
In a society that has experienced war, disruption, displacement and disintegration 
of its own structures and institutions, violence tends to take the form of what is defined as 
‘cycles of violence’ (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004). Scholars have concentrated 
on understanding and analysing the persistence of violence in order to improve peace 
building strategies and policies and ultimately to try to avoid the creation of ‘cycles of 
violence’. The focus, therefore, has been put on “the larger project of national 
rehabilitation, constructing a sustainable peace by addressing cultural violence (beliefs 
and values that support and sustain or justify violence) and structural violence (such as 
poverty, discrimination, and institutionalized inequality) as well as preventing a return to 
direct violence (immediate physical harm)” (McEvoy-Levy, 2001: 89).  
Steenkamp tried to map the factors that play a major role in the support of violent 
behaviour in order to explain the continuation of violence (2005). In her study she 
highlighted factors in support of violence at many different levels from the macro 
(international), to micro (individual), but at the same time she recognised as the main 
dynamic at work the “impact of violent conflict on the norms and values of society” (2005: 
253). The crucial point of her study is the recognition of the shaping power that violence 
has on the norms and values shared within a society, to the point that violence becomes 
widely tolerated. The system of norms and values that is created through and by violence 
during the time of conflict is referred to by Steenkamp as a ‘culture of violence’ (2005: 
254). However, if on one hand adults are more likely to have known and lived in a pre-
conflict environment where norms and the values system were not influenced by violence, 
and therefore can more easily return to those societal structures and system of behaviour, 
on the other hand the question is how much a ‘culture of violence’ will be perpetrated and 


transmitted by youth and children who have grown up during the conflict and have no 
experience outside war. 
Steenkamp’s understanding of the impact of violence on the values and norms of 
society represents the foundation on which this paper’s approach stands. Given the 
complexity and multidimensionality of violence a broad understanding of the term should 
be adopted in order to grasp as many aspects of the reality and dynamics of violence as 
possible. In particular Galtung’s categorisation of violence will represent the underpinnings 
of how violence is understood. In this paper violence will be considered not only in its 
physical dimensions but also in its social, structural and cultural aspects because, as 
Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois put it, “The social and cultural dimensions of violence are 
what give violence its power and meaning” (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois, 2004: 1). 
During the fieldwork various examples of the different dimensions of violence in the 
context of Sierra Leone have emerged: examples of direct violence such as robberies, 
rape, murders. Structural violence can be found in the corruption of the justice system, in 
the barriers of access to health treatment and education and in the inequalities between 
men and women as well as between the elders and the younger generations. The belief in 
initiation rituals to secret societies as compulsory rite of passage for the youth is an 
example of how cultural violence justifies and legitimises violent practices and behaviours. 
 
Conclusions: a culture of violence 
 
As discussed in the first section of this chapter, in this paper culture is understood as the 
values, norms, beliefs and behaviours constituting the system of meaning of a given 
society or group which are learned, shared, produced and reproduced. Following the 
discussion on the various types of violence, violence is here understood broadly as direct 
violence but also and foremost as structural and cultural violence. Moreover the 


understanding that violence exercises a deep influence on society represents the 
foundation of this paper’s approach to violence. From the combination of the two terms 
the meaning of the expression  ‘culture of violence’ is derived, and is understood here as 
the phenomenon that sees violence becoming embedded in the values, norms and 
behaviours of a group or society. A ‘culture of violence’ refers to “the system of norms, 
values or attitudes which allow, make possible or even stimulate the use of violence to 
resolve any conflict or relation with another person” (Cruz quoted in Steenkamp, 2005: 
254).  
Through the use of this concept, I want to put the focus on the normalisation of 
violence and its acceptability in the everyday functioning of a community. Violence is in 
this way not perceived as violence any more, and simply becomes part of the everyday 
experience of the individual within the society. During violent conflict, violence is 
normalised through a continuous, daily exposure to it, to the point of being accepted or 
even expected. This process of normalisation is not only passively received by the 
members of society but, on the contrary, it is acted, created, transformed and transmitted 
by them. Once normalised, the violence-based behavioural system becomes so 
internalised as to be acted upon and reproduced automatically, ensuring its lasting long 
after war has officially ended. Thus, as Waldmann has pointed out in his work on a 
‘culture of violence’ in Colombia 
“To find out something about how they [the facts of violence] are supported 
and embedded in a culture, we are well advised to pay less attention to 
statements that refer directly to coercion and violence, and more to exploring 
the conceptual and ideological settings in which they are made. There is in 
fact a general sociological argument supporting this more indirect approach. 
Sociological system theorists realized quite early that a society’s central value 
and norm orientations are by no means continuously emphasized. Rather, 
they tend to be mentioned in passing precisely because they are 
unquestioned matters of course.” (Waldmann, 2007: 595) 
 
 War is a devastating event for any society at all levels of its structures. The main 
impact of war on the individuals as well as on the society is represented by the effects of 
the extreme violence and the long exposure to it experienced during the years of fighting. 


There is a continuum between the violence of the war and the violence of peace after war. 
Violence enters socialisation dynamics and becomes entrenched in the individual’s 
understanding of self, the other and the world. However, as culture is learned and 
therefore ‘taught’, a culture of violence is ‘taught’ or rather transmitted too, especially to 
the new generations, and in this way it persists as part of the system of meanings shared 
by the community. In the next chapter I will explore the process of transmission in relation 
to youth in order to identify how a ‘culture of violence’ makes its way into peace time and 
remains a main feature of post-accord societies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

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Chapter 2: Youth and the transmission of violence 
 
The impact of war on children is particularly devastating in the modern warfare because of 
the increasingly blurred boundaries between combatants and civilians. Children are 
displaced, separated from their families, they are psychologically and physically wounded.  
They are abducted as fighters and become directly involved in armed struggles, they are 
killed and raped and abused. Children and youth in modern conflicts are both victims and 
perpetrators, but they can adopt coping mechanisms. In general, exposure to the extreme 
violence of war and armed conflict is responsible for the internalisation of a ‘culture of 
violence’ (Machel, 2003: 82) so that “Images and practices of violence among both 
perpetrators and victims (especially when young) become part of a new habitus of 
violence – an internalised mental response pattern anchored in behavioural routines – and 
also a template in the collective memory of a society” (Abbink, 2005: 18). But what 
happens to that ‘culture of violence’ internalised during the war when the fighting ceases? 
When and how do values, attitudes and forms of behaviour based on the normalisation of 
violence and aggression survive in the society under reconstruction? Is a ‘culture of 
violence’ transmitted by those children and youth who experienced the war, and if yes, 
how? 
Exhaustive answers to the above questions have yet to be given as the existing 
studies and analysis carried out in various disciplines rarely focus on these issues 
(McCough, 2009). Nevertheless in this chapter I will try to delineate how the studies of 
youth and of the transmission of culture have been assessed so far in various disciplines, 
in order to lay the foundations for further analysis of the process of transmission of a 
culture of violence in post-war societies. First of all it is necessary to clarify what is meant 
by youth, the definition of which is rather controversial and on which there is little 
agreement among scholars or policy makers. In the second part of the chapter the 
different approaches to the study of youth and of the process of transmission are 


delineated in order to identify the base for the analytical framework that will be applied 
during the field research.  
 
Defining ‘youth’ 
 
The category ‘youth’ has been defined in a myriad of ways. The United Nations at the 
celebration of the Year of the Youth (1985) defined youth as being between 15 and 25 
years of age (Tyyska, 2005). In Western cultures youth is a rather flexible concept but is 
mainly defined by age. However, in other cultures such as many in Africa and in other 
countries of the ‘southern hemisphere’ the age-boundary is less applicable and instead 
the discriminatory factors are social and economic, as well as cultural. Also, it is 
necessary to bear in mind that the population in many developing countries is composed 
in certain cases of up to 65% of children and young people. In sub-Saharan Africa, out of 
a population of 500 million, half the people are under the age of 15 (Olawale and Alao, 
2007: 6). The tendency is to define youth according to ‘social status’ rather than age. In 
particular, the dependency of the individual upon parents or family members for material 
support is the main factor applied (Kostelny, 2006). Some researchers approach the 
concept of youth as a socially constructed one that depends on the historical, cultural and 
political milieu. From this perspective the meaning attributed to the different stages of life 
are culturally-specific, so that the idea of childhood and youth as a happy and care-free 
stage of life is strongly rejected outside Western societies (Wyn and White, 1997; De 
Boeck and Honwana, 2005; Barber, 2009).  
The notion of youth can also be understood as the process of transition from 
childhood to adulthood in which it is not simply the age that changes but the role, 
responsibilities and social status that change. In the Western countries adulthood tends to 
be postponed in modern times by the prolongation of education and the consequent 

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financial dependence of young people on parents and family. This phenomenon is 
reversed in many developing countries. In these instances education is lacking and much 
shorter in duration, mainly due to poor conditions and the incapacity of the family and the 
state to support children through school (Abbink, 2005). In conditions of extreme poverty 
children also represent a source of economic support through child labour, so that many 
children are compelled to interrupt education and start working. In these conditions 
children enter a more mature stage of life very early (Kostelny, 2006). But poverty is not 
the only factor that precipitates adulthood. War and armed conflict have similar 
consequences. “In Africa there are many such people who have had to delay their entry 
into adulthood: they feel excluded and powerless and struggle to survive” (Abbink, 2005: 
6). When parents and other adult family figures are missing because killed or because of 
displacement, children may find themselves to be the carer for their younger brothers and 
sisters (De Boeck and Honwana, 2005). Education may be suspended in time of war and 
if children cannot access schools any more, this creates a halt in the child’s life, childhood 
is put on hold. After the end of the violent conflict many young people, who have had the 
responsibilities and roles of adults during the war, re-enter the school system and the 
return to school puts them back into the category of children/youth (McIntyre, 2005). The 
result is that when talking about youth in Africa, individuals aged up to the mid-thirties are 
included in the category because of unfinished education, unemployment, or inability to 
raise a family. Therefore a youth in Africa can be considered to be an individual whose 
age lies between 14 and 35 years. Up to 14 years of age, people are considered children 
because they are still dependent on others for subsistence; once one has reached 35 
years old, one is expected to have already started a family and to have a stable job that 
ensures a certain social status (Abbink, 2005). So family, employment or the completion 
of a cultural rite of passage are the major factors that define a person as a youth or not, 
both for males and females. In this system marriage, or entering the work force, can 
represent rites of passage for young people, so that a young 14 year old girl who gets 
married is not considered a child or a youth anymore, while a 30 year old unemployed 

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single man is still called a youth and is treated as such (Kostelny, 2006). In the specific 
case of post-war Sierra Leone the government defined youth as being between the ages 
of 15 and 35 because of the delay caused by the war (National Youth Policy, 2003). 
Youth are also often stereotyped as a category, usually as troublemakers or as 
peacemakers, as the problem or, less often and naively, the solution for the future of the 
society (Olawale and Alao, 2007). This dichotomy prevents a realistic understanding of 
the category of youth. As troublemakers, youth are often depicted and perceived as prone 
to violence and aggression. However they are not only a source of potential instability but 
they can be an asset for the development of post-war societies. The black and white view 
of youth essentially obfuscates their agency as it pictures them as passive recipients, 
easily manipulated in a world ruled by adults. Whether participating in guerrilla 
movements or in grassroots peacebuilding projects, it is important to recognise their 
agency in trying to find their own course in the society and environment they live in; and 
by participating in it, they concur to shape, negotiate, produce and reproduce its meanings, 
values, norms and identities (McEvoy-Levy, 2006).  
 
 Transmission of a ‘culture of violence’  
 
The impact of war on societies is not only the disruption of existing societal systems and 
structures. From the annihilation of the fabric of society, war derives space for the 
negotiation and creation of new social systems and structures (Boas, 2007). As outlined in 
the previous chapter, when a society experiences protracted violence and war, the traces 
of that experience can survive within the norms, values and beliefs that constitute the 
cultural system of the society. This set of norms and values that has been created during 
the time of conflict as survival strategies are kept alive even after the official end of the 
violent conflict by the transmission and reproduction that naturally take place within a 

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society. However, the transmission of norms, practices and culture does not have a single 
locus and means. Among whom this process of transmission takes place is an extremely 
important aspect. Values and norms can be passed from one generation to the next one 
as for example from parents to their children. The other main space for the reproduction 
and production of practices and ideas is among peers. Youth socialise with each other in 
schools, sport centres, leisure centres, in the neighbourhood and so on. 
There are also more practical aspects to take into consideration when looking at 
the perpetuation of violent behaviour in post-war societies. One is the economic and 
survival aspect, or more specifically the role of poverty in the reproduction of violent 
behaviours. Studies have demonstrated how a lack of job opportunities, education and 
access to basic services can be the reason why many youth keep engaging in illegal 
activities and petty crimes to provide for themselves and their families what is necessary 
for survival (Patterson, 1991; Kramer, 2000; Lederman et al., 2002; Mac Ginty, 2006). 
Urdal points out how “historically, the coincidence of youth bulges with rapid urbanisation, 
especially in the context of unemployment and poverty, has been an important contributor 
to political violence” (2006: 613). Most post-war societies are characterised by extreme 
levels of poverty. War disrupts formal and informal economies, damages infrastructures 
and leaves the country dependent upon foreign aid. The collapse of the state during a 
period of violent conflict limits the capacity of a country to restore a functioning economy. 
Poverty also means lack of education and unemployment, which in turn result in 
marginalisation and exclusion of large parts of the population, especially vulnerable 
groups such as children, youth and women. During war families are displaced, parents 
can be divided from their children, or parents can be wounded or killed, and in both cases 
they are no longer able to provide for their children. The traditional social safety nets are 
destroyed by war and as a consequence children and youth often become the bread 
winner of the household supporting not only themselves but brothers and sisters too. To 
ensure their own daily survival, they find coping mechanisms and often resort to direct or 
indirect violence to obtain what is needed. Stealing, robbing, smuggling and pick-

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pocketing are among the activities in which youth engage to provide for themselves and 
sometimes also for their families. Poverty is indeed a relevant element in the study of the 
perpetuation of violence and describes a part of the reality of violence in post-war 
societies but, per se it does not explain the magnitude of the phenomenon. 
The study of youth in post-war environments has been covered more in-depth in 
academic research and international institutions and governments only fairly recently 
(McIntyre  and Ventura, 2003). Previous and current research on youth has been mainly 
carried out within the discipline of sociology and psychology. In both disciplines the focus 
was respectively on deviant and pathological youth, mainly located in the industrialised 
world and, more specifically, in urban suburbs. Tyyska tried to put order into the numerous 
theories of youth developed in the past fifty years (2005). As Tyyska (2005) pointed out, 
an important group of theories concerning youth is represented by ‘conservative theories’ 
which focus mainly on issues of conformity, i.e. how youth are prepared and educated to 
play their social role within the social environment and to productively function in it. This 
umbrella of theories is also defined as functionalist, and it has influenced most of theories 
of youth in the twentieth century (Tyyska, 2005: 5). Within this group of theories scholars 
have focused on two different loci of socialisation. Some concentrated on the socialisation 
mechanisms that take place within the structure of the family (Parsons, 1956 quoted in 
Jones and Wallace, 1992) while others put at the core of their studies a ‘secondary 
socialisation’ which instead takes place through other institutions such as schools and 
more generally among peers (Mannheim, 1952 cited in Tyyska, 2005). This second group 
of scholars identified in the peer groups and in the socialisation dynamics among peers a 
crucial space for the transmission of values, attitudes and behaviours. Both the variants of 
functionalist theories look mainly at how to control destructive tendencies in youth and 
their delinquent forms of behaviour.  
Critical theories about youth, on the other hand, concentrate on the 
disempowerment that youth experiences in Western societies. According to these theories, 

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the very system of society is adult-oriented and leaves youth in a secondary and 
marginalised position in which their economic and political rights are negated (Marquardt, 
1998 and Carrigan, 1998). The most prominent approach within Critical theories is the 
Marxist approach or political economy approach (Wulff, 1995). This group of scholars 
focused their studies on working-class youth and their politicisation. The age stratification 
theories that evolve from this economic approach look at how the various age strata are 
exploited and marginalised in industrialised societies. In this context peer groups are seen 
as the means of escape from conformity and from those figures who represent it, e.g. 
adults in general, parents and authority figures. Peers become the space which provides 
freedom for developing and sharing an alternative set of values and norms of behaviours 
and attitudes (Kendal, Murray and Linden, 1997; Côté and Allahar, 1994). The focus is 
shifted in order to shed light upon youth subcultures and the importance of understanding 
them both as rebellious manifestations and as a reflection of the dominant/adult-led social 
system. In this vision of youth subcultures, young people are considered as active agents 
instead of mere passive recipients.  
In the last two decades, parallel to the theories developed in the ‘North’, critical 
theories have been emerging from the developing countries of the ‘South’. The first 
critique formulated by these scholars is directed to the idea, dominant in the European 
and North American sociological tradition, of uniformity of the stage of transition between 
childhood and adulthood. Scholars pointed out, for example, how in many ways the stage 
of life called youth is much less complicated and how it seems to be burdened with fewer 
difficulties than other life stages (Jones and Wallace, 1992; Sharp, 2002). These scholars 
have highlighted how colonisation had disrupted the traditional age categories of pre-
colonial Africa for instance. The changes that occurred inside African societies due forces 
resulting from colonisation have greatly affected young people’s roles within society. 
During the colonial era, the dynamics of exclusion of local populations and marginalisation 
created a generation of young men which was referred to by the colonial rulers as the 
‘youth’, identifying in this way youth with the young male population and with those 

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members of society who were emerging as the driving force toward independence (De 
Waal, 2002). Aggravated by poverty, marginalisation, exclusion and disempowerment, as 
family structures and social systems were annihilated, young people found themselves 
caught in between incompatible sets of values and norms. These dynamics have 
continued into the present, escalating and leading to resentment, frustration, violence and 
too often to armed conflict (Argenti, 2002; Everatt, 2001).  
 
All the aforementioned theories explore that stage of human life that is commonly 
referred to as youth. However, little has been said in these theories about the particular 
reality of those youth who have experienced the trauma of war or who have been long 
exposed to extreme political violence.  
Events such as war and armed conflict leave profound wounds in society as a 
whole and in its single members as well. Children and youth are even more vulnerable to 
exposure to the brutalities and atrocities of war, and the consequences of this exposure 
have been the focus of studies and research carried out in great part within the discipline 
of psychology (Leavitt and Fox, 1993; Thabet and Vostanis, 1999; Papageorgiou et al., 
2000; McIntyre and Ventura, 2003; among others). The concept of trauma and its 
consequences was principally the concern of psychologists. In particular the aftermath of 
war for children and youth was looked at through the lens of mental health and especially 
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), in short in pathological ways. Numerous studies 
have been conducted in post-war countries in an attempt to map the symptoms of PTSD 
and its incidence within the young members of the society (Argenti and Schramm, 2010). 
This approach to the effects of war on children has its limitations. In the first place 
concepts developed within Western psychology are often not applicable to societies that 
share little or nothing with Western concepts of mental health and mental illness; at the 
same time a lot can be missed or left out when the cultural specificities of the community 
under study are ignored (Wessells and Kostelny, 2009). Also this approach tends to 

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atomise the problem, separating each individual and his/her experience from the larger 
social and cultural environment and “a focus on trauma can marginalise other effects of 
war such as mistrust, hopelessness, social exclusion, and the current stresses of daily 
life” (Kostelny, 2006: 22). 
The work of psychologists and psychiatrists has also given important insights into 
the transmission of such traumas from one generation to the next, mainly within the 
context of the parent-child relationship. The majority of these studies on the 
intergenerational transmission of trauma have been conducted on Holocaust survivors 
and their offspring (Klein, 1971; Freyberg, 1980; Berger, 1988; Rowland-klein and Dunlop, 
1997; among others). Although the focus has been maintained on PTSD pathologies, 
nevertheless important results have been achieved in understanding the conscious, as 
well as unconscious, mechanisms of transmission and its repercussions on the so-called 
‘second generation’ (Rowland-Klein and Dunlop, 1997). These studies show how the 
children of Holocaust survivors tend to identify themselves with their parents’ experience 
and tend to become the vehicles for the parents’ healing process. This inhibits the 
independence of the offspring and creates a strong sense of identity centred in the 
parents’ traumatic past (e.g. Auerhahn and Laub, 1998; Feltsen, 1998). 
An alternative approach to the impact of war exposure on youth is that deriving 
from the aggressive behaviour tradition, as discussed by Punamaki in her work on “the 
link between exposure to war violence and the potential development of antisocial and 
aggressive behaviour” (2009: 62). This perspective is founded on the link between 
exposure to violence and aggressive behaviour as evidenced in the numerous studies on 
children who have experienced community and domestic violence (Jaffe, Wolfe and 
Wilson, 1990; Garbarino, Dubrow, Kostelny and Pardo, 1992; Garbarino, 1995). 
According to these models of aggression, aggressive behaviour is socially learned and 
“there is an increased risk for aggression because in crime-intensive environments 
children learn violent behaviour by modelling and imitating others” (Punamaki, 2009: 63). 

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This approach has led to the labelling of youth as a ‘lost generation’ in various post-war 
situations due to the rather deterministic nature of the behavioural model of aggression 
itself. Researchers have demonstrated how the link between violence and aggressive 
behaviour is highly person and situation specific, and defies generalisation (e.g. Schwartz 
and Proctor, 2000). Putamaki, recognising the limits of the social learning approach to 
aggression, points out how the processes involved in the impact of violence exposure on 
youth are multiple and include the cognitive, emotional, and psycho-physiological realms, 
and also external factors such as the family, political ideologies and social environment. In 
developing a framework to analyse the link between exposure to violence and aggression 
behaviour in war environments she stresses the need for an integrative approach that 
accounts for the complexity of the factors that influence youth. However, her framework 
leaves out elements of identity and culture and does not explain the dynamics and 
mechanisms through which violence becomes normalised and therefore embedded in the 
societal, and consequently youth’s, behavioural codes, norms and practices. Thus the 
question that remains unanswered is how violent practices, norms and values are 
transmitted, ensuring their survival within a society and creating the ground for potential 
future instability.  
In his work on the transmission across generations of the experience of war and 
violence, Prager calls for a marriage between psychoanalysis on one side and sociology 
on the other, with the former accounting for the experiential side of the issue and the latter 
accounting for the collective/institutional side (Prager, 2003). From the psychoanalytic 
side, he draws on the studies of the transmission of the traumatic experience of the 
Holocaust from the survivors to their children that have been described above. From the 
sociology side he draws on the theories of generational transmission as developed by 
Mannheim. According to Mannheim’s theory, a generation does not occupy exclusively a 
time span but also a specific space and position within society (1928). The element 
‘generation’ becomes in his analysis crucial to change and as a source of social 
dynamism. Following this concept then, the process of transmission of the traumatic 

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experience of violence from one generation to the next, as in the example of the 
Holocaust survivors, obliterates the difference between the two generations. This results 
in the loss of the natural generational dynamics within the society in what Prager calls 
“lost childhood and lost generations” (2003: 174), as the experiences of one generation 
become those of the following, “Trauma thus deprives the collectivity a critical resource of 
social and cultural renewal” (2003: 176). The idea that the family occupies a central 
position in the well-being of children and youth is reflected in many international 
conventions (e.g. the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989). Most 
often policy papers stress the role of family in protecting and nurturing children, especially 
for those children experiencing war and armed conflict. This vision though of dependency 
and vulnerability of children has implications for the policies put in place by international 
and humanitarian institutions (Ager, 2006). Ager, instead, calls for the recognition of the 
“plurality of socialising forces in the lives of children”, especially in the context of war and 
armed conflict (2006: 42). The design of projects directed to children and youth needs to 
take this multiplicity of sources of influence and the children’s agency into account if they 
want to be effective. 
Parents and the family are not the only space of transmission of norms, values and 
beliefs. The influence of peers on youth seems to be as important (Espelage, Holt and 
Henkel, 2003). During the time of adolescence in particular meaning and belief systems 
are formed and in this phase of development, the environment the child or youth lives in 
plays a central role. If during the early stages of the life of the individual the principal 
source of influence is represented by the parents and the family which guides the child in 
the first phase of development, once children enter adolescence the influence of, and 
exposure to, external sources and especially to peers, increase (Winstok and Perkis, 
2008). 
Studies on peer influence in youth have been mainly focused on deviant behaviour, 
delinquency, alcohol or drug abuse and antisocial behaviour. Again the space of 

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observation of youth behaviour and attitudes has been largely inside Western society and 
in suburbs of large metropolitan areas (e.g. Bauman and Ennett, 1994; Kupersmidt, 
Burchinal and Patterson, 1995; Kiesner, Cadinu, Poulin and Bucci 2002). Nevertheless it 
is useful to keep in mind some concepts developed by sociologists regarding the influence 
of peers among youth: homophily and socialisation seem to be the prevalent ones at work 
in youth dynamics. Homophily refers to the phenomenon by which “social contact occurs 
at a higher rate among similar individuals than among dissimilar individuals” (Prinstein and 
Dodge, 2008: 4). Socialisation refers to the mechanism of acquisition of the values, norms, 
attitudes and behaviours of the community by the child. This process provides the child 
with the ‘cognitive and socialisation templates’ that the child will use to interact with the 
world (Ross, 1993).  
These are not the only concepts applied to peer influence among youth. In his 
study on peer influence in adolescent socialisation, Campbell draws from Festinger 
theories about peer groups. Fenstinger developed a two factor theory of peer groups’ 
influence. The first important factor is ‘group attractiveness or valence’ (Campbell, 1980: 
325). This factor aims to explain the function that the group performs for the individual, i.e. 
the affirmation through the group of his/her identity. The second important factor is known 
as ‘means control’ which can be explained as “the ability [of the peer group] to mediate 
goals which are important to its members through the mechanisms of applause, shame, or 
the withholding of social status or goods” (ibid.).  
The experience of war and armed conflict has an immense impact on the whole 
population that lives through its tragedy. Therefore the variables that affect the 
development and life of children and youth differ from those of more peaceful societies. 
How does the experience of war and extreme violence weigh on youth development, 
values and meanings systems, beliefs, and consequently on attitudes and behaviours? 
Studies that have explored these topics are still scarce; therefore it is not easy to find an 
answer to these questions.  


Are socialisation, homophily, group attractiveness and means control still the most 
relevant factors through which we can analyse the realities of youth in post-war settings?  
The study of youth in Mozambique and South Africa conducted by Antoinette Errante 
(1999) attempts to answer this question by using the concept of socialisation to analyse 
the impact of war on youth tendencies toward both aggression and peace. Her analysis of 
youth through the lens of socialisation theory reveals how the context of violence and war 
creates templates of socialisation based on vilification and dehumanisation of the outsider 
and violent responses to conflict. The templates created by children and youth during the 
time of war survive after the end of fighting and define the way in which youth interact and 
read the world around them and experience human relations. This is possible because, in 
general, templates that were formed during war time tend to elevate those values, norms 
and forms of behaviour that dignify aggression and violence. The survival of a 
socialisation for aggression is possible because during a protracted armed conflict the 
social bond and social capital of the community is broken down, resulting in a lack of 
sources for the guidance and protection of children and youth.  
She concludes by pointing out how the violence persisting after peace accords is 
often considered by policy-makers as an inevitable consequence of the social and 
economic conditions following the armed conflict. However, this attitude ignores 
completely the link between socialisation patterns of aggression and the protracted 
exposure to armed conflict, and consequently leaves the issue completely unaddressed. 
In this way patterns of socialisation of aggression undermine the construction of much-
needed socialisation patterns for peace, putting the stability of the whole peace process at 
stake. Adding to this risk there is also the danger of having the youngest members of 
society marginalised because of the violent behaviour associated with socialisation for 
aggression which are no more acceptable and legitimised within their own community. 
Unaccepted youth, outcasts in their own community, can further exacerbate violence-
based conflict and behaviours. At the same time resorting to violent and aggressive 
behaviour can ensure the recognition and respect of the peer group. Sharing norms and 
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values based on a template of socialisation for aggression can bring social status to the 
young people (Wessells and Kostelny, 2006). This is especially true when it comes to 
child soldiers and the military identity that youth develop when directly involved in armed 
groups and fighting. The embracing of such identities implies a complete shift in the sets 
of values, aggressive behaviour patterns that can combine to lead youth to perpetuate 
‘cycles of violence’.  
Within the discipline of Social Psychology, socialisation theory has been utilised 
before to explore the links between war and the resilience of violence across societies and 
cultures (Ember and Ember, 1994). It has also proved successful in explaining the 
resilience of violence among youth in post-war society, as through the work of Antoinette 
Errante. Her findings had greatly influenced my work since it supports the idea that 
violence survive well into peace time and characterises the socialisation templates of 
youth and children that have experienced war (Errante, 1999). However socialisation 
theory will not be directly used in the analytical framework of this thesis as it does not 
account for the resilience of violence into the new generation that does not have 
experience of the war. 
The spaces of interaction for youth in the aftermath of violent conflict are various and 
each of them represents an opportunity for youth to socialise, share meanings, define and 
exchange values and norms; they are places where peer influence is exerted. McEvoy-
Levy has tried to account for and narrate all these places, because “the agency of youth in 
war and post-war situations is multidimensional and extremely influential. Young people’s 
actions, and their collective narratives of those actions, influence how conflicts are 
experienced, understood, remembered, transmitted across generations, and, potentially, 
transformed” (McEvoy-Levy, 2006: 134). The places of interaction that she analyses are 
armed groups, post-war gangs and militia, refugee camps, schools, the streets, economic 
activities, religious communities and finally communities of peace. In her work the stress is 
put on the agency of youth who, far from being apathetic, passive recipients dependant on 

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the mediation of adults to act within the society, act inside each of the spaces mentioned 
and construct their own identities, meanings, social rules and norms. Directing the focus 
to the agency of youth proves how they are a multidimensional social force that strongly 
influences the post-war society. Often as a social force youth can be the carrier of a ‘war 
system’ and a culture of violence but also, and increasingly, they become the driving force 
for the creation of a ‘peace system’ (McEvoy-Levy, 2006: 149). In this view their role 
becomes crucial in the struggle for ending intractable conflicts and in the effort of 
maintaining peace. However youth are still denied a space in official politics and their 
voices continue to be marginalised and neglected.  
Another important dimension of the process of transmission of values, ideas and 
beliefs is that of identity and how a culture of violence can survive as the distinct element 
around which the group, and a sense of belonging and identity as a member of the group, 
are constructed. The concept of social identity is defined by Tajfel as “that part of an 
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social 
group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership” (Tajfel, 1978: 63). Scholars of social psychology have focused their attention 
on the way the individual identifies him/herself with a group. The identification with a group 
is always matched with the attribution of positive values to one’s own group, in contrast 
with negative values attached to other groups. This mechanism of social categorisation 
represents “a system of orientation which helps to create and define the individual’s place 
in society” (Tajfel, 1978: 63). Membership of a social group can also represent a means to 
personal achievement for the individual, access to otherwise inaccessible resources and 
power, creating a positive reinforcement for membership of the group. This aspect can 
trigger competition between social groups (Tajfel and Turner, 1979: 94). It has also been 
noted how individuals tend to attribute positive values to themselves as well as to the 
group to which they feel they belong “because they have a natural need for high self-
esteem” (Curley, 2009: 651). The positive or negative connotations attached to the inner-
group and to the outside groups are learned by the child through the process of 

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socialisation (Tajfel, 1978). Groups have standards of values that the members seek to 
stand up to and at the same time are required to comply with. In the case of a post-war 
society in which violence has become deeply entrenched in the society’s culture, the 
standards that characterise the group’s values can include violent practices and attitudes 
which would be produced and reproduced through the processes of social categorisation. 
More and more often over the past decade, scholars have been calling for the use of 
multiple methodologies in the approaches to the study of war-affected children and their 
impact on society. As Kostelny reminds us  
“Although Western psychology has yielded an impressive body of science and 
practice, it embodies the Enlightenment values of individualism. In conceptualising 
how children have been affected by armed conflict, this lens leads people to focus on 
individual impact, when effects on children are mediated by their social ecologies, 
such as families, peers, and communities. Even our understanding of the child and 
these ecologies is culturally constructed. One cannot assume the universality of 
Western constructs of children, families and communities” (Kostelny, 2006: 19). 
 
Still the question of how elements of violence among youth persist in post-war society, 
and how this ‘culture of violence’ is transmitted, remains mostly unanswered.  
 
 Conclusions 
 
Youth has been the focus of many studies in the past decades, most of which explored 
youth in Western societies and mainly in relation to deviant behaviour and delinquency. 
The theories developed by these studies have rarely been applied to post-war societies. 
However, Errante proved that theories such as socialisation theory can help in 
understanding the dynamics of youth in relation to violent behaviour in countries like 
Mozambique and South Africa.  


The concept of trauma and of PTSD used in psychology to explain the impact of 
war on children, even with its limitations when extracted from its milieu and applied to 
other cultures, can still help us understand how the experience of violence can also be 
transmitted also unconsciously from parents to their children, keeping the traumatic 
experience alive.  
More and more scholars have identified the need for a more integrative approach 
to the study of youth, of the impact of war on them but also of the life of youth in the 
aftermath of war. In a similar way to the work of McEvoy-Levy on the space of interaction 
and socialisation of youth in the aftermath of war, the attempt made throughout this paper 
is to identify the spaces in which a culture of violence is perpetuated, transmitted and 
transformed through the use of an multi-lenses approach that integrates multiple 
methodologies in order to grasp the phenomenon in all its complexities and facets. 
Sociologists tell us that family and peers are the primary sources of influence upon youth 
and that they represent the two spaces in which meanings, beliefs, norms and values are 
learned and transmitted. These two spaces will be the focus of the current research, 
together with processes of social categorisation. In fact the organisation of society into 
social groups with which the individual identifies him/herself can support the perpetuation 
of violent practices and attitudes as if these constitute the group’s standards and 
requirement for membership. However environmental factors such as poverty should be 
taken into account as well. In fact in an environment of poverty, social disruption, and with 
limited or no access to education and health care, youth who are politically and 
economically marginalised can resort to violent behaviour for other reasons, mainly 
pushed by the need to provide for themselves and family members in the everyday 
struggle for survival. 
During the preliminary research into the process of transmission of a ‘culture of 
violence’ the possible ‘spaces’ of transmission that have been identified are poverty, the 
family, peers and social groups. These ‘spaces’ form the framework through which I 
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analysed the case study during fieldwork. The analytical framework that results from the 
preliminary research allows an integrative approach to the process of transmission and it 
was used to describe and understand the phenomenon in all its aspects simultaneously 
and in all its complexity. However, during fieldwork an aspect of the process emerged that 
had not been considered during the phase of the project reported in the current chapter. In 
fact throughout the interviews all the participants mentioned the role of political 
factionalism as being vital to the transmission of a ‘culture of violence’. This demonstrated 
the validity and importance of the fieldwork in the study of such a dynamic and complex 
phenomenon. 

Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
In Chapter One and Chapter Two the focus was centred on the outline and identification 
of key concepts and theories which pertain to the issue explored in this research project. 
Chapter Three is now concerned with the explanation of the various aspects related to 
field research. The aim is to point out the rationale behind the field study, the strategies 
employed by the researcher and the way in which the project was conceived and 
implemented. It will also be necessary to discuss the researcher’s position about ontology 
and epistemology as the latter determined the angle and perspective adopted in 
approaching the topic as well as helping explain the aims and goals of the research effort. 
The point of view being exposed by the researcher is that of a post-positivist ontology, 
sharing the belief that “as fundamentally social beings, individuals or states cannot be 
separated from a context of normative meaning which shapes who they are and the 
possibilities available to them” (Fierke, 2007: 170). In terms of epistemology, the 
researcher maintains a point of view that is consistent with the ontological position 
previously mentioned and one that is indebted to the constructivist tradition. The idea of 
the existence of an objective world will be rejected; instead the researcher and the object 
of the research ‘talk’ to each other, influence each other and mutually construct each other. 
As Kratochwil pointed out: “what we recognise is always already organised and formed by 
certain categorical and theoretical elements” (2000: 91).  
Once the position of the researcher on ontology and epistemology is established, 
the chapter will delve into the details of the various aspects of fieldwork. First, it will 
explain how the theories delineated and discussed in the previous chapter combine to 
compose the analytical framework which guided the researcher during the fieldwork 
experience. Second, the methods used to conduct the research are discussed. In the third 
part, the author will explain the choice of the case study and the rationale behind it, while 

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in the fourth section issues related to the context, to ethical matters and research biases 
will be addressed.  
 
Analytical framework  
 
The first two chapters of this thesis delineated the theoretical elements on which this 
thesis stands. In Chapter Two, theories on youth and on the transmission of ideas and 
practices have been discussed. In this section, how those same theories will be used as a 
framework to analyse the case study during fieldwork will be explained. In order to explore 
a complex process such as the process of transmission of a culture of violence, it is 
necessary to use an integrative approach, that is an approach that integrates multiple 
methodologies, applies multiple perspectives and draws from multiple disciplines. Instead 
of a single lens this research employs multiple lenses through which to look at the various 
loci and means of transmission. More specifically the four spaces of transmission 
discussed in Chapter Two come to constitute a four-part analytical framework which was 
used to organise the way interviews carried out during fieldwork were conducted. The 
different elements that support the transmission and survival of violence in post-war 
societies are intertwined and coexist in any given context. However, the way in which 
these elements are combined, which is more salient to the process of transmission and 
support of violence and which is less, makes each instance unique. The aim of this project 
is to determine which of the ‘spaces’ theoretically identified, and discussed in the previous 
chapters, are indeed relevant to the specific case of youth in post-war Sierra Leonean 
society, and also to explain how the factors interact with each other and support each 
other.  
The ‘spaces’ that emerged from the theoretical discussion of the previous chapter 
are four: family, peers, poverty and social groups. These four ‘spaces’ are the factors 

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constituting the analytical framework. First, the family (and parents in particular) as 
demonstrated in the experience of Holocaust survivors and their offspring. Secondly, peer 
groups represent a space in which attitudes, beliefs, values and norms are created, 
recreated and transmitted. The third space is to be found in the context of poverty, lack of 
opportunities and marginalisation. The economic and political stagnation that often follow 
long-lasting wars can support the perpetuation of violence as the only means of survival. 
However the word ‘space’ is used here in an abstract way, therefore poverty should be 
understood as the conditions that characterise the environment in which youth live. 
Poverty, lack of opportunities and marginalisation is here considered a trigger, a 
contextual factor that allows for the persistence of violence in the society Poverty 
represents the conditions in which violent behaviours and attitudes are accepted as a way 
of dealing with the everyday needs for survival as well as a means of empowerment amid 
widespread marginalisation. The fourth space is social groups and social identity. Social 
groups have values and norms to which the members are required to share and comply to. 
By becoming a member of the group the individual embraces the values and norms 
shared within the group. Through this process the group becomes a vehicle for the 
transmission of ideas, values and norms about attitudes and behaviours. The concept of 
social identity tells us how the individual defines his/her own identity through the 
identification with the group. Thus, the values and norms shared with the group come to 
form the foundation for the individual’s own identity, so that the social group is not only a 
vehicle for transmission but it is also a very powerful and effective one as the values and 
norms are internalised as part of one’s own identity. As explained in the case of 
Mozambique and South African youth (Errante, 1999) as well as in many cases of youth 
soldiers, the systems of meaning and templates of socialisation constructed during the 
time of war become inextricably part of the way in which youth read and understand the 
world and social relations. In this way violence comes to sit at the foundation of youth 
identity, defining who they are in relation to others and the outside world. The social 
groups that characterise Sierra Leonean society are various and are present at many 

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levels of society. Widespread throughout society and characteristic of Sierra Leonean 
societal landscape are secret societies such as the Poro society. Secret societies are 
embedded in the traditional organisation of society in Sierra Leone both for men and 
women. In addition to this traditional type of social group, other kinds of social groups are 
present among youth. Youth groups range from school cliques, university fraternities 
(called camps in Sierra Leone) and societies to street gangs, community- and 
neighbourhood-based groups or associations. 
As previously mentioned the word ‘space’ should be read here in an abstract 
sense. The ‘spaces’ of transmission identified and delineated in chapter two are not to be 
considered physical or geographical, thus tangible, spaces. They are factors that allow the 
transmission of culture. Because of the abstract nature of these factors their borders are 
blurred and, at times, they overlap. The distinction between one another is maintained 
artificially by the researcher, however it is in their overlapping areas that the interaction 
among the four ‘spaces’ is revealed. At the same time the demarcation between one 
space and the other was kept fluid and flexible during the fieldwork. During the interviews 
it was not specified what was meant for family or peers or which social groups. The 
interviewee was left free to talk about what he/she considered to be family, who were 
peers in his/her context and his/her understanding of the social groups. 
The four ‘spaces’ here identified do not encompass all the possible factors 
responsible for the transmission of a ‘culture of violence’ in Sierra Leone. These four 
‘spaces’ are the result of research in the existing literature on the process and 
phenomenon of transmission of ideas, beliefs, values, norms and, attitudes and 
behaviours. Other ‘spaces’, for instance, could be the international community, the state, 
Western culture. Steenkamp, for example, includes in her work the international level and 
the state level in the factors that create and sustain a ‘culture of violence’ (Steenkamp, 
2005). Unlike Steenkamp, this paper focuses on micro communities and applies ground 
research to explain the phenomenon under study. For these reasons the four factors 

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identified and used in this paper emerged as the most appropriate to analyse and study 
the micro mechanisms that underpin the process of transmission within the communities 
and among individuals. 
A call for an integrative approach to the study of youth and the consequences of 
exposure to violence has been made by many scholars (Boothby, Strang and Wessells, 
2006; Punamaki, 2009; Barber, 2009). The analytical framework put together in this 
project seeks to answer that call. In particular, the aim is to include both the individual and 
the social context. This choice derives from a belief that on one hand it is impossible to 
isolate the individual from society, and on the other hand it is impossible to look at society 
disregarding the basic fact that it is composed of individuals. It is hoped that the four 
‘spaces’ that emerged in the previous chapter and which constitute the analytical 
framework of this study will account for both spheres and for the integration of the two.  
The four elements represented by family, peers, poverty and identity, provide the 
lenses through which the process of transmission is analysed, understood and explored. 
Use of the analytical framework conceived as a combination of factors aims to unfold the 
process of transmission in its all complexity and multiple facets. This approach will also 
attempt to unfold the process of transmission and simultaneously to understand the 
impact that this process has on the society and on the society’s efforts to rebuild and 
maintain peace. The fieldwork was organised according to the 4-factor analytical 
framework. The interviews were structured following the four-factor outline and each 
participant was asked about all four ‘spaces’ in order to collect information and 
perspectives about each of them from all the participants. Through discussing each factor 
with all the interviewees, I was able to identify the connections between the ‘spaces’ of 
transmission and understand how they interact with and support each other. Additionally 
asking questions about all four factors at each interview gave me several different angles 
on each factor, helping to form a complete, rounded picture of the phenomenon. 
 

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Research methods  
 
The methods employed in this project were based on qualitative research methods, as the 
intent of the study was that of reaching a deeper understanding of social phenomena than 
what merely quantitative data would provide. The focus of this study is the process of 
transmission of violence and its mechanisms, something that quantitative analysis would 
be unable to provide deeper insights about. Qualitative research, on the other hand, 
allows one “to share in the understandings and perceptions of others and to explore how 
people structure and give meaning to their daily lives” (Berg, 2001: 7), thus providing the 
researcher with the tools necessary to understand and explain the phenomenon under 
study.  
Within the broad range of qualitative methods, the researcher chose to adopt an 
ethnographic approach. Ethnography is understood in a variety of ways by scholars 
engaging in ethnographic work (Gay y Blasco and Wardle, 2007; Berg, 2001) but in 
general ethnography can be described as the attempt to study and understand human 
behaviours and societies through the direct observation by the researcher who immerses 
him/herself in the setting that is the focus of study. Therefore, for the ends of this project 
ethnography is considered as  
“the study of people in naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by means of methods 
which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the 
researcher participating directly in the setting, if not also the activities, in order to 
collect data in a systematic manner but without meaning being imposed on them 
externally” (Brewer, 2000: 10).  
 
The choice of using an ethnographic approach to the study proposed in this project was 
given by the very nature of the topic of scrutiny. In fact this project is concerned with social 
and individual processes of transmission of culture that would not be grasped or accessed 
without the direct presence and contact of the researcher with the agents of transmission, 
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post-war generation of youth. Moreover the aim is to disassociate the research from the 
Western influence of the existing literature on the topic, as described in the previous 
chapter, and to try to understand how the Sierra Leonean society defines and measures 
the process of transmission and the perpetuation of violence among youth. In order to 
obtain a deeper understanding and knowledge of these processes and mechanisms, 
ethnography provides the most effective and productive approach. 
Within the methods provided by ethnography the one that was used for this project 
consists of semi-structured interviews. This kind of interview involves predetermined 
open-ended questions asked in a systematic way to all interviewees in a semi-formal 
setting. Compared to questionnaires and fully structured interviews, it has the advantage 
of leaving the interviewee the freedom to shape or even change the direction and focus of 
the interview, instead of he/she being a mere ‘respondent’ (Fife, 2005). Since semi-
structured interviews often develop into conversations more than real interviews they tend 
to put the interviewee more at ease, which in turn tends to result in more openness and 
co-operation. In this way it is possible to build a relationship with the participant that allows 
for a more full immersion in the participant’s life and environment. In a few occasions the 
participant offered to introduce me to his group of peer’s friends, family or school 
environment. The limited length of the fieldwork did not allow for a complete immersion of 
the researcher in the environment under study however semi-structured interviews 
allowed a more personal atmosphere to be established that in turn opened the possibility 
for more direct observation of the reality of youth life. This method also gives the 
researcher the space for flexibility which “reflects an awareness that individuals 
understand the world in varying ways” (Berg, 2001: 70). Specifically, structured interviews 
would not give the chance to the interviewee to express his/her ideas and thought in a 
meaningful way; also, closed questions could not possibly account for such a multifaceted 
and diverse phenomenon such as that explored here. The context of the interviews was 
also predominantly informal, for which formal interviews are not appropriate.  
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The type of questions asked depended greatly on the interviewee as the language 
and the framing of the questions had to match the status, role and education of the person 
interviewed. However the interviews always covered all the four factors of the analytical 
framework which formed the basic template on which the conversations were carried out. 
When interviewing INGOs or NGOs personnel, the questions explicitly mentioned the 
process of transmission of a culture of violence, conversely when talking to a street youth, 
the questions more generally concerned his/her own everyday life experiences with 
regard to the four elements of the analytical framework. It is thanks to this flexibility in the 
conduction of the interviews that the complexities and interconnections of the process 
emerged and the crucial role of political factionalism was brought to my attention, which 
resulted in its integration in the report of findings as an independent factor. The material 
was recorded through notes taken by the interviewer without the use of any mechanical or 
digital recording device. This choice was made for the purpose of maintaining informality 
in the interviews. Participants tend to speak more freely when they are not recorded on 
tape, hence taking notes manually seemed to be the best approach to gain the most 
genuine answers. Finally, the material collected through the interviews was processed in 
the aftermath of the fieldwork and subdivided according to the four spaces of transmission, 
such that each of the four factors forming the analytical framework was reported upon 
through the direct use of the comments of the interviewees. 
Special attention was paid to the sampling method and a complete list of the 
participants in the interviews can be found in Appendix 5. Since the focus is on a process 
in its diachronic more than synchronic manifestation it became necessary to adjust the 
sampling of potential interviewees accordingly. In order to get the most complete picture 
possible of the phenomenon, two groups were targeted for interviews: a) government 
officials from the Ministry of Youth and Sport, personnel from UN agencies and INGOs, 
local  NGOs and organisations,  community associations and charities whose projects 
target youth and youth-related issues; b) youth (18 years and above) who took part or still 
take part in such projects, youth groups, and student associations, and street youth. The 
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former group was selected as witnesses of the process of transmission and its 
mechanisms. Working in direct contact with youth, and having engaged with them over a 
period of time from the end of the war up to today, enables them to describe the dynamics 
and forces at work among youth as groups and individuals. Since the projects are 
designed with regard to the needs and realities of youth on the ground (or at least they 
purport to be), personnel who collaborate in the projects can provide testimony of the 
changes that have taken place over time in the approaches to and involvement of youth in 
violence.  Through the intercession of IGNOs and local NGOs I was put in contact with 
grassroots-level organisations and community associations. In this way I was able to 
cover various levels of organisations, from the advocacy organisations to the operational 
ones who are implementing INGOs’ projects, as well as community associations 
supported by the work of community members. The second group, being 18 years of age 
or more, are instead likely to have undergone such processes themselves, even if they 
might not be conscious of it. The fieldwork was based on the youth’s characterisation of 
their own interaction with each of the ‘spaces’ constituting the analytical framework and 
not on observation of youth within the ‘spaces’ of transmission. Through specifically 
designed questions the researcher aimed to access their direct experience of the 
transmission of a culture of violence. Since often violence is normalised and internalised 
by those who experience it during and after time of armed conflict, the interviewee might 
not be aware of surviving elements of violence in their personal attitudes, beliefs and even 
behaviours. This lack of awareness does not mean, however, that they cannot give 
important insights about the persistence of violence in their society and in their daily life. 
On the contrary their perception and understanding of violence and its manifestations are 
the main interest of this research project.  
 I did not rely on a single gatekeeper, on the contrary I asked each organisation to 
put me in contact with other organisations at a lower level. Often INGOs or local NGOs 
personnel accompanied me to visit the community they had projects in and to meet with 
youth within those communities. On other occasions the youth themselves were 
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gatekeepers for me. Through a volunteer in a local NGO who had recently graduated from 
the local university, I gained access to the student groups at the university. In the case of 
street gangs I was accompanied by an ex- member who now works with them to improve 
their livelihood through music projects. This variety enabled me to meet with youth at 
different levels in society which allowed a wide assessment of the perpetuation of violence 
in their everyday life. 
 
Why Sierra Leone?  
 
This project is concerned with the survival of violence in post-war societies and in 
particular with the process of transmission within the younger generations that enable the 
perpetuation or breaking of cycles of violence. Prolonged armed conflicts tend to 
normalise the everyday presence of violence and both its victims and perpetrators tend to 
internalise it. As a result of these two processes violence often remains after the signing of 
peace accords, as disrupted societies find it difficult to build new structures and systems 
of meaning that do not incorporate the presence of violence (Steenkamp, 2005).  
When choosing the case study for this research, several elements were taken into 
account. Firstly, the society that was to be studied must have experienced prolonged 
conflict as this projects stems from the idea that prolonged armed conflict has a deeper 
impact both on the functioning of the society and on the individual. Secondly, enough time 
must have passed after the formal end of the war. This is because the process of 
transmission takes place over time and becomes manifest particularly in the new 
generation that is born soon after the war or toward the end of the war. In addition the 
society under study needs to be well into peace time in order to see more clearly how the 
violence of the war is transmitted during peaceful times. Third, a particularly young 
population would have been more useful in order to observe the phenomenon and since 
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the focus of the paper is on how youth are the vehicle of transmission. Sierra Leone 
emerged as the ideal case study as all three of the above elements apply. In particular, 
youth count for more than 50% of the population in Sierra Leone (Richards, 1996), which 
means that most of this part of society experienced the war in their childhood and teenage 
years. Also the atrocities committed and witnessed by youth during the long war had a 
deeply disrupting impact on the societal fabric and systems of meaning of the whole 
Sierra Leonean society. Youth as a group played a central role during the conflict and, 
according to some scholars, also before the conflict, to the point of being considered the 
main force that commenced and fuelled the war (Abdullah, 2005). In the aftermath of the 
war the new state, together with  international agencies, centred peacebuilding projects on 
youth, recognising the importance of this group for the stability of the peace process. 
However, youth remain marginalised as Sierra Leone has become the second poorest 
country in the world and the state fails to provide education and job opportunities.  
Fieldwork was conducted within the capital of Sierra Leone, Freetown. From this 
geographical limit a specific focus on the urban youth population was derived which 
excluded the situation and realities of young people in the rural areas. There is a strong 
tendency for  centralisation upon the capital within Sierra Leone. The distribution of 
population, and in particular of youth, is concentrated in Freetown as a result of the 
phenomenon of urban migration from rural areas to the capital, especially of young people 
during and after the war. Currently the population of Freetown is estimated to be 1.2 
million, which represents about one quarter of the total population of the country (DFID, 
2007). Hence this research speaks mainly of the situation of youth in an urban setting 
which cannot be taken as applicable to the realities for youth in the rest of the country. 
The choice of limiting the research to urban youth was made in order to make the 
fieldwork feasible in its practical execution within the time given on the ground. Also, the 
inclusion of rural youth would have required further discussion about the specificities of 
society in the rural areas, and that would have exceeded the capacity of this thesis.  
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The context, ethics and biases  
 
In this section, consideration is given to the context in which the research was conducted, 
the ethical implications of the research and the biases embodied in various aspects of the 
project. The fieldwork was carried out from 17th March to 17th April 2010. Ethical approval 
had been obtained prior to the fieldwork from the University of St. Andrews1. The first point 
that should be considered stems from the nature of the environment in which the research 
was conducted. As Nordstrom and Robben have noted, post-war societies raise specific 
difficulties for researchers especially when the focus of the research is violence (1995). 
The lack of a formal societal structure can bring problems in terms of gaining access to 
people and information. One must also consider the expectations that the people we 
interview as part of the research have, and this needs to be taken into consideration both 
when the researcher approaches the subjects and in the collection of their experiences 
and stories.   
What can particularly weigh on the research effort are the emotional scars and 
baggage of the experience of extreme violence, and of the war, that characterise most of 
the population. People can be unwilling to discuss what for them are sensitive topics. This 
raises ethical issues related to trauma and psychological wounds. It is the responsibility of 
the researcher to make sure he/she does no harm to the interviewee (Smyth, 2001). 
Asking respondents who have witnessed or experienced extreme violence and atrocities 
to talk about issues related to those experiences can reopen emotional wounds that the 
researcher is not able to deal with. This is especially true for vulnerable groups such as 
youth, hence the choice of this author to meet and interview youth within a ‘safe’ 
environment where they felt protected, such as at NGOs’ and associations’ premises with 
the availability of a trusted adult at hand in case of need.  
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The ‘outsider’ factor can play a role in the respondent’s willingness to 
communicate and collaborate (Smyth, 2005). This author is an ‘outsider’ to the society 
under study. This position in relation to the society has consequences at various levels. 
On one side, as an outsider, it can be more difficult to obtain data and access to sources 
and people as the local population may look upon the researcher with suspicion. This can 
be especially so when being an outsider is made obvious by the colour of one’s skin, 
which raises issues of power hierarchies as well as stereotyped identity representations. 
Responses given during interviews can be shaped by these ‘insider’-‘outsider’ positions 
and the researcher should be aware of this possibility when collecting data (Gabriel, 2000). 
On the other, hand the contrary might also happen where being an ‘outsider’ can be 
perceived as being neutral to the forces and powers of society and as a consequence the 
interviewees might feel more comfortable and safe in expressing their ideas and stories to 
an ‘outsider’. Nevertheless in both cases the ‘outsider’ often has a more detached 
understanding of the events and the society he/she is studying. While this can result in 
fewer biases in relation to societal groups and interests, it also means that the knowledge 
of the outsider is often more shallow and limited (Smyth, 2005). With regard to this aspect 
of conducting research, during the fieldwork in Freetown in one instance, when 
approaching a street gang, I was immediately recognised as an outsider and some 
members of the gang became very upset and angry about my presence. Because of my 
appearance, they thought I was working for an NGO or some international organisation. 
Since the end of the war they have been approached several times by NGOs or 
international organisations personnel who wanted to get them involved in youth 
empowerment projects or employment programmes. However, in all cases after six 
months or a year the funding would stop and the projects would end, leaving them in the 
same poor and marginalised conditions as before, but now additionally with frustration and 
anger towards those same organisations who promised help and a way out of poverty. In 
their eyes I was representing those same people who were getting rich behind their backs. 
Only with the intervention of the gatekeeper who was accompanying me at the time did 
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they agree to participate in the interview, after having understood that I was not there to 
exploit them once more. In this case the intercession of an ‘insider’ to vouch for me was 
vital for the youth to overcome their suspicions. 
The colour of one’s skin is not the only physical characteristic that can influence 
the research work. The gender of the researcher can make a difference in the way the 
person is accepted or rejected by the community and by each potential respondent. For 
example, as a female it can be possible to have difficulties in creating rapport, trust, and 
respect with members of the population of the opposite sex. The obstacles that a female 
researcher can encounter could range from not being taken seriously because of her 
gender to not getting interviewees’ collaboration because of embarrassment due to the 
social rules on relationships between genders (Gurney, 1991). To overcome obstacles 
such as these, a possible solution can be that of wearing very professional-looking outfits, 
and in the latter case it might be advisable to be accompanied by a male person or 
colleague.  
What can represent the most influential bias for the researcher is his/her own 
identity since “no matter our dedication, we cannot escape the legacy of our culture” 
(Nordstrom and Robben, 1995). The identity of the researcher has an impact on the whole 
research effort, from the conceptualisation of the project to the fieldwork organisation, 
implementation and analysis of data. Even if the researcher tries to apply objectivity and 
neutrality, most scholars agree that complete objectivity and neutrality are just not 
achievable. Each of us brings the baggage of our upbringing, social environment and 
cultural education which together shape our view of the world and our understanding of it 
and of human relations. We ‘read’ the world through the lenses that we have acquired 
during a lifetime and that guide us in our daily lives. As researchers  
“There is also the fact of having been immersed in a particular society since 
childhood, having interiorised its language (and the mental structures that go 
along with it), its habits, traditions, myths, sensitivity and affectivity. History 
counts at least as much as intelligence, and geography more than genes. We 
are part of the Western world.” (Comte-Sponville, 2008: 62).  
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This awareness, however, must be the starting point for the researcher in attempting to 
conduct research in a comprehensive, objective, inclusive and detached way (Smyth, 
2001). 
 
Conclusions  
 
In this chapter the author has delineated all the elements that underpinned and 
constituted the fieldwork project as well as the difficulties and possible biases. First, I tried 
to explain how the theories discussed in the previous chapter were used to create an 
analytical framework to be used  during fieldwork as a lens through which to study the 
phenomenon of the transmission of violence and its impact on post-war Sierra Leonean 
society. The rationale behind the choices made in terms of research methods and case 
study was then discussed, in order to make clear to the reader how the fieldwork project 
was designed. Last, I tried to identify the possible issues, obstacles and biases inherent in 
conducting this research. It was not possible to foresee all of the challenges and 
difficulties that may be encountered in the field, but this researcher was confident in her 
abilities to make the necessary adjustments when confronted with any possible obstacles 
in the field. 
 In Chapter 5 the material collected during the fieldwork will be organised according 
to the structure of the analytical framework, namely utilising the four ‘spaces’ of 
transmission of poverty, family, peers and social groups, plus the unexpected space of 
political factionalism which emerged during the fieldwork. Before reporting the fieldwork 
findings, the next chapter will provide the reader with a background overview of Sierra 
Leone, the war and the role of youth during the armed conflict as well as today.  
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Chapter 4: Sierra Leone, Civil War and Youth 
 
Before commencing the report on the material collected during fieldwork and its 
discussion, it is necessary to outline, however briefly, the context in which the research 
has been carried out. Sierra Leone experienced a 10-year civil war that devastated both 
the material and human capital of the country. In order to understand the reality of Sierra 
Leone today the causes and events of the civil war need to be addressed. A heated 
debate has evolved around the nature of the Sierra Leonean war; however, the crucial 
role of youth as stakeholders in the armed conflict seems to be a common element in 
many of the different perspectives on the causes and dynamics of the war. In the context 
of this paper it is useful to highlight the role and participation of youth in the violence 
preceding the war, as well as during the war, thus to better understand the legacy that the 
experience of the violent conflict has left to youth as individuals and as a group. 
 Therefore the aim of this chapter is to outline the background in which the present 
study is embedded, giving basic information about Sierra Leone, the events of the war, 
the debate surrounding its nature, and finally the role of youth in Sierra Leonean society 
and in particular in the armed conflict.  
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About Sierra Leone: General data 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

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10 years of civil war 
 
The civil war in Sierra Leone started in March 1991 when a group of rebels crossed the 
border from Liberia. This rebel group, composed of some National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPLF) military personnel from the Liberian civil war, some mercenaries from 
Burkina Faso and some Sierra Leonean dissidents, called itself the Revolutionary United 
Front, RUF (Keen, 2005). The RUF portrayed the attack as the beginning of a revolution 
which aimed to overturn the corrupt one-party government controlled by the All Peoples 
Congress (APC) party. The war lasted for a decade during which the fighting forces 
multiplied and shifted alliances to the point that the borders between the different groups 
became blurred. In 1992 a coup d’état was successfully perpetrated by young military 
ranks, creating the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and virtually dissolving the 
reason for the RUF armed struggle. However the war did not end. The NPRC saw the 
RUF as an enemy but “offered amnesty in return for unconditional surrender” (Richards, 
1996: 11). However, the RUF continued to fight the National Army, and later the Civil 
Defence Forces that emerged as pro-government militias during the second part of the 
war, in the name of the poor and marginalised and “throughout its nearly eleven-year 
campaign of largely terroristic violence, the RUF targeted mainly those very dispossessed 
people, killing and mutilating them in an orgy of bewildering cruelty” (Gberie, 2005: 6).  
In 1996 general elections were held that brought the Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP) to power. In 1997 the military staged a coup d’état, deposing the newly 
democratically elected president and inviting the RUF to join in forming a military junta 
government (Hoffman, 2006). In early 1998, less than one year after the coup of the 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the democratically elected government was 
reinstated. The war continued until 2002 when it was officially declared over, ending with 
the disarmament of all fighting factions (Gberie, 2005).  
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By the end of the war more than 75,000 people had been killed or maimed and 
about half of the whole country’s population was displaced (Keen, 2005). Because of the 
length and spread of the armed struggle “most Sierra Leoneans experienced it directly, 
and virtually every aspect of life was affected by what became a habitus of war” (Hoffman, 
2006: 5). The civil war in Sierra Leone became infamous around the world due to the 
attention that the media paid to the atrocities committed by the fighting forces as well as to 
the widespread use of child soldiers. Even more tragic and shocking were the reports of 
child soldiers being the perpetrators of some of the worst atrocities such as maiming other 
children and pregnant women. The involvement of youth in the fighting and the role that 
they played during the war makes the research focus of this thesis especially relevant and 
important. The brutality of the war in this otherwise forgotten small country in West Africa 
was looked at as senseless and barbaric by the foreign public and international 
community (Gberie, 2005) but nevertheless attempts to explain the causes of the war 
were made by numerous scholars. 
 
The causes of the war: A debate 
 
Many questions have arisen from the bloody war in Sierra Leone. On one side there was 
the necessity to identify the causes and roots of the conflict, its genealogies, its rationale, 
and what made it possible. On the other side there was the necessity to understand how 
the war could last for so long; who were the groups that were benefiting from it, who 
supported it, and what was the real aim of the revolution? A number of scholars tried to 
give answers to these questions both during and after the civil war. However, they did not 
answer with one voice. The perspectives and angles from which the conflict, its causes 
and dynamics have been explained are multiple.  
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Some scholars focused mainly on the crisis of the state as the principal cause of 
the ‘revolution’. Boas argued that the crisis of the neopatrimonial state was the main 
cause of the inevitability of the war both in Sierra Leone and Liberia (2001). Some 
scholars explored the role of greed, grievances and the interaction between the two in 
trying to identify the aims and goals of the different actors involved in the armed conflict 
within the context of a collapsed state (Keen, 2005). In his work, Keen stressed the 
importance of the economic agendas of the different players. Economic factors are also at 
the centre of Hirsch’s theory of the war which interprets the case of  Sierra Leone as a 
“prime example of an internal conflict where economic aspirations for control of valuable 
mineral resources, especially diamonds, have been largely responsible for its inception 
and protracted duration” (2001: 15). Similarly Gberie considered the protracted life of the 
RUF phenomenon as “a case of organised mass delinquency” (2005: 8) mainly aiming at 
economic accumulation through the diamonds trade, even if she recognised that the 
“progressive disintegration of the Sierra Leonean state” also played an important role in 
the causes underpinning the war (2005: 7)6. 
A more apocalyptic view is that of Kaplan who considered the Sierra Leonean war 
as the result of a ‘new barbarism’7 provoked by environmental degradation, population 
pressure, rising crime and youth delinquency (1994). Richards’ interpretation of the civil 
war in Sierra Leone is a direct response to and criticism of Kaplan’s thesis of senseless 
anarchy. Richards considered the war as “a sectarian intellectual response to the 
perceived corruption of a metropolitan patrimonial state”, as a ‘crisis of modernity’ in which 
the rain forest and its resources played a symbolic and material role (1996: xxv). In turn 
Richards’ work was strongly criticised by Sierra Leonean scholars such as Abdullah, 
Rashid and Bangura whose work was collected in the book ‘Between democracy and 
terror: The Sierra Leone civil war’ (Abdullah, 2004).  
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 On the role of natural resources and diamonds in the war in Sierra Leone also see Campbell G., Blood 
Diamonds, 2004; Smillie I, GberieL. And Hazleton R., The heart of the matter: Sierra Leone, diamonds and 
human security, 2000 
7
 The term ‘new barbarism’ was used by Richards (1996) to describe the theory that Kaplan presents in his 
work. 
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The role of youth before, during and after the war 
 
The debate among these scholars has been fervent. However, they all recognised the 
pivotal role of youth in the tragedy of the civil war, even if in rather different ways. Kaplan 
refers to youth as ‘loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid’ (1994), while Richards 
depicted them as the major victims of the recession of the state (1996). Although Richards 
recognised the importance of youth culture in the dynamics underpinning the armed 
conflict, Bangura pointed out how he failed to understand the role of youth culture and its 
nature in full (2004). The development of youth culture within the political and economic 
environment during the two decades preceding the war is the main focus of Abdullah’s, 
Rashid’s and Bangura’s study of the causes of the civil war as it is described by Rashid at 
the beginning of his paper ‘Student radicals, lumpen youth, and the origins of 
Revolutionary groups in Sierra Leone, 1977-1996’ (2004): 
“An investigation of the history and sociology of urban youth culture and politics 
in the 1970s and 1980s is more likely to yield more insight into the character of 
the conflict and its main architects than other interpretations. The architecture of 
that youth culture, and the way it impinged on national politics, are crucial in 
understanding the events that led to the rise of the RUF and the general 
character of the movement.” (2004: 67) 
 
The three Sierra Leonean scholars investigated the development of youth cultures 
at various levels, in universities, and schools as well as among marginalised uneducated 
and unemployed youth. From their studies, youth emerged as the only opposition left for 
the one-party government of the APC. This opposition started within the university’s 
institutions and spread to the so-called lumpen youth as “The interaction between radical 
students and the urban youth significantly influenced the political orientation of the latter” 
(Rashid, 2004: 67). The focus was also put on the role that lumpen youth played as thugs 
for the APC since the late 1960s, and how political violence has characterised urban 
youth culture since a very early stage of the life of Sierra Leone as an independent state. 
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Lumpen youth were present in Freetown as early as the colonial period. Lumpen youth 
were those youth who were not educated, mainly unemployed and living at the edge of 
society. They were “mostly pickpockets and petty criminals, engaged in violence in their 
everyday life” (Abdullah, 2005: 173). They were, however, lacking any political agenda. In 
the 1970s and 1980s more and more educated youth found themselves sharing the same 
marginalisation and unemployment of the lumpen population due to the harshening of the 
economic situation. This new type of lumpen youth was different in that “it included a 
significant youth element with middle and lower middle class backgrounds. Being literate, 
they were more aware of the country’s problems and more critical of its political leadership. 
With their unfulfilled higher aspirations, they tended to be strongly anti-establishment and 
rebellious towards authority” (Rashid, 2004: 73). In this context the collaboration between 
the radical students at the universities (especially those at Fourah Bay College) and the 
urban, lumpen youth population against the government became stronger and stronger. 
Abdullah, Rashid and Bangura showed how the revolutionary feelings that became crucial 
to the formation of the RUF were born from youth culture and youth political engagement 
(Abdullah, 2004).  
Youth were also fundamental elements for the continuation of the war. The 
widespread phenomenon of youth/child soldiers became a distinctive trait of the civil war 
in Sierra Leone. There is extensive literature describing the methods of recruitment of 
children as young as 7 years by the different fighting factions, the various tasks they were 
assigned to, the impact of the military life on their mental health, and the challenges of 
reintegration (Peters and Richards, 1998; Zack-Williams, 2001; Abdullah and Rashid, 
2004; Shepler, 2005; Peters, 2005; Rosen, 2005; Devon, 2010; among others). Not only 
the RUF but also the National Army and the Civil Defence Forces and militias used under-
age combatants. The habit of giving drugs and alcohol to the young recruits and forcing 
them to witness or commit killings and atrocities against their own community was a 
method commonly used to cut off all bonds with families and communities. The army then 
became a surrogate family, providing protection, food, and clothes (Peters and Richards, 
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1998). One of the estimates of the number of individuals under 18 years of age 
participating with the fighting forces during the 10-year civil war is as high as 40,000 
(Maclure and Devon, 2006: 2). The extension of the phenomenon demanded that special 
attention be paid to the effects of the exposure to, and participation in, the violence and 
atrocities of the war on these young individuals.  
The involvement of children and youth with the fighting factions necessitated 
immediate attention in the aftermath of the war. Reintegration for these young individuals 
in the communities and families has not been an easy process. Perpetrators or victims? 
“The paradox of this brutal war was that children were its most vulnerable victims as well 
as some of its most vicious prosecutors” (Abdullah and Rashid, 2004). The agency of 
child soldiers has been vastly debated (Maclure and Devon, 2006). The dichotomy, 
victims or perpetrators, does not belong exclusively to the literature about child soldiers 
but also, and more importantly, it belongs to the perception of the communities that 
suffered the war and the families of the child soldiers themselves (Peters and Richards, 
1998). The reintegration of under-age soldiers faced many challenges, as indicated by 
Wessells’ study of reintegration processes in the northern provinces. The difficulty of 
shifting from a military role to a civilian role is coupled with shame for what they have 
committed as soldiers and the fear of reprisals by those same communities they attacked 
during the time of fighting. In turn communities are suspicious of these young men who 
are looked at as animals (Wessells, 2006). A major aspect of the reintegration of child 
soldiers was the possibility of economically sustaining themselves through employment. 
Most of them lacked both education and skills, so part of the reintegration process 
involved skills training in order to allow them to meet their basic needs. However, “the 
combination of stigmatisation, fear, and lack of livelihood left many child soldiers in doubt 
over their ability to reintegrate into civilian society” (Wessells, 2006: 186). During the war 
children and youth were among the most vulnerable groups and after the war children and 
youth are still the most vulnerable part of society.  
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Youth have also been recognised as a priority after the end of the war, both by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and by the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). 
The final report of the TRC was published in 2004 and contained an in-depth analysis of 
the role of youth in preparing the ground for the armed struggle as well as their 
contribution in the continuation of the war.8 The TRC report outlined recommendations for 
containing the risk of renewed conflict and for the construction of a sustainable peace with 
regard to youth.9 The TRC recommended the formation of a National Youth Commission 
to deal effectively with matters concerning youth, who are considered a priority for 
effective post-war reconstruction. A second recommendation of the TRC concerning youth 
is the inclusion of youth in politics and decision-making in order to eliminate their 
marginalisation and exclusion that were among the root causes of the conflict. Most 
importantly, the Commission called for the recognition of the youth question as a matter of 
‘national emergency’ which needs ‘national mobilisation’ (Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission report, 2004: Vol 2 Chapter 3, pg. 166). Tackling youth issues such as 
unemployment and disempowerment is also among the priorities identified by the UN 
Peacebuilding Commission “for risk reduction and peace consolidation in Sierra Leone” 
(PBC/2/SLE/1, 2007: 3)10.  
In 2003 the Sierra Leone government released the National Youth Policy that has 
been designed “to mainstream Youth activities and contributions and to highlight Youth 
concern as critical input in the development process” (National Youth Policy, 2003: 3). The 
National Youth Policy defined youth as any individual between 15 and 35 years of age; it 
also delineated the rights and responsibilities of youth as well as the roles of the various 
players in the post-war reconstruction that should be dedicated to youth-related issues. 
The policy should have been reviewed every three years, but up until today no revision 
has been done. The priorities identified by the policy correspond to the areas which both 
the TRC and the PBC later found crucial for the reduction of the risk of renewed violence 
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8
 See Appendix 2 for the TRC report on Youth. 
9
 See Appendix 3 for the TRC recommendations concerning Youth. 
10
 See Appendix 4 for the UN Peacebuidling Commission report 
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and the construction of sustainable peace. In 2009 some steps forward were taken, but 
there is still a lot to be accomplished with regard to youth empowerment, inclusion and job 
creation (UN Security Council meeting, SC/9890, 22nd March 2010). 
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Chapter 5: The youth population in Sierra Leone. Research 
findings 
 
Keeping in mind the history of the war in Sierra Leone and the role of youth in Sierra 
Leonean society as delineated in the previous chapter, the attention will now be directed 
to the conditions of every-day life of youth in relation to the transmission of violence today 
in Sierra Leone, as emerged through the fieldwork. The preliminary research was 
dedicated to defining the focus of interest and building an analytical framework to use as a 
lens to explore and understand the mechanisms of transmission of a culture of violence. 
During the first phase it became clear that in order to cast light on such a dynamic and 
multifaceted process, first-hand research on the ground was necessary. Semi-structured 
and informal interviews were identified as the most fruitful method of investigation and two 
target groups were delineated, on one side people working with youth and on the other 
side, youth themselves. The fieldwork lasted for over a month during which numerous 
interviews were carried out. This chapter is a report of the interviews and talks conducted 
during the fieldwork. The aim is to let the voices of the interviewees speak of the ‘spaces’ 
of transmission of a culture of violence that compose the analytical framework. The 
intention of this chapter is to report on the findings of the research through the statements 
and comments of the people who participated in this study. A list of the interviewees cited 
in this chapter can be found in Appendix 5. 
In the following section the material collected during the interviews will be 
organised according to the ‘spaces’ of transmission: poverty, family, peers, social groups. 
Also, the main trends that emerged from the interviews will be highlighted. Additionally, 
attention will be given to those aspects that initially had not been included in the analytical 
framework but that were identified as significant by the interviewees, namely the 
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unexpected space of political factionalism. The analysis of the collected material will be 
left to the next chapter in order to ensure as much authenticity as possible. 
 
Poverty 
 
Poverty and marginalisation have been recognised to be major factors in the persistence 
of violence in post-war societies before. With no exceptions, every single interviewee 
stressed how in the case of Sierra Leone the widespread poverty has an even harsher 
impact on youth and how the high rates of unemployment and illiteracy especially among 
youth are among the principal causes for the engagement of youth in violent activities. 
“Poverty is the major cause, together with marginalisation, why violence is still embedded 
in society. Youth have nothing to do and they see violence as a means of survival.” 
(COOPI, Programme Manager, Mr. Robin Yoki.) 
Poverty supports the continuation of violence on many different levels. Many 
interviewees used an expression to describe the link between unemployment, lack of 
education and violence: “idle hands will do the devil’s work” referring to the coping 
mechanisms that youths have to put in place to survive everyday life. For a young man or 
a young woman no job means no home and no food. The consequences of such a 
precarious life were described in many interviews, for example “You see young girls and 
boys sleeping at night on the pavement in front of businesses, they are vulnerable.” 
(CCYA, National Coordinator, Mr. Ngolo Katta.) Another interviewee connecting poverty 
and violence told me “Unemployment is also a huge problem because it leaves youths 
down the street doing nothing, and a beggar has no choice”, (Youth Employment 
Secretariat, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Mr. Yusuf Kamara), and also “They run 
toward violence when they see it because they can use that as a chance to get money out 
of it, stealing and robbing.” (SLYEO, Executive Director, Mr. Charles Lahai.) 


  The result is in front of your eyes when you walk the crowded streets of Freetown. 
Youth of all ages are hanging around doing nothing, and according to an interviewee 
“They engage in violence because they have nothing to do, bad habits are result of 
idleness.” (AYPAD, Executive director, Mr. Philip Bangura.) “Every night there are many 
sleeping just here (pointing at the narrow concrete corridor running between the street and 
the entrance of his shop), they have no place to go, they sleep on the street, can you 
imagine?” (Issa, Young entrepreneur.) As it was pointed out during many interviews, often 
the cycle of poverty starts in the family. The parents in the first place do not have a stable 
job and struggle to provide for the children: “The parents cannot afford to provide for all 
the children, children are down the street to help home.” (UNICEF, Project Officer – Child 
Protection, Mrs. Rosina Conteh.) This results in the inability to send the children to school. 
“A lot of kids are down the streets too, helping with the stands, selling food or other goods 
at the side of the street, they are literally everywhere!” (Graduate student, Rahim.) In this 
way “Children became the breadbasket of the family.” (CCYA, National Coordinator, Mr. 
Ngolo Katta.) 
The interviewees seem all to agree that the street is the first real space for the 
transmission of violence. On the street children learn how to survive. “When you wake up 
in the morning, you don’t know what you will eat that day, so you go and sit at the junction 
and you wait for a friend to pass by and hope he will help, maybe one day you’re lucky 
and you get some chop (food), other days no chop at all, just water.” (AYPAD, youth 1.) 
Once on the street, the teachers and trainers of young people are older youths: “Parents 
don’t have enough to support their children so the kids end up on the street. When you 
don’t have to eat you don’t think to go to school you think of how you can find some food 
and if a friend on the street, normally an older youth, can provide for you then you don’t 
care about what your family says since they cannot provide for you, you just do what he 
says.” (AYPAD, youth 2.) Petty trade is the norm for children and youth and “In petty 
trading in this city you need to be violent if you want to succeed and to get a living.” 
(YAPAD, National Coordinator, Mr. Bockarie Enssah.) They sell what has been stolen, 
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robbed or smuggled the night before. Stealing and pick pocketing are also means of 
survival: “Armed robbery is a way for the youths to make easy money to support 
themselves which shows them that violence pays.” (International Youth Forum, Director, 
Mr. John Paul Bai.) Violence becomes the way to access resources, as expressed by this 
interviewee, “Every time there is some mayhem you see the youth running there because 
in the chaos they can steal something or loot or pick pocket and in that way they make 
enough for that day.” (International Youth Forum, Director, Mr. John Paul Bai.) With no 
education and no jobs, violence is seen by many youth as the only way of achieving 
something in life. “The only way of fulfilling their aspirations is through crimes and informal 
economy. There is no hope so youths find a space of personal development in the 
violence of the street life.” (CCYA, Programme Officer, Mr. Edward Massaquoi.) As one 
young guy explained to me, stealing occurs even among friends and family: “If I don’t 
have to eat I check my mom’s purse when she’s not looking and take the money she has, 
or I rely on my friends to share. If in the morning I have nothing then I go and see my 
friend to share something with him but if he has nothing, I don’t know, maybe he leaves 
the phone on the table you know and when he doesn’t look I take it and I walk out, like 
that you know. And go and sell the phone to get chop for that day. But we are still friends 
after.” (Base, Aberdeen, youth 1.) 
In some interviews the role played by the DDR programmes in sustaining the 
perpetuation of violence in a context of extreme poverty also emerged. According to the 
interviewees “DDR programmes were not sustainable because the skills training was not 
properly focused resulting in no job placement which in turn resulted in new vulnerabilities 
for the youth. Ex-combatants are everywhere, poor and unemployed and hungry which 
make them dangerous.” (YAPAD, National Coordinator, Mr. Bockarie Enssah.) A 
university student at Fourah Bay College explained to me that the way of life that 
characterised the war has transmigrated into the post-war setting, “The culture of ‘I take 
what I want with violence’ coming from the war is still spread today especially among ex-
combatants” (Fourah Bay College, youth 2), so that still today youth with no job 
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opportunities and no education re-enact the same way of life down the streets of Freetown 
where “you need to be strong so that nobody will mess with you.” (Base, Aberdeen, youth 
1.) This phenomenon was also described by another interviewee: “A lot of children and 
youth during the war used to not work hard to get what they wanted but they are used to 
get what they want with violence, with force. This became a culture.” (ENCISS, Youth 
Officer, Mr. Ishmael Bash-Kamara.) 
Psychologically, the youth interviewed expressed depression and hopelessness. 
“Youths are desperate. The frustration turns into aggression because they are not 
ensured their basic needs.” (Fourah Bay College, youth 3.) Many street youth told me that 
the ghetto with its alcohol and marijuana is often the way to forget the struggle of 
everyday life. “The ghetto is the best place to be to cool down from the stress of the street 
life.” (Base, Aberdeen, youth 3.) The youth of the Black Street Family, a renowned gang 
occupying a territory next to the national stadium, were smoking marijuana and drinking 
pojo (palm wine) even while talking to me, and they explained that “We drink pojo and 
smoke marijuana to forget about our stress and frustration because we are screwed. The 
car wash is all we do and we do it with no good equipment not even running water, we are 
paid pittance and the police come every day to try and kick us out of here. There is 
nothing for us, this is what we will do until we die.” (Black Street Family, youth 1, youth 3.) 
As a consequence of the extremely poor life conditions, many children and youth abuse 
both alcohol and drugs. “Very few job opportunities in the country, kids are often just 
looking for survival, to cope with the frustration of life they take drugs. When they take 
drugs they would do anything, engage in violence, rob, attack people. Fighting can be a 
coping mechanism for this frustration.” (WarChild, Deputy Country Director, Mr. Saidu 
Mansaray.) Youth are described as ticking bombs, ready to start fighting at the first 
chance. “People are very short tempered nowadays and fights can start in a second 
because of the frustration of everyday life and lack of livelihood.” (CCYA, Programme 
Officer, Mr. Edward Massaquoi.) Frustration characterises their state of mind as they feel 
that society and the state are doing nothing for them. “They see themselves as nothing in 
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the society which aggravates their anger.” (iEARN, National Coordinator, Miss. Jane 
Peters.) They simply stop caring about the consequences of their actions and what people 
might think of them. “They don’t care, even if people frown at them, they just do it anyway, 
they don’t care; they don’t realise how bad it is to kill somebody, they are not educated to 
the value of life.” (iEARN, National Coordinator, Miss. Jane Peters.) 
Although poverty emerged as a central ‘space’ for the transmission and support of 
a culture of violence in post-war Sierra Leone, it would not be enough by itself to explain 
the persistence of violence within society. Poverty is one aspect of the process and it 
relates to all the others, in the first place to the family. 
 
Family 
 
The family was often recognised as holding responsibilities for the transmission of 
violence. In numerous interviews the family was described as a highly violent environment. 
“There is a lot of violence within the household between the parents and the children learn 
from the parents arguing with each other and abusing each other.” (COOPI, Programme 
manager, Mr. John Saidu.) Violence characterises the relationship between the parents as 
reported by these interviewees: “Fighting between the parents is very common and they 
use a lot of abusive language, the kids learn that as a practice. The parents might be 
themselves traumatised by the war.” (Warchild, Deputy Country Director, Mr. Saidu 
Mansaray.) “Parents can be aggressive and abusive to the partner, to other people and 
the children copy it.” (Salone Youth and Adolescent Network, youth 1.) Regarding the 
relationship between the parents and the children: “Parents continually beat the children 
and non-violent moral values will be absent from those children.” (International Youth 
Forum, Director, Mr. John Paul Bai.) The situation in the household was described as 
even more serious when the father is an ex-combatant or ex-child soldier. The war legacy 
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manifests itself in high levels of domestic violence and this is clearly explained by the 
words of one interviewee: “the father is angry for what happened during the war, the 
children are angry as well without knowing for what reason.” (Youth Employment 
Secretariat, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Mr. Yusuf Kamara.) The father’s past 
actions as a combatant are used to intimidate and threaten both the partner and the 
children during arguments and moments of tension within the family, when for example, 
“Ex-combatants now have families, kids and when they quarrel they use abusive language 
and they threaten the wife and the kids with the stories of what they did during the war. 
The kids learn these stories and take them to school where they repeat them and they 
become slogans.” (YAPAD, National Coordinator, Mr. Bockarie Enssah.)  
This aspect emerged only a few times compared to other dynamics that involve the 
family in the process of transmission of a culture of violence. In fact, reading through the 
interviews, what recurred most often is the impact of family breakdown as a consequence 
of the war. Through the war, or because of the war, the family has been profoundly 
transformed. “Before the society was like a whole big family. Everybody took care of the 
children. Now the family has become modular and only the parents are responsible for the 
children. The culture of upbringing has been distorted.” (ENCISS, Youth Officer, Mr. 
Ishmael Bash-Kamara.) Families were divided, parents were lost, children were lost and 
those networks which characterised the family were destroyed: “The breakdown of 
families’ structures and safety nets means that the youngsters live on their own.” (CCYA, 
National Coordinator, Mr. Ngolo Katta.) A considerable number of interviewees 
recognised in these changes the reason for the perpetuation of violence. The main 
consequence of these changes that was pointed out by the interviewees was the lack of 
control and authority that the parents have on their children “Families have no control over 
their children. Children do not have the respect toward their elders that they used to 
have,” (UNICEF, Project Officer – Child Protection, Mrs. Rosina Conteh) which resulted in 
the incapacity of the family to pass on values and norms to the offspring: “The families are 
not in control of the passing on of values which results in a loss of traditional values.” 
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(Plan International, Youth policy advisor, Mr. Martin Sisay Hudson.) This vacuum is filled 
from other sources of influence with new ideas and new systems of values, thus becoming 
one of the most important aspects of the transmission of a culture of violence. Often in the 
interviews it emerged how children and youth find in Western culture an alternative to fill 
the vacuum created by the loss of their traditional culture. “There is no ‘light’ in Sierra 
Leone so they look elsewhere for ideas and hope. Hip-hop and gangsta star from the 
West are the youth’ role models, they think that what they see in movies and music videos 
is real and they want to imitate it.” (AYPAD, Executive director, Mr. Philip Bangura.) 
Another interviewee also described this phenomenon to me: “There is a deviation from the 
traditional cultural heritage toward an acquirement of Western culture without 
understanding it. Kids follow these role models and they form gangs and groups in school 
and down the street like they see in the American movies. Violence is the main element of 
this new identity.” (ENCISS, Youth Officer, Mr. Ishmael Bash-Kamara.) 
The loss of the traditional role of the family couples with poverty and the lack of 
jobs, hence the inability of the family to provide for the children. “Parents do not have 
strong control over the children as they cannot provide for them.” (COOPI, Programme 
manager, Mr. John Saidu.) The breakdown of family structures and social safety nets are 
the reasons why so many youngsters live on their own, often down on the street. The 
frustration of the parents is a main source of domestic violence. “Domestic violence 
comes from the everyday challenge of life because there is little to hope for.” (CCYA, 
Programme Officer, Mr. Edward Massaquoi.) The abuses become part of the daily life of 
the children inside the household. “Children are exposed to a lot of violence in the homes, 
then take the habits and become violent.” (SLYEO, Executive Director, Mr. Charles Lahai.) 
In a number of interviews it was stressed how this situation is exacerbated by the 
introduction of children’s rights, and human rights in general, in Sierra Leonean society. 
Children are taught their rights as children, which they turn to their advantage in 
demanding that the parents ‘respect’ their will and listen to their voice: “Parents think twice 
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before saying anything to the children because the children can take them to the police. 
There are great misconceptions about child rights.” (ENCISS, Youth Officer, Mr. Ishmael 
Bash-Kamara.) The roles of the parents in guidance and education of the children are 
misread as a violation of the right of the child to choose for himself as it is his life. “The 
kids hear about their rights from the media and at school so the parents cannot educate 
and control the kids anymore because the kids can take them to the police. Children are 
left loose, they think they can choose for themselves.” (Oloshoro, youth 3.) An interviewee 
explained to me that “As parents lose the grasp on the children the norms and values 
which were traditional of the Sierra Leonean culture are not forced on the kids anymore. 
Youth think they can do anything and there are no consequences. Old social structures 
are eroded but no new structures are put in place that fit the society. There are a lot of 
misconceptions about the child rights.” (COOPI, Programme manager, Mr. John Saidu.) 
The issues created by the uncritical introduction of Child Rights within the Sierra Leonean 
society were recurrently brought up during the interviews. In almost all the interviews the 
lack of control of the family over the children, and the resulting incapacity of the parents to 
educate the children, was pointed out as the main reason for the perpetuation of a culture 
of violence, especially when the breakdown of the family was coupled with poverty and 
marginalisation. 
 
Peers 
 
The role of peers’ influence in the transmission of violence came forth relentlessly during 
the interviews. What especially emerged is the extent of peer influence in contrast with 
family influence: “The influence from outside the home is far stronger than that from the 
family.” (GOAL- Sierra Leone, Disadvantaged Children and Youth Project Coordinator, Mr. 
Michael Thompson.) The interviewees seemed to agree that the strong influence of peers 
cut across the social strata, being a common feature of youth both on the street and in the 


schools or universities, for example. “Children, even if they come from a good family and 
they behave nicely at home then once they go out they are more influenced by the peers,” 
(PLAN International, Youth policy advisor, Mr. Martin Sisay Hudson), and similarly “At 
home they are peaceful but when they are outside with their peers they are dragged into 
violent activities because they admire the group’s culture, like the gangs from the Western 
culture.” (Bananawater, youth 1.) 
Interviewees often reported on the peers’ dynamics at work on the streets where 
so many youth are forced to live and work. Many interviewees reported how the children 
and youth who are forced to the street are subjected to the influence of other youth and 
children who are already on the street. Many youth find themselves on the street looking 
for survival: “Children often have no choice and once down the street they follow their 
‘bras’ older brother/boss” (UNICEF, Project Officer – Child Protection, Mrs. Rosina 
Conteh); here they meet with other youth who have found their ways of getting what is 
necessary for their daily living. “The younger ones want to copy the actions of these 
people because they see them getting a living like that.” (Salone Youth and Adolescent 
Network, youth 2.) In the absence of any other guidance or protection, the newcomers 
learn from those who are already part of the system. Many interviewees stressed how 
street life is entrenched with violence. On the street it is a matter of survival so youth have 
to learn quickly the tricks and the rules that let you survive: “They have to survive. What 
they learn down the street from other youth counts more than what they learn in the 
house.” (SLYEO, Executive Director, Mr. Charles Lahai.) “Younger ones are in the ghetto 
where they take drugs, and they learn from the older ones, they teach themselves about 
the techniques of survival like pick pocketing and smuggling.” (GOAL-Sierra Leone, 
Disadvantaged Children and Youth Project Coordinator, Mr. Michael Thompson.) 
Considering the level of poverty and the lack of jobs and opportunities, a large 
share of the economy is informal and often illegal. “When in a slum out of 200 youths 
10/15 of them go out at night to rob and smuggle and come back with TV sets and other 
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stuff to sell, the others will soon follow.” (CORD, Executive Director, Mr. Alfred Sandi.) 
Even with education and training it is likely that youth would still be unemployed, while on 
the street they can make a living, achieve what even a university degree might not be able 
to guarantee.  “They are down the street where they learn that they can be somebody 
through bad behaviours learning from older youth. They get to believe that violence is the 
way to succeed and be somebody.” (EMERGENCY, Head of Paediatrics, Dr. Jane Babati.) 
In this context those youth who are already on the street and who are doing fairly well 
become the role models for the younger ones, as even university graduates holding 
masters’ degrees are still unemployed 6/7 years after finishing university. “The head of the 
ghettos or the drug dealers make money easily, they make a lot of money and in a poor 
society they become role models, they encourage the youngest to join them.” (National 
Youth Coalition, President, Mr. Ishmail Al-Sankoh Conteh.) Violent youth demonstrate 
how, with violence, you can survive in the day-to-day struggle with poverty and 
marginalisation: “the negative influence that the kids get when involved in petty trading 
comes from older youth or adults who think of themselves as youth even if they are 40/50 
years old and they behave as the Godfathers, they are the role models and they influence 
the young kids. These adults use to be violent back when they were young and they tell 
stories about their past and what they would have done back in the days.” (YAPAD, 
National Coordinator, Mr. Bockarie Enssah.) 
Another aspect that emerged through the interviews is the impact that the 
reintegration of ex-child/youth soldiers has in relation to the perpetuation of a culture of 
violence. Ex-child soldiers were reintroduced within the communities at different levels. 
“DDR programmes, reintegration brought ex-combatants back in the communities and in 
schools, whenever there is violence they are at the forefront.” (National Youth Coalition, 
President, Mr. Ishmail Al-Sankoh Conteh.) Many interviewees agreed on the inadequacy 
of the rehabilitation programmes which result in the socialisation of violent-prone 
individuals with other youth and/or children. “A lot of ex-combatants or even just the young 
kids who helped the fighting factions, during the rehabilitation process they were put back 


in school sometimes in primary school and there they socialise with the younger kids and 
with their behaviour and attitudes they teach to the smaller kids.” (YAPAD, National 
Coordinator, Mr. Bockarie Enssah.) Through this interaction, the rules and dynamics that 
characterised the war enter society, influencing the youngest and creating a continuum 
between the war and the present. “Ex-child soldiers were reunited with the families and 
they brought violence within the house and the younger kids copy from them.” (National 
Youth Coalition, President, Mr. Ishmail Al-Sankoh Conteh.) Again, “Sometimes ex-
combatants who cannot go back to school, they end up being the caretakers of the 
younger kids and pass a culture of violence to them” (YAPAD, National Coordinator, Mr. 
Bockarie Enssah.) “When in 2002 ex-combatants and youth who experienced the war 
started to be replaced in learning institutions (schools and universities) events of sports 
and leisure among or between schools turned into violent events.” (CAUSE Canada, 
Peacebuilding project coordinator, Mr. Daniel N’bompa-Turay.) Another interviewee 
explained how during the sport events youth were literally mimicking/staging the violence 
of the war, reproducing the gestures, the actions that were part of everyday life during the 
war: “during sport events you see gangs of youth literally mimicking with fake, or 
sometimes real, weapons what was happening during the war.” (Youth Employment 
Secretariat, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Mr. Yusuf Kamara.) 
The problems inside the household are one of the main causes that bring children 
and youth to the streets. “In the streets the other youth help you, encourage you and don’t 
beat you so you will like the street better than home.” (iEARN, youth 1.) The conflict inside 
the home drags the children toward their peers, increasing the influence of the peers over 
that of the family: “The influence of the peers is stronger than that of the parents because 
there is no finance for the parents to take care of the children” (BASE, Aberdeen, youth 2.) 
Children and youth are completely out of the control of the family. “Kids in their teens go to 
clubs, cinemas, stay out late at night, and if you don’t conform they pick on you.” (PLAN 
International, Youth policy advisor, Mr. Martin Sisay Hudson.) In the process of 
socialisation with their peers, the youth have to adopt the norms and behaviours of the 
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group, otherwise they are treated as an outsider: “Youths consider you old-fashioned if 
you don’t smoke marijuana.” (CORD, Executive Director, Mr. Alfred Sandi.) 
During the interviews it was often pointed out to me how the influence of peers on 
the streets and at school is highly correlated: “The school kids see violence in their own 
communities and take it back to the schools. If you are the bad guy, taking drugs, you are 
cool, you have something to be proud of.” (National Youth Coalition, President, Mr. 
Ishmail Al-Sankoh Conteh.) The cliques and groups that are formed at the community 
level are not confined to the community. “Groups are formed outside the schools but they 
are then taken inside the schools.” (COOPI, Programme manager, Mr. John Saidu.) An 
interviewee explained the dynamic of peer influence as a result of the war in these terms: 
“A negative outcome of the war was an extreme rural-urban migration, Freetown was the 
safe haven during the war so a lot a lot of youths came here, a lot of them formed a family 
here and got children here; during this process the new youth have been socialising with 
youth who have been idle already from before the war, with drop-outs and uneducated 
youth. These youth were influencing their peers and the influence is spilling over to the 
schools. These idle youth who have left home are living with friends who might be going to 
school and who are influenced by these dropout youth in their lifestyle so that the culture 
gets into the schools.” (GTZ, Programme Manager, Mr. Muhamed Lebbie.) The school 
institution also fails to act as a place of education for the children and youth, as “9/10 
hours per day are spent in school which are overcrowded so the teachers cannot educate 
them either, as a consequence children are more influenced to bad practices by their 
peers.” (National Youth Coalition, President, Mr. Ishmail Al-Sankoh Conteh.) A dynamic 
that was often reported by the interviewees sees the children of wealthy families as the 
initiators: “They are violent to be noticed, to be popular. A lot of these kids have families 
with money, the parents can pay to get them out of troubles which results in impunity.” 
(ENCISS, Youth Officer, Mr. Ishmael Bash-Kamara.) Again, “In schools the rich kids think 
they can get away with anything so they are the leaders and they influence the poor 
ones.” (COOPI, Programme manager, Mr. John Saidu.) The financial resources of the 
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family are the means of getting out of trouble, so that “The offspring of high society people 
are often the bad boys; because of the resources and money they influence their peers, 
they become a model because of the social position of the family.” (International Youth 
Forum, Director, Mr. John Paul Bai.) 
Although brought up only few times during the interviews, it is interesting also to 
include in the picture the influence that Sierra Leonean children and youth from the 
diaspora are having among the youth in Sierra Leone. As explained to me by an 
interviewee, “Troublesome kids from SL who were abroad studying, learnt about the 
fraternities in the West and because they were troublesome they were sent back to SL 
and they brought with them the fraternity culture that now is creating so many problems 
and violence, spread to the secondary schools with all these cliques and gangs.” (iEARN, 
youth 2.) Similarly, “Sierra Leonean kids abroad are sent back to Sierra Leone because of 
their violent behaviour and because they cause trouble where they are: once here they 
influence other kids because here there is a widespread impunity.” (Salone Youth and 
Adolescent Network, youth 3.) The impunity that characterises Sierra Leonean society, as 
pointed out in the last comment, seems to be recurrent in many settings. It is the same 
impunity that allows the children of wealthy families to get away with violent behaviours, or 
that allows rape to have no consequences for the perpetrator.  
 
Social identity: Social groups 
 
A theme that emerged in almost every single interview is that of social groups, identity and 
belonging, and how a society that traditionally tends to organise itself into groups creates 
a space for violence and for the transmission of violence. “It’s part of the characteristics of 
Sierra Leonean society to organise in groups and identify oneself with the group. It is a 
matter of identity. Some of these groups advocate and preach violence.” (Peacelinks, 
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Programme Coordinator, Mr. James Hallowell.) “The original culture in Sierra Leone has a 
lot of societies/groups which is on its own a platform for violence because the different 
views are not respected/accepted.” (SPW, Country President, Mr. Farai Muronzi.) In the 
history of Sierra Leone, the groups to which society was divided were the secret societies. 
Secret societies were central to societal life, they were the locus of decision making where 
youth could become men: “Until you are part of the decision making you are not an adult. 
Before it was about being part of the secret societies and being at a certain level of 
hierarchy within the secret society to take part in the decision making. Until this point 
youth can be ordered to do anything and the decisions taken are in the interests of the 
elders.” (WANEP, National Coordinator, Mr. Edward Jombla.) Secret societies played a 
central role in Sierra Leonean society, but the nature of their role has been highly 
ambivalent; on the one hand, for example, they were a means of education for the youth: 
“Formerly the secret societies used to be educational institutions, youth were being 
trained and learned during the time of initiation but this changed over the years.” (National 
Youth Coalition, President, Mr. Ishmail Al-Sankoh Conteh.) However, on the other hand, 
together with knowledge, skills, ideas and values, violence was also transmitted as “The 
traditional aspects of the secret societies are violent as for example in their initiations.” 
(International Youth Forum, Director, Mr. John Paul Bai.) The very structures of traditional 
society were means for the perpetration and transmission of violence. “Violence is 
appreciated, it’s been planted a long time ago by the structures within the society, by the 
politicians, by the secret societies, by ethnic groups, by the parenting models, by elders-
youth relationships, especially by the elders controlling totally and marginalising the 
youth.” (GOAL-Sierra Leone, Disadvantaged Children and Youth Project Coordinator, Mr. 
Michael Thompson.) However, while the networks and structures of the traditional society 
were in great part disrupted by the war, what has been created in substitution maintains 
the violent aspects in new forms, as many interviewees pointed out: “There has been a 
transfer from the secret societies to university groups of a culture of violence.” (GOAL-
Sierra Leone, Disadvantaged Children and Youth Project Coordinator, Mr. Michael 
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Thompson.) This tendency to organise themselves in groups is more and more evident 
among youth. “Before the war there were social groups in the school institutions and 
universities for social activities. Violence has become the criteria for being part of these 
groups. This continues after they graduate as those who are leaving become the patrons 
for the groups.” (ENCISS, Youth Officer, Mr. Ishmael Bash-Kamara.) To begin with, “The 
traditional secret societies have youth groups in them,” (SPW, Country President, Mr. 
Farai Muronzi) which means that youth have already been exposed to violence as 
perpetrated within the secret societies’ framework. When youth form groups outside these 
traditional structures, they tend to reproduce the violence that characterises the secret 
societies, for example by using the same violent method of initiation: “If you want to be a 
member you have to go through a violent process, this is true for the secret societies as 
well as the university groups.” (GOAL-Sierra Leone, Disadvantaged Children and Youth 
Project Coordinator, Mr. Michael Thompson.) 
Youth organise themselves into groups and cliques inside the schools, and in the 
university as well as down the street: “Groups/gangs are in the schools, in communities, in 
university. 5stars is the general; everybody wants to be the general, the more you are 
violent the more people respect you; each gang has a 5 stars that rules.” (AYPAD, 
Executive director, Mr. Philip Bangura.) Among street youth the group is represented 
mainly by the gang which recreates the structures that were in place during war time. 
“Within the gangs they use military ranks and military language as during the war; the 
structure, the hierarchy within the gangs are the same of the war time, one older guy, the 
most violent guy is the commander.” (WANEP, National Coordinator, Mr. Edward Jombla.) 
Within the gangs violence is appreciated and rewarded. “They have military hierarchy 
within the groups and you get up and get promotion depending on how violent your 
actions are. They see it as a way of being social.” (AYPAD, Executive director, Mr. Philip 
Bangura.) In the gangs system, respect equals fear and the members want to be 
perceived as intimidating in their communities. “They are proud of having names that 
scare people; they want to show other groups they are ready to fight.” (iEARN, National 
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Coordinator, Miss. Jane Peters.) And the names of the gangs are written on every wall 
around Freetown, some of the names being ‘Prison thug’, ‘Skull gang’, ‘Freetown 
gangstas’, ‘Thug money’, ‘Evil squad’, ‘Rambo’, ‘Devil sons’. As an interviewee pointed 
out, respect is strongly associated with fear, “People fearing you is respect, fear is respect 
as during the war.” (GOAL-Sierra Leone, Disadvantaged Children and Youth Project 
Coordinator, Mr. Michael Thompson.) Another interviewee also told me that “Respect 
comes from the use of violence, being strong and brave.” (GTZ, Program manager, Mr. 
Muhamed Lebbie.) 
Gangstarism is widespread among street youth but it also spills inside the schools 
“In schools there are cliques that perpetrate violence, going to school with knives, stones 
and getting into fights with other cliques.” (Graduate student, Rahim.)11 The reasons for 
school children and youth engaging in violence are based on social position and 
popularity. “The young people want to be the big, strong ones, they start in school where 
they want to be the most popular by copying the gangs down the street, they want to be 
superior,” (iEARN, National Coordinator, Miss. Jane Peters), while for street youth it is 
mainly a matter of survival: “The need to be the top-dog is entrenched in the culture, it 
was like this during the war and it is the same now. Being superior, being the top-dog 
becomes your focus in life. That is the system and the mindset of youth works within that 
system.” (UNIPSIL, Youth Employment and Conflict Advisor, Mr. Eldridge Adolfo.) There 
has been a mushrooming of social groups and cliques within the schools after the war. 
“Gangstarism is very spread in schools, the mentors are the bad boys, those who use 
violence and abusive language”, and also “Cliques are bad boys; most of the times they 
have money therefore they influence their peers.” (International Youth Forum, Director, Mr. 
John Paul Bai).  
Almost all the interviewees indicated the creation of groups and cliques among 
youth as a focal point in the transmission of a culture of violence, especially because of 
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the inherently violent nature of many of these groups. “They organise in small groups at 
school and university, and the initiation is through beating and harming by their peers. The 
lecturers are involved as well and this supports the use of violence.” (Youth Employment 
Secretariat, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Mr. Yusuf Kamara.) The interviewees were 
often concerned about the incapacity of the school institutions to limit this phenomenon 
and control the violence. “The problems in the schools are not dealt with so they keep 
going. A school can expel somebody but that same kid next day is in another school. 
Nothing really changes for them which results in impunity.” (SPW, Country President, Mr. 
Farai Muronzi.) What especially emerged through the interviews is how the group has 
become the platform for youth to express their identity, a means of achieving something 
and feeling part of something: “The school kids who take part in the gang groups have 
names that scare people and they are proud of that so they start feeling safe with the 
group; the group is the protection for the kid, the group becomes the family, it’s very 
united, it gives sense of belonging.” (iEARN, National Coordinator, Miss. Jane Peters.) 
The sense of belonging and violence seem to merge in the group system as a young 
activist explained to me: “It is an element of belonging to the groups, I’m part of the group 
so I’m violent, I’m violent therefore I’m part of the group.” (AYPAD, Executive director, Mr. 
Philip Bangura.) According to another interviewee, “In schools and other institutions occult 
societies perpetrate violence and engage in violent activities as part of the belonging to 
the group, influencing the new students, for example taking drugs,” (WarChild, Deputy 
Country Director, Mr. Saidu Mansaray); he also further explained “Occultism used to be 
only in universities but now it got down to the primary schools supported by teachers as 
well. The initiation processes involve drugs and violence. These groups create a sense of 
belonging and they will help you in your life to get jobs and be connected.” (WarChild, 
Deputy Country Director, Mr. Saidu Mansaray.) Parallel to gangs that reproduce the 
structure and hierarchy in place within the fighting factions during the war, other types of 
‘social group’ were reported by many interviewees as being widespread among youth. 
These other types of social group are based on the hip-hop culture and on the imitation of 
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the life-style preached by Western hip-hop stars. “After the war young people have been 
creating groups and cliques imitating gang culture of hip-hop stars, imitating the life-style 
of gang groups. They get to stab each other especially among students but also at the 
community level.” (National Youth Coalition, President, Mr. Ishmail Al-Sankoh Conteh.) 
The situation in the university institutions, and particularly at Fourah Bay College, 
had been recurrently reported as extremely serious with regard to violence. “In the 
universities there are groups, social groups among which there is high rivalry, for example 
about student politics. This is connected to the war because the level of violence 
nowadays in these institutions is so much higher.” (GTZ, Programme Manager, Mr. 
Muhamed Lebbie.) In fact, “By the end of the war the White/Black camp differentiation 
came up. These are the most powerful and dangerous groups and they are widespread 
also in secondary and primary schools. You have to go through an initiation process that 
involves a lot of violence and creates a lot of troubles to the point that people dies during it 
or some women came out pregnant from it without knowing who the father was. These 
two groups have infiltrated student union politics. The two groups are increasingly 
regionalised, Black from the south and White in the north and the rivalry between the two 
groups is very strong. Student union elections involved as much violence as the general 
elections.” (Anonymous local NGO officer.)  
A university student described his initiation to the White Camp in these terms: “In 
the university groups initiation is very very hard, they beat you up, they humiliate you, they 
will do anything to destroy your will and dignity and you do it because they tell you that 
you will have all these advantages from it, like spare material, no problems with the 
courses, and they will help you to find a job but then once you are in you don’t receive any 
of these benefits so I want to leave because it’s just evil, what I had to go through is evil. 
And you have to vote accordingly [at the university elections] and they are so powerful 
that you don’t vote against them, and you take an oath with them so even if your own 
brother runs for the other side, you would not vote for him, you would go against your own 
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blood rather than vote against your group.” (iEARN, youth 3.) Violence inside the two 
camps and the numerous subgroups has been escalating after the war, as pointed out by 
an interviewee: “If I’m beaten during initiation next year I will beat the new initiated even 
more as reprisal, so that the initiations are getting more and more violent.” (International 
Youth Forum, Director, Mr. John Paul Bai.) The initiation rituals have become so violent 
that every year students die during the initiation. With regard to university groups, and 
especially the two camps, the overlaps with the traditional secret societies have become 
especially evident “There are a lot of similarities between the two groups and the Poro 
secret society,” explaining, for example, “The hierarchy of the black camp is the same of 
that of the Poro society” (Graduate student, Amin.) The White and Black camps are not 
simply social groups, they are layered structures with a lot of subgroups, female wings 
and even militant wings which are dedicated to the perpetration of violence, as the same 
member told me: “White and Black camps have militant groups which fight and take up 
arms,” [...], “The militant group of the Black call themselves Bakasi boys after a militant 
group of youth in Nigeria which is an extremely violent group that kills and use extreme 
violence. The militant group of the Black camp wants to be associated with them.” 
(Graduate student, Amin.) 
University students involved in this dualistic system are linked with the rest of 
society at various levels and they spread the tentacles of a culture of violence. They are 
connected with street youth. “Youth in university are networked with street youth who can 
be their brothers or community friends. The street youth are the ready battalion for the 
university students.” (WANEP, National Coordinator, Mr. Edward Jombla.) University 
students represent the future élites of the country and since reaching university education 
is rare in Sierra Leone, they already have great potential influence for the younger 
generations. “A lot of factions at university against each other and see each other as 
enemies and they are the foundations for political unrest, intolerance and these youth will 
have strategic positions in the country. Also these youth from university become role 
models for other younger students.” (Salone Youth and Adolescent Network, youth 4.) 

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The rivalry is increasingly passed on to the schools and to the communities. The division 
between the two camps is reaching secondary and primary schools as “The two groups 
are fishing for members for the university already in the secondary school; it is an 
orchestrated structural violence. The logic is that I have to stop other students from the 
other camp to take the exam or to get good marks, it’s an unhealthy competition.” 
(WANEP, National Coordinator, Mr. Edward Jombla.) The communities are affected as 
well: “This rivalry is transferred in the community. Once out of university when seeking a 
job if I know you were part of the Black camp and I was part of the White camp I’ll make 
sure that you don’t get the job.” (WANEP, National Coordinator, Mr. Edward Jombla.) 
What emerged strongly through the interviews is that youth groups, whether 
among street youth, school youth or university students, share an underlying rationale that 
can be summed up in the explanation of an interviewee: “You have to belong to a group to 
get someone to respect you/to fear you, the group is the only way to achieve something”, 
[...], “There is a strong need to have something to identify themselves with and the groups 
are that something. It’s about superiority, my group is better than the others.” (SPW, 
Country President, Mr. Farai Muronzi.) 
 
Unexpected ‘space’: Political factionalism 
 
The political element was not considered as part of the analytical framework. However 
during the interviews the role of political factionalism in the transmission of violence was 
brought up on many occasions. 
The connection between the political system and youth emerged mainly at two 
different levels, with street youth and with university associations, but it was also often 
stressed, more in general, that “Elders take advantage of the vote/political power of youth 
because they are the largest bulk of votes.” (SPW, Country President, Mr. Farai Muronzi.) 
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In fact, “The relevance of youth comes out only for political reasons before the elections 
when they are manipulated by the political parties.” (SLYEO, Executive Director, Mr. 
Charles Lahai.) 
In the previous section the violence that characterises the two university camps 
has been explained. The other element that kept coming up during the interviews is the 
link between the two camps and the national political system. “The politicians are deeply 
involved with the two university camps. Student union politics became involved with the 
state politics. The politicians support also financially these groups. This reality is becoming 
a threat to the stability of the country.” (Anonymous local NGO officer.) A graduate student 
explained to me that “Black and White camps are highly political; they play in miniature 
what happens in national politics. The two groups are affiliated with the two political 
parties, the White with All Peoples Congress and the Black with Sierra Leone People’s 
Party.” (Graduate student, Amin.) Politicians are involved in  university politics and the two 
camps to the point that “Politicians participate in the initiation rituals.” (Graduate student, 
Amin.) Not only do the two camps mirror the two political parties, but also the rivalry that 
characterises the political parties is reproduced within the university environment: “There 
is a duplication of the rivalry in the national politics within the university environment. Now 
university groups are all about violence, especially during elections.” (WANEP, National 
Coordinator, Mr. Edward Jombla.) During an interview, I was told the reason for this tight 
relationship: “Politicians support these two groups because they are élites youth and they 
need them. Universities are breeding the young leaders and that’s what the politicians are 
aiming for.” (WANEP, National Coordinator, Mr. Edward Jombla.) The two camps have 
special subgroups dedicated to politics which are characterised by extremely violent 
initiations. As an insider told me, “AURADICALS is the political wing of the Black camp, 
they are considered very prestigious and they choose only the brightest to be members. 
The initiation process for this group lasts 40 days and it’s very brutal. This organisation 
breeds politicians. The LIBERALS are the same thing but for the White camp.” (Graduate 
student, Amin.) This polarisation along political lines of the university students creates a 
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platform for tension among youth which often results in violence: “Adults use youth, for 
example student unions are politically used by the political parties creating tensions 
among young people.” (SPW, Country President, Mr. Farai Muronzi.) 
This polarisation is not limited to the university environment. “The country is highly 
politicised and polarised; you have to be affiliated with your political party for survival. 
Youth are politicised by poverty and marginalisation, it’s easy to manipulate them. It’s a 
patronage system.” (CCYA, National Coordinator, Mr. Ngolo Katta.) This mechanism 
applies even more to those youth who are unemployed and uneducated. Street youth 
become very important for the politicians to carry out the dirty work, for example, “Young 
people collaborate with senior state officials in illegal activities in order to survive. 
Sometimes the youth blackmail the officials for what they know.” (Anonymous local NGO 
officer.) Many interviewees pointed out how election campaigns are characterised by a 
high level of violence because “There are still politicians who are giving alcohol, drugs and 
money to youths to mobilise them. Because of poverty youths are easy recruits for the 
politicians.” (Peacelinks, Programme Coordinator, Mr. James Hallowell.) Street youth are 
recruited to perpetrate violence against the opposing party: “Youth are very active and are 
the majority to vote so they have been used by politicians against the opposite party to 
perpetrate violence,” (Warchild, Deputy Country Director, Mr. Saidu Mansaray); and also, 
“During elections’ campaigns politicians use the need of youth of food and drugs to 
mobilise them against the opposition party.” (ENCISS, Youth Officer, Mr. Ishmael Bash-
Kamara.) It was also pointed out to me that the politicians have an interest in keeping 
youth in a subordinate, and therefore easy to manipulate, position. “The élites are very 
happy to keep the youth down because they can be manipulated,” (UNIPSIL, Youth 
Employment and Conflict Advisor, Mr. Eldridge Adolfo), and further, “Politicians hope for 
young people to be marginalised and hopeless so that they need them, depend on them.” 
(CCYA, Programme Officer, Mr. Edward Massaquoi.) Because of the poor living 
conditions of the youth, “It’s cheap for the politicians to have followers ready to start the 
violence. For last year’s riots against the opposition party’s offices the youth were paid just 
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5000 Le [1$] each.” (Anonymous high rank official.) A young man I interviewed in a 
community candidly told me how “Politicians come to the Ghetto to take us to fight for 
them.” (BASE, Aberdeen, Youth 1.) 
In this way violence among youth, and perpetrated by youth, is highly supported by 
the political élite who make use of youth for their own interests. An example of this system 
is given in the following story narrated to me during an conversation. “A high-up politician, 
he is in the current government, lives next to me and couple of weeks ago he got into a 
fight with a female neighbour. Other couple of neighbours and myself got out to try and 
pacify the two, while we were there the politician made a call and within 10 minutes 10/15 
motorbikes ridden by big bad guys arrived ready to ‘take care’ of the person who was 
creating the problem to the politician, without asking questions about what happened or 
anything. You see this is the way fear and intimidation is created. Each politician has his 
boys, his thugs that he can call and mobilise at any moment.” (Anonymous informant.) 
Some interviewees also stressed on how violence is condoned at the highest 
political level and how this influences how violence is perceived by the youth, mainly 
stripping violence of its gravity. “The culture of violence has not been sincerely addressed 
by the state, people who have been perpetrating violence in the past become heroes of 
the state, are admired and they have been rewarded by becoming presidential guards. 
This is condoning violence, they become role models.” (Anonymous iNGO officer.) The 
politicians exploit the ex-child soldiers thus “Politicians have taken these ex-child soldiers 
on board, giving support to them, employing them for protection, surveillance, giving them 
cars, drugs, alcohol,” (National Youth Coalition, President, Mr. Ishmail Al-Sankoh Conteh) 
because of their proneness to violence. “Some politicians believe that the best way to 
make a point is to use ex-combatants, who are poor, unemployed and hungry and 
therefore dangerous, for violence.” (YAPAD, National Coordinator, Mr. Bockarie Enssah.) 
The example that was given to me of this phenomenon relates to the permanence of ex-
combatants and child soldiers in high positions within the establishment such as the 
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presidential guard, “Presidential guards are often ex combatants, this gives a bad 
message about what violence means and makes violence look cool for the kids so they 
want to imitate these people and they admire them.” (YAPAD, National Coordinator, Mr. 
Bockarie Enssah.) The same idea was expressed by another interviewee: “The 
presidential guards are ex-combatants, and some of the worse ones too, but in this way 
they are turned into heroes, into role models, they are famous for what they’ve done. This 
becomes a message to the youth.” (Anonymous high rank official.) What is also well 
known is the role that these individuals continue to have in today’s violence. “During the 
attacks to the opposition party offices few months ago those same presidential guards 
were leading gangs of boys to loot, destroy, set on fire, beat people and women were 
raped during it too.” (Anonymous iNGO officer.) This was confirmed by another 
interviewee: “The presidential guards were leading the riots and attacks to the opposition 
party’s offices that ended in rapes, looting and burning down of the offices.” (Anonymous 
high rank official.) 
The politicians emerged in the interviews as having an active role in transmitting a culture 
of violence, as clearly pointed out during an interview: “Politicians are deliberately 
encouraging the youth to engage in violence, they maintain the youth to be loyal to them 
to perpetrate violent acts.” (GOAL-Sierra Leone, Disadvantaged Children and Youth 
Project Coordinator, Mr. Michael Thompson.) 
 
Conclusions 
 
The aim of this chapter was to let the voices of the participants in the research project 
speak of the dynamics and forces at work within Sierra Leonean society. Each one of the 
‘spaces’ of transmission was dealt with as much as possible exclusively through the 
material that was collected during the fieldwork and the stories heard from those who work 

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with youth, as well as from the youth themselves. Through the interviews carried out 
during the month spent in Freetown, the process of transmission was explored using the 
analytical framework. The interviews allowed me to identify which factors are relevant to 
the phenomenon under study and how each of them contribute to it. Also, without the 
contribution of the participants, vital elements involved in the transmission of a culture of 
violence would have been missed, such as the role of political factionalism which was 
added to the analytical framework as a result of the fieldwork. In this sense the 
contribution of the fieldwork has been crucial to the revision of the analytical framework 
and to a full understanding of the way a culture of violence is transmitted. 
One difficulty lay in maintaining the fictitious borders created by the categories that 
compose the analytical framework since the process of transmission happens 
simultaneously at all levels. It will be the aim of the next chapter to analyse how the 
process is constructed through the interaction of the dynamics and forces at play within 
each category. Emphasis will be put on the complexities that emerged through an 
analytical reading of the same material that contributed to this chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Living with violence in peacetime. Discussion of 
findings 
 
In the previous chapter I attempted to report faithfully what emerged during the fieldwork 
through the voices of the interviewees while leaving the analysis of the collected material 
for this chapter. The discussion of the elements and trends that emerged during fieldwork 
aims to cast light on the dynamics and forces at play within and between the spaces of 
transmission of a culture of violence. So far in this study the various elements of 
transmission of a culture of violence have been described only two-dimensionally. In this 
chapter I attempt to highlight the third dimension of the phenomenon by revealing the 
connections among the various elements and the way they interplay and support each 
other, bringing volume to the picture.  
In fact, reality proved to be much more layered than anticipated by the analytical 
framework as outlined in Chapter Three, and the various elements were found to be highly 
interconnected. What emerged relentlessly during the time spent in Freetown is how the 
transmission of a culture of violence stretches its tentacles in all directions within society 
and impacts on youth in multiple interwoven ways. It runs horizontally and vertically within 
society creating a net/web of forces that in turn support the transmission and perpetuation 
of violence. What is accepted in terms of behaviours and attitudes, or even encouraged at 
times, has become or is becoming institutionalised as societal norms, and values are 
shaped around endemic violence. Confronted with the reality of the fieldwork findings the 
analytical framework had to be modified to include new elements which emerged through 
the interviews, and reviewed to reconsider the role that each factor constituting the 
framework plays. 
A recurrent theme in the numerous interviews was the disruption of traditional 
values and norms that allows the formation of new sets of values and norms which have 
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been forming in a highly violent environment (namely the post-war setting) and which 
consequently normalise violent behaviours and attitudes. The process also functions in 
the other direction as the widespread occurrence of violent attitudes and behaviours 
shapes the production and reproduction of values and norms which support them. It is in 
the carrying out of everyday life that the negotiation of what is acceptable and what is not 
takes place. Throughout the interviews it became clear that violence is often taken for 
granted as part of the range of societal mechanisms, especially among youth.  
This chapter will discuss in more detail how the various ‘spaces’ are related, how 
they support each other and what the consequences are for the future stability of Sierra 
Leonean society. More specifically I will try to identify the connecting lines in order to 
reveal the structure that is created by the interaction of all the ‘spaces’ of transmission. An 
attempt will be made to cast light on the depth that the phenomenon reaches within Sierra 
Leonean society and the risks that are inherent in it.  
In the effort to show the connections between the ‘spaces’ forming the analytical 
framework used so far, it becomes harder and harder to maintain the borders among the 
categories and explain them individually, as the discussion of one aspect overlaps with 
the others and vice versa. The division into categories is in fact artificial, and since in the 
discussion an attempt is made to  delineate the real dimensions of a process that involves 
all the categories simultaneously, it is extremely difficult to identify when one category 
begins and another ends. However, the purpose is to highlight the complexities and 
multifaceted nature of the process of transmission, and the overlaps and redundancies 
can be seen as evidence of the interconnectedness of all the different aspects of the 
phenomenon. 
 
 

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Poverty 
 
In the previous chapter we have seen how poverty and marginalisation are considered by 
the interviewees to be the main forces that promote the perpetuation of violence in Sierra 
Leonean society. Lack of jobs and limited access to education were among the main 
grievances that mobilised youth during the war in the first place. The 11 years of civil war 
aggravated the situation, leaving Sierra Leone the second-poorest country in the world. 
For the youth of Sierra Leone this meant even higher levels of unemployment and lack of 
education than before. 
The war left a disrupted economy, the private sector did not exist any more; all the 
infrastructure, such as roads, ports, railways, electricity etc., necessary to develop the 
country’s economy had been destroyed. The government has become more and more 
dependent on foreign aid as it is unable to restart the domestic economy. The 
unemployment rate remains extremely high, especially among youth who were not able to 
achieve either an education or job skills during the long war. The final report of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission pointed out how conditions for young people were among 
the root causes of the conflict in the first place, and urged that priority be given to policies 
intended for the creation of jobs for youth, in order to create stability and build long-lasting 
peace in the country. However, the policies for job creation remain political rhetoric 
leaving the youth with no real prospects for the future. The same can be said for 
education. Even if primary school is officially free, often the family cannot provide food for 
the children let alone uniforms, books and school materials, and as a consequence boys 
and girls find themselves on the street instead of in a classroom. 
Soon after the end of the war poverty started creating distortions among youth 
which resulted in the reproduction of violent identities. During fieldwork it emerged how 
the DDR policies had created a division among youth, between ex-child soldiers and all 
the others who were witnesses and victims of the war. The DDR programme paid the 
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young combatants to disarm, thus producing an initial division in the youth population. The 
message sent to the youth was that violence in the end pays. In this situation many youth 
pretended to be combatants in order to receive the $300 provided by the DDR programme 
to each combatant who surrendered a weapon and demobilised (Solomon, 2008). 
However, pretending to be an ex-combatant meant adopting violent attitudes and 
behaviours accordingly, to play the part as it were. This system indirectly supported those 
who had been using violence as a way of life during the war.  
Reintegration of the ex-child soldiers involved skills training. However, numerous 
interviewees pointed out how the training schemes put in place to change the role of the 
ex-child soldiers from military to civilian through work was highly ineffective, if not 
counterproductive. At the end of the training period the job market did not offer positions 
for the youth, who eventually sold the working kits to raise some money and then found 
other ways of making a living. Again this policy generated distortions among the youth. In 
the first place those who fought the war were ‘rewarded’ with skills training, while victims 
and witnesses of the war were left apart. Secondly, it failed to provide jobs for the ex-child 
soldiers who often resorted again to violence for survival. Many ex-combatants and 
especially ex-child soldiers became taxi drivers or Okada drivers12 (motorbike drivers) as 
these professions do not need real skills, and are in much demand. As a consequence 
drivers are regarded with suspicion and fear by the general public as they are considered 
drug addicts at best (mainly as a consequence of the war),  and as violent individuals and 
criminals as well in most cases. Okada drivers especially are described as ‘drivers by day 
and criminals by night’ as the motorbikes which function as taxis during the day are used 
during the night for robberies and smuggling. Acts of extreme, and at time random, 
violence, such as murder and rape, committed by both taxi drivers and Okada drivers who 
are ex-combatants  are reported with extreme frequency. 
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 The name Okada comes from Nigeria where the phenomenon of motorbike taxis started. The format was 
imported into Sierra Leone after the war and has spread to all the major towns of the country.  
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The ‘legacy’ of the DDR programmes in a context of extreme poverty played a 
crucial role in the perpetuation of violent behaviours and attitudes which is still at play 
today. The result is that being an ex-child soldier is ‘cool’, and ex-child soldiers are 
respected because they are feared by adults and youth alike. The extent of the poverty in 
Sierra Leone has created a bulge of marginalised and disgruntled youth who are fighting 
every day for survival. Poverty represents the fundamental condition in which a culture of 
violence can breed and perpetuate itself. The experience of the frailty and insecurity of 
their very existence exacerbates the frustration of youth. They compete every day with 
each other for the limited resources available and any means that ensure survival are 
acceptable. In the end is a matter of life or death. The situation is aggravated by the 
relatively easy access to alcohol and drugs. Many ex-child soldiers were drug addicts by 
the end of the war. In most cases the addiction has continued until today. Drugs and 
alcohol were used during the war to increase bravery and the proneness to violence. In 
peace time drugs and alcohol are still used by youth to make them ‘bold’ and able to carry 
out whatever is necessary to survive for another day. However, youth are increasingly 
using drugs and alcohol to numb themselves, to evade the daily reality of their desperate 
living conditions and lack of hope. 
Poverty, together with unemployment and a lack of education, is at the root of the 
youth’ resorting to violence in everyday life: “The harshness of society makes the youth 
react with equal harshness.” (Peacelinks, Programme Coordinator, Mr. James Hallowell.) 
When survival is at stake, strength and proneness to violence are crucial to ensure one’s 
own survival. Consequently youth, and especially street youth, feel the need to be 
physically strong and simultaneously to demonstrate their readiness to fight. This state of 
things promotes the use of violence and in a sense provides justification for youth to 
engage in violent activities. Violence in a context of extreme poverty becomes culturally 
acceptable, as it is seen as part and parcel of how things are, how things work, part of the 
societal dynamics and societal system: “Unemployment aggravates their anger and so to 
survive they end up using violence.” (COOPI, Programme Manager, Mr. Robin Yoki.) The 
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protraction of a situation of extreme poverty results in creation of the ground for the 
perpetuation and transmission of violence. 
The condition of poverty interacts with all the other elements and in a way 
underpins all other dynamics. Poverty erodes the integrity of the family as an institution, 
forcing so many children and youth onto the streets where they are vulnerable to any kind 
of exploitation and violence; the war has torn apart the social fabric and destroyed the 
safety nets that were in place in the communities before, so children are left completely 
alone. To survive they steal, rob, pick pocket, sell drugs, and smuggle goods, all illegal 
and dangerous activities, but households are so poor that parents do not have the luxury 
to worry about where their children got the money from, or how. When girls find 
themselves on the streets begging for money or food, they become easy targets for 
sexual exploitation and often become prostitutes, when they are vulnerable to rape and 
beating as well as sexual transmitted diseases and early pregnancies, but again when 
they go home with money the family do not ask what they had to do for it.  The despicable 
living conditions of so many youth make them vulnerable to exploitation and manipulation 
by the richer and more powerful strata of the population, as, for example, political élites as 
well as educated peers. In general poverty provides the wider context in which the use of 
violence remains possible, thus poverty is better considered a structural factor in the 
process of transmission of a culture of violence. 
 
Family 
 
The role that the family plays in the transmission of a culture of violence is pivotal. In the 
analytical framework, the role of the family was considered mainly in terms of transmission 
of psychological trauma from the parents to the children, consciously at times but 
unconsciously in most cases. This role of the family in the transmission of war trauma is 
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known from the literature that is concerned with the survivors of the Holocaust, and their 
offspring. However, what emerged through the interviews conducted during fieldwork is a 
different, and somehow unexpected, role of the family in the transmission of a culture of 
violence. 
Firstly, it is important to point out the complete lack of studies about the 
transmission of trauma from one generation to the next in Sierra Leone. The dynamics of 
the relationship between parents and children have also generally not been explored. 
Hence, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to comment about the impact of psychological 
trauma related to the war within the family realm in the Sierra Leonean case. The 
interviewees themselves could not comment specifically on the issues defined using 
concepts belonging to Western psychology, and more generally about mental health13. 
Therefore, with regard to the role of the family, it is necessary to take a different approach 
and follow what emerged from the voices of the interviewees in order to understand which 
dynamics are at work within its realm. 
When discussing the role of the family, the participants in the study highlighted two 
main aspects. The first aspect was related to children’s exposure to high levels of 
domestic violence within the household. The violence that is experienced within the family 
is not specifically derived from the war. It was part of the male-female dynamics and 
elders-youth dynamics within the Sierra Leonean society also before the war. Domestic 
violence is still rampant today despite the social campaigns and the dedicated police task 
force, mainly because family issues tend to be resolved at the community level. The use 
of violence and abusive language within the household is commonly linked to the poor 
conditions most family are forced to live in. The frustration and, at times, desperation 
experienced day after day by the parents translates in domestic violence. The daily 
exposure to this type of violence was not reported as a factor directly responsible for 
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 There is only one psychiatrist in the whole country and the facilities outside Freetown are limited to the 
work of foreign NGOs which cannot possibly cope with the number of patients that the war has left behind. 
Syndromes related to PTSD and trauma, and more general mental health problems, are still today mainly 
treated by traditional healers. 
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children engaging in violence. Instead, domestic violence seemed to be considered to 
create the ground, or the context for children and youth to engage in violent activities.  In 
fact this element can be read within the aggressive behaviour tradition which links the 
exposure to violence with aggressive behaviour. Aggressive behaviour is considered to be 
socially learned, in this case from the parents at home. However, Putamaki pointed out 
that the social learning approach to aggression is not on its own enough to explain the 
involvement of youth in violent behaviours and activities (Putamaki, 2009); the participants 
in this study seemed to agree that exposure to domestic violence, however important in 
the everyday life of youth and children, is not in itself enough to explain the process of 
transmission of a culture of violence in Sierra Leonean society. Instead, domestic violence 
is one major reason for children and youngsters to leave the household. Before the war it 
was unthinkable for youth and children to simply leave their family or run away. Today it is 
extremely common. Youth and children do not accept the situation in silence, on the 
contrary they rebel against the violence that they experience at home. It is in the breaking 
of the bond between the family and the child that the conditions for negative influence 
enter the life of the children and youth. Away from the family children and youth are 
exposed to the harshness of street life and the coping mechanisms offered on the streets 
are often entrenched with violence. 
A second dynamic within the family realm emerged during the fieldwork. This 
aspect seemed to be the most important one in terms of effect on youth’ lives and in terms 
of perpetuation of violent behaviours. More than on what the family does, the focus was 
put on what the family cannot do any more for the children and youth as a result of the 
war or of poverty. Before the war the family used to largely coincide with the community; 
in this societal system the education of the children in the norms and values of society 
was shared within the community. After the war the family shrank to the nuclear unit 
consisting of the parents and children only. As a consequence of the war, there is often 
only a single parent, making the situation even more difficult. Moreover, the extreme 
poverty in which most families live means that parents cannot provide for their own 
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children any more, not even satisfying the daily need of food. The family lost its role within 
the social system and the social fabric; the family is no longer capable of being a 
respected place for the transmission of shared values and norms. This disruption of the 
guidance role of the family is made even more serious by the endemic poverty that affects 
the households. Families are crippled both psychologically and economically. When the 
family is unable to provide for its young members it loses credibility in their eyes, and as a 
consequence it loses authority over them. The new generations are inevitably looking 
elsewhere to fill the vacuum left by the retreat of the family capabilities. 
As pointed out by Ager (2006) when children are separated from or lose their 
family during armed conflicts and wars, they find alternative spaces of socialisation. 
Children cannot be considered only as dependent on the family and as vulnerable if 
separated from it. On the contrary, children have their own agency and when the 
institution of the family fails or is unable to provide (physically or psychologically) for them, 
they will find other sources, other ways to make sense of reality, to create sets of meaning 
that will constitute their system of norms and values within which to act and perform 
everyday life and relate to others. This is the case for many post-war Sierra Leonean 
children. 
In their rebellion against the family, children and youth are strongly supported by 
what they learn through the media and at school or from NGOs personnel about children’s 
rights. The introduction of the concept of child rights and what that entails has provided 
children and youth with the justification and legitimacy for resisting parental authority. 
Justified or not, the awareness of children and youth of their rights exacerbates the lack of 
grip and control that parents exercise over their offspring. It erodes the capacity of parents 
to pass on values and the system of meaning that characterised the traditional Sierra 
Leonean society. What children and youth take from the child rights narrative is their right 
to decide for themselves and to reject any imposition by the parents that is conveniently 
read as a violation of their rights and as violence toward them. Many youth leave their 
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household because of the frustration that builds between the two generations, the parents 
and the offspring. Children and youth naturally look for alternative sources of norms and 
values to create the system of meanings they need to make sense of their surroundings in 
their everyday life. Peers are the first source of influence for children and youth, but this 
will be discussed more broadly later in the chapter.  
During the fieldwork something else emerged as a crucial and widespread source 
of influence upon children and youth: Western culture, as in Western movies, music, stars. 
The West has become the principal influence on Sierra Leonean youth culture. Problems 
arise because of the complete lack of censorship regarding what children can watch or 
listen to. The levels of violence of the movies children are exposed to would horrify any 
parent in most Western societies. In Sierra Leone cinemas are not a formal enterprise, 
cinemas are a dark room made with metal siding that mushroom around town without any 
need of licensing or permit. This uncritical exposure to violent life styles leads children to 
believe that what they see in Western or Nigerian movies and music videos is real. 
Children come to believe that in the West we do live in a constant street-gang-warfare 
reality and because it comes from the West, it is automatically considered ‘cool’, and 
children start in this way to imitate the behaviours they see in the movies and music 
videos projected around town. Moreover, the gang culture fits very well in a society that is 
traditionally organised around the concept of groups and membership/belonging to a 
group, be it a secret society or a social group or a political party. This is where the family 
becomes powerless. The influence from the outside is too strong. The family does not 
have positive role models to offer to children and a vacuum is created that needs to be 
filled. Often the filling is characterised by violence as a normal way of life.  
In conclusion, the family emerged as a contextual factor in the process of 
transmission that this study aims to delineate. The family is not directly involved in the 
process of transmission; the ‘space’ of the family is not recognised per se as a place 
where values and norms that include and accept violence are transmitted. It is the 
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breakdown of the family that plays a central role in creating the context, the conditions 
within which children and youth are initiated into violent practices and in creating the 
ground where violence is acted out and re-enacted in everyday life.  However, it needs to 
be noted that the family has the potential to restrain the transmission of violence; when 
the structure and institution of the family is not eroded, it can still act as a positive guide 
for children and youth. 
 
Peers 
 
The influence of peers has emerged during the fieldwork as a major element in the 
process of transmission of violence. As pointed out above, the breakdown of the family 
creates a vacuum which children and youth need to fill. The peer group is the most 
immediate source to which children and youth will look for guidance and for those 
meanings, social norms and values indispensable in the construction of their own identity 
and in making sense of the world around them. It is in this context that peers become 
crucial in the process of transmission of violence.  
Because of poverty and/or family breakdown, children and youth are forced more 
and more onto the street. As the concept of homophily indicates, contacts occur more 
frequently among similar individuals which, in the case of the streets of Freetown, means 
that children and youth socialise mainly with their peers. It is when socialising with their 
peers that those templates that dignify violent attitudes and forms of behaviour as a way 
of life are transmitted. Similarly to what Errante described in Mozambique and South 
Africa (1999), the values, norms, attitudes and behaviours that are acquired on the streets 
of Freetown by youth from other youth derive from the wartime when the templates of 
socialisation promoted aggression and violence. Demonstration of the persistence of 
those templates can be found in the mimicking by youth of the violence of the war, of its 
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gestures and actions, in the use of military ranking within groups of youth and in the 
practice of taking with violence what they want and need for survival.  
Ex-child soldiers in particular seem to be the principal agents of the transmission of 
those socialisation templates that they have acquired when fighting during the war. The 
difficulty that child soldiers experience in shifting from military identities to civilian identities 
makes the templates formed during the war time especially resilient. When reintegrated 
with society, back in the families and schools, ex-child soldiers socialise with other 
children and youth. Ex-child soldiers act as involuntary vehicles of norms and values that 
include the use of violence as accepted behaviour, and they introduce them at different 
levels of society, influencing street youth as well as family members and school children 
and other youth. A culture of violence is in this way transmitted at all levels of society with 
no regard to class.  
At the street level boys and girls forced out of the home and struggling for survival 
are ready recipients of those norms and values that can help them in the everyday fight 
for survival. In this case poverty creates the context in which the transmission of a culture 
of violence is acceptable, even well received and useful. During the war children and 
youth learned that they could obtain what they wanted through the use of violence. Today, 
10 years after the end of war, it is still the case. When children and youth find themselves 
on the streets they quickly learn from other youth that they can obtain what they need with 
violence. Thus the norms and values that promote or legitimise certain violent behaviours 
and illegal activities become the way for personal achievement in a system that does not 
provide it otherwise. In other words, there are no real incentives for youth to change their 
attitudes and behaviours as violence proves to be effective in the logic of street life.  
The transmission of violence continues not only for the material gain that youth 
recognise in it but also for the social status derived from sharing norms and values based 
on templates of socialisation of aggression. To be violent is ‘cool’, it brings with it respect 
for the individual and social status among the youth group. The individual is pushed to 
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comply with the values and norms shared by the peer group through mechanisms of 
applause and shame, the recognition of social status and its withholding. If one is ready to 
fight, steal, smoke marijuana or drink alcohol, he/she is considered cool and modern; 
other youth would respect that individual and he/she would enjoy popularity within the 
group. On the contrary rejecting violent attitudes and behaviours results in marginalisation, 
being ridiculed, picked upon, called names. This mechanism, called ‘means control’ 
(Campbell, 1980: 325), is particularly effective when the children of wealthy families and 
Sierra Leonean children from the diaspora participate or even initiate the violence. In this 
way the equation violence=social status is reinforced, since these children and youth 
already enjoy greater social status thanks to their family wealth, or because they have 
returned from abroad. 
Peer influence is not limited to street youth but it is preponderant in schools and 
universities as well. These institutions are not immune from the levels of violence of the 
streets. On the contrary, schools are the principal place of socialisation for children and 
youth. The presence of violence in school institutions was identified as a major problem by 
most interviewees. Violence characterises in particular the social groups and cliques that 
are formed among students. These groups fight for popularity and ‘power’ within the 
schools and the rivalry often ends in violence. Secondary-school students go to school 
with stones, knives and blades, sometimes even guns. Sport events seem to be the 
catalysts for youth violence. At any school sport event violence may burst out and the 
police have to intervene14. Rivalry in general seems to be framed in violent terms, as if the 
logic underpinning it is ‘either you or me’.  
Similar dynamics are at play at the university level. However this aspect is mainly 
related to the organisation of groups, which is discussed in detail later in the chapter. 
What needs to be pointed out here is how peer relations are crucial in the transmission of 
a culture of violence not only where street youth are concerned, but also among school 
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pupils and university students. An additional point to be made is that university students 
have a particular influence on younger youth because of the special status they embody 
as university students. In fact university education is expensive and therefore rare in 
Sierra Leone, and as a consequence those youth who makes it to university enjoy a 
special status; they are highly respected and listened to by other youth. The violent 
dynamics in place within the universities (which will be discussed in detail in the next 
section) are therefore passed on to younger youth in secondary schools but also to street 
youth. 
Schools and state institutions in general seem powerless to break the perpetuation 
of violence among children and youth. Schools are overcrowded and teachers are 
severely underpaid, therefore schools fail to act as educators as much as the family fails. 
Moreover, since the end of the war and the introduction of children’s rights, teachers, and 
educators in general, cannot use physical punishment to control the pupils. Far from 
saying that corporal punishment is a good means of education, I am simply reporting the 
inability of teachers to control and impose their authority over the children. They are not 
given any alternative means of holding their authority over the pupils, which translates as 
a complete inability to guide and educate children and youth to accept values and norms 
that do not support violence. Teachers also tend to be involved in corruption mechanisms 
as they do not earn enough to support their families, thus being negative role models for 
children and youth who learn from them that illegal/criminal activities pay more and that 
that is the way society works.  
Violence seems to be deeply entrenched in peer relations and socialisation 
dynamics. Among peers, and elsewhere, there seems to be a distortion of the value 
attributed to violence. Violent behaviours and attitudes are perceived as normal, to say the 
least, if not as positive and revered. Peer pressure and peer socialisation are the vehicles 
for the transmission of violence not only down on the street but at other levels of society 
as well. The interviews carried out during the fieldwork mainly confirmed not only the 
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validity, but also the centrality, of the peers’ influence in the process of transmission of 
ideas, behaviours and attitudes supporting the perpetuation of violence.   
 
Social identity: Social groups 
 
Sierra Leonean society tends to organise itself in groups. This is not a result of the war but 
a characteristic of traditional Sierra Leonean society, part of its traditions and of its way of 
structuring itself. This aspect of society was revealed to be crucial to the transmission of a 
culture of violence. From one interview to the next, this ‘space’ was more and more 
vehemently brought up by interviewees who stressed its importance and also its 
complexities.  
The tendency of the Sierra Leonean society to organise itself into groups and the 
importance that the groupings have in the societal dynamics and mechanisms unfolded 
slowly but relentlessly. The roots of this phenomenon are so deep that they reach across 
society, at all levels, horizontally and  vertically; it is simply everywhere, from street gangs 
to school cliques, university ‘camps’ and secret societies. Sierra Leonean society seems 
to have taken the concept of social identity and social categories to a new level. Meanings 
are formed and shared through these structures; the process of group creation and 
membership entails the sharing of values and norms among the members, which means 
that violence can travel through this system and as a result can be transmitted through it. 
This aspect of the society represents in itself a very powerful and pervasive vehicle for the 
transmission of a culture of violence. Inherent in the construction of groups is the definition 
of the in-group in opposition to an out-group. This contraposition lays the ground for the 
creation of rivalries and possibly violence between different groups.  
In this system, it is which group a person is affiliated with that determines social 
position, what can be achieved in life and ultimately defines who you are. The interviews 
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pointed out how, increasingly, one of the required elements for membership in the group 
is the readiness to take up violence. This is especially true for street gangs but also more 
and more for school cliques, university camps and so on.  
Violent initiation practices were part of the traditional secret societies that 
represent the skeleton of Sierra Leonean society; however, the practice of initiation 
through violence of new members spread to other types of groups that adopted the same 
usages of the secret societies. The adoption of the structure, the modality, and the 
initiation practices of the secret societies is particularly obvious in the two university 
camps (similar to fraternities). Violence characterises several aspects of the camps’ 
activities. From the violence of the initiation rituals reported by new members to the 
violence that characterises the rivalry between the two camps in relation to university 
politics, and more blatantly the existence of armed wings within both camps, violent 
practices have become an inherent part of the two sides. As a consequence those youth 
who belong to the two camps (and university students do not really have a choice, 
because if you do not join the camps you are considered an outcast) are immersed in a 
system that perpetrates acts of violence. Higher education does not seem to be an 
antidote to violence and the fact that the university structure has been infiltrated by a 
culture of violence, and becomes itself a vehicle for the transmission of it, testifies to the 
extent to which the tentacles of violence have spread inside Sierra Leonean society. 
Besides, university students represent the future élites of the country, which means that 
the practices that become normal within the university structure will impact on the culture 
of the future ruling class, with an impact in the long term upon what is accepted and 
acceptable in terms of use of violence. In addition we have to take into consideration the 
influence that university students have on younger youth, but also on street youth. 
Considering the violent nature of the rivalry in place between the two camps and the 
consequences of the animosity between their members, it becomes clear which kind of 
values and ideas underpins the two groups, and thus which kind of role model university 
students are for the younger ones. The extent of the link between university and street 
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youth15 is demonstrated by the recruiting of street youth to perpetrate violence against the 
other camp during university politics campaigns or in other moments of tension between 
the two groups.  
After the war groups tended to adopt the structure and hierarchy that existed within 
the war fighting forces, maintaining in this way a link with the reality of the war, including 
the normalisation of violence. So today children and youth aim at becoming the ‘general’ 
within the group they join and in order to advance in the ranking system, which resembles 
the army ranks, one needs to commit violent acts, such as stealing something, beating up 
a member of a rival group or even killing somebody. This marriage between a structure 
deeply entrenched in Sierra Leonean society and elements deriving from the war proves 
to be of great concern among the interviewees principally because of how elements of the 
war become normalised by their combination with something so familiar, widespread and 
widely accepted in Sierra Leonean society. The violence of the war enters in this way from 
the back door into the fundamental structures that constitute society in Sierra Leone, and 
since it does so through the young generations it is likely to take hold and persist in the 
long term.  
Youth are strongly driven into violent practices by the influence of elements of 
Western culture, and more specifically, hip-hop gangster culture16. Hip-hop music and its 
stars from the West are highly regarded by youth in Sierra Leone. They get to re-enact the 
life style of the rap American stars and their rivalry. In a society that naturally tends 
towards the creation of groups, the mentality portrayed in the music videos fits easily. 
Youth adopt the Western models from the media but they de-contextualise them, there is 
no critical reading of what is portrayed in the music videos and movies, therefore youth 
get the idea that a violent way of life is normal in the West. Groups are created in relation 
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to one or another rapper in the West or the corresponding hip-hop gang in Freetown, and 
the rivalry with other groups that support a rival rapper or hip-hop gang is automatic. 
Violence in the hip-hop gang culture is a positive element; being violent translates as 
being tough. Violent practices enter the way of life of children and youth through the 
imitation of Western hip-hop culture, as violence is the main element of this new identity. 
The lyrics of foreign as well as local hip-hop groups’ songs are extremely violent and 
preach extreme violence against the enemy groups and the establishment. The 
phenomenon is so widespread that it often makes it into the newspapers in Freetown, 
especially with regard to the way in which the gang culture has infiltrated the school 
institutions and encourages youth and children in the use of violence17. However, music is 
also considered a means of expressing oneself in a society where youth have no space. 
Youth use music to make their voices heard about their needs and their hopes in a 
context of disempowerment and marginalisation. As a consequence many NGOs have 
developed music or film projects in order to allow youth to express their disagreements, 
grievances and frustrations in a positive and productive way. 
This tendency to look up to Western culture in general is widespread and it derives 
from the rejection of traditional values by the young generations. Traditional values and 
ways of life are considered not adequate for the present time. Comparison is made 
between the wealthy West and the poor condition of Sierra Leone. As a consequence 
young people are attracted more by Western or foreign cultural practices in general as 
they are considered modern and respectable. However, the uncritical reading of the 
movies and music scene from the West misleads young Sierra Leoneans into thinking that 
what they see is reality and as a consequence they simply imitate and reproduce the 
violence they see. Gangs and groups formed on the streets or in the schools take rap 
music stars and gang culture as role models, and in doing so they adopt the violent 
practices and values embedded in that way of life. The extent of this phenomenon of the 
copying of Western practices has to be understood in the context of extreme poverty and 
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lack of family support. Hip-hop culture represents a way of surviving in a violent context, 
which is what Sierra Leonean youth experience every day. Thus the gangster’s way of life 
gives hope to poor and marginalised youth for a better future, showing them a way of 
achieving success and wealth through the use of violence. 
Sierra Leonean society has traditionally organised itself into groups as a form of 
social structure but also as an identity formation process. Today this characteristic 
remains strong and in itself is a vehicle for the transmission of values and norms that 
accept and normalise violent practices. However, this grouping tendency is acquiring new 
forms as influences from the West and from the war entered the system, adding more 
factors that support violence.  
 
Political factionalism 
 
While I was researching the literature in order to build the analytical framework through 
which to study the transmission of culture of violence, politics and the political sphere did 
not appear to be relevant to the phenomenon in question. However, as pointed out in the 
previous chapter, politicians and the political arena play active roles in the transmission of 
a culture of violence and in perpetuating it.  
There are at least three areas in which politicians have an important influence that 
need to be discussed.  First their involvement with the university camps, the White and the 
Black. The relationships of the two political parties with the two university camps 
transformed university politics in a miniature of national politics. However, the fact that the 
two camps both have the structure and the practices of secret societies distorts their 
rivalries and at the same time distorts a healthy political debate over group opposition that 
often breaks out into violence. Politicians all have interests in influencing the politics of the 
university and in breeding university students within this oppositional system since in the 
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process the two parties create a reservoir of party loyalists, future cadres and voters. The 
two camps become places where the future politicians are bred. This link in turn creates a 
continuum between the violent practices of the university camps and the violent rivalry 
that characterises their relations and the political arena, and the practices of political 
actors on a national level.  
Since the end of the war the political rhetoric has become increasingly polarised 
between the APC and the SLPP and the two major ethnic groups, the Temne and the 
Mende, as the two parties represent respectively more and more one specific ethnic group, 
and consequently the related region of origin within Sierra Leone. The exacerbation of this 
division is more evident inside the White and the Black camps at university where the two 
groups recruit along regional, and therefore ethnic, lines and incite their members to vote 
for the corresponding political parties in the national elections. Therefore the rivalry 
between the two university camps is also a political rivalry between the two national 
parties, and more and more between the two regions/ethnic groups of the country. The 
violent terms of the rivalry between the White and the Black camps and the violent rhetoric 
preached by these groups and their level of influence cast a dark shadow on the future 
relations between opposing groups at the national level. The division along regional and 
ethnic lines is reaching to the future generations as the White and Black camps have 
started recruiting in secondary schools, and corresponding groups have also appeared as 
low down as primary schools, creating a cleavage that runs down to the youngest 
generation.  
A second aspect that emerged from the interviews is the connection between 
political élites and street youth. In this case the political élite not only supports the use of 
violence but directly promotes it by recruiting street youth to create mayhem and 
perpetrate violence. The thug-culture introduced during the 1970s has not yet 
disappeared. On the contrary politicians count on the desperation of large bulges of youth 
who are unemployed and uneducated. The struggle for survival makes these youth 
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vulnerable to the manipulation of those with power and economic means. As a result of 
these practices, street youth get still highly involved in violent and criminal activities, 
behaviours and attitudes that are ‘legitimised’ by the politicians themselves who promote 
them as a way of achieving their own ends. This implies that there is little interest in the 
political arena in substantially improving the livelihood of young people, since the current 
conditions provide them with a large supply of highly easy-to-influence individuals. During 
election campaigns politicians directly address the needs of the young in order to get their 
votes, just to forget them once they obtain power. In the process street youth receive 
some money or alcohol and drugs to attack the opposite party, in order to influence the 
election result. The violence that the country experiences before both national and local 
elections speaks as proof of this system. The level of violence preceding elections has 
been increasing significantly since the end of the war, which is the result of the 
normalisation of the use of violent practices for political reasons and the consequent 
escalation in the level of violence. With this in mind, concerns were widely expressed 
during the interviews for the next national elections in 2012. The level of violence 
perpetrated by street youth recruited by the political élite is incredibly high, and includes 
physical assault, looting, beating, burning buildings and houses, and rape. Rape seems to 
occur every time there is civil unrest, riots or mayhem. Some consider it a left-over from 
the practice of rape as a weapon of war during the 10-years of civil war. More generally 
the levels of rape in Freetown are extremely high, which seems to be connected to the 
concept of masculinity related to the wartime that is still entrenched in the common 
mentality, especially of young men. 
The third aspect again brings to the surface the distortion that characterises the 
perception and the position of violence within the set of values shared within Sierra 
Leonean society. Violence has come to have a positive connotation at many different 
levels. The political arena is not immune from it; on the contrary, it is complicit in 
attributing to violence a positive connotation through condoning it publicly. Numerous ex-
combatants and ex-child soldiers have been reintegrated in the police forces, as personal 
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security for politicians and ultimately as presidential guards. These individuals are known 
by the public to have been responsible for extreme violent acts and atrocities during the 
war; however, only the highest ranks have been persecuted, while the others have been 
left free to re-enter the forces. The presence of these individuals in the presidential guard 
sends a clear message to young people about the consequences of using violence: no or 
few consequences. Moreover, the presidential guard has been witnessed to promote and 
organise violent attacks against the opposition party and to rally street youth to carry out 
riots and create mayhem. Interviewees have pointed out how the presidential guards have 
been portrayed as national heroes and how young people look up to them as role models. 
In this way violent practices become legitimate and acceptable, almost expected as the 
normal way of doing things in the political arena. Youth learn from these individuals that 
using violence pays career-wise, as brutal and violent ex-war commanders now hold such 
powerful and reputable positions. Violence is condoned at the highest levels and this 
provides additional legitimacy for violent attitudes and behaviours as well as 
institutionalising violence and the transmission of values and norms supporting it.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have tried to highlight the importance of the connections between the 
‘spaces’ of transmission. None of them on its own is enough to explain the resilience of 
violence among youth in post-war Sierra Leone but together they create a system of 
forces that reinforce each other and that perpetuate a culture of violence. The interaction 
of the different categories composing the analytical framework creates a network that 
reaches all strata of Sierra Leonean society. In this way a culture of violence is becoming 
an integral part of the societal structure and of the system of meanings, values and norms 
shared by the Sierra Leonean society.  
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 The culture of violence enters the life of youth from many different directions and at 
many different levels. In turn youth interiorise the values and norms that constitute the 
system described in this chapter. Attitudes and behaviours are shaped according to this 
system of values and youth performing them in their everyday life become the agents of 
transmission of a culture of violence.  
 Some of the categories identified in this study act as contextual factors relevant to 
the process of transmission, as factors such as poverty and family do not contribute 
directly to the transmission of violence. However, they are not less important in explaining 
the phenomenon as they create the conditions, the context in which violence still 
germinates, is picked up by the young generations and is ultimately transmitted. The other 
categories, peers, social groups and politics, can be described as more immediate factors 
as they have a direct role in the process of transmission. 
 Youth are deeply involved in, and at the same time affected by, the resilience of a 
culture of violence within Sierra Leonean society and by internalising it and becoming the 
vehicles of its transmission to other youth, they involuntarily create a bridge to the next 
generations, projecting the impact of a culture of violence in the long term. The 
implications for peace and stability in Sierra Leone are serious. The levels of violence 
seem to slowly but relentlessly escalate and this process could open the door for further 
cycles of violence. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The resilience of violence in post-war societies represents a serious challenge for the 
implementation of peace accords and the construction of long-lasting peace. The 
experience of the war leaves marks both on the society and on its members which last for 
a long time after the official end of fighting. This ‘legacy of war’, as Steenkamp (2005) 
called it, is often characterised by the persistence of high levels of violence after the 
signing of peace accords. A society during war responds to its disruption by creating new 
systems, structures, norms and values that function in the context of war. Thus war not 
only tears apart families, kills and traumatises, but also impacts on the norms and values 
of society and inevitably changes them. During war, violence is part of everyday life and 
the continual exposure to it makes those who live through it take violence for granted, 
accept it, and they become numb to it. Violence becomes so embedded in the societal 
system of values and norms that it is perceived as an acceptable, and expected, form of 
behaviour. Through this process violence comes to be part of the culture of a society to 
the point that we can talk of a ‘culture of violence’ (Steenkamp, 2005; Waldmann, 2007). 
Culture is shared by a community and is learned by its members, and in the same way a 
‘culture of violence’ is passed on within the society and to the new generations, and in this 
way it survives over time.  
However, the impact of war is especially significant for children and youth who 
know very little or nothing of the reality of peace time and who learn in the early stages of 
their life the practices, values and norms at work in time of war. Children and youth 
represent the group most vulnerable to the violence of war. Often forcibly abducted by the 
fighting parties, displaced and separated from their families, exposed to violence and 
sexual exploitation, they pay the highest price during armed conflict (Machel, 2003). 
Children and youth also represent the next, future generation which makes them a vehicle 
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for the transmission of the practices and ideas that support and perpetrate violence in the 
society.  
The transmission of a ‘culture of violence’ explains how high levels of violence can 
still be found in post-war societies. The process of transmission is a complex and 
multilayered phenomenon that cannot be understood from a single perspective. In this 
thesis, four ‘spaces’ of transmission were identified during preliminary research: poverty, 
family, peers and social groups. These four factors constitute the analytical framework 
used during the fieldwork in Sierra Leone to research the phenomenon of transmission. 
The first-hand research carried out during fieldwork produced findings fundamental to the 
understanding of the process of transmission of a ‘culture of violence’. In fact what had 
emerged through the preliminary research using secondary sources  depicting a flat two-
dimensional picture which did not account for the dynamism of the process. From the 
interviews, the picture gained more depth as the actual role of each factor was clarified 
and the interactions among the various ‘spaces’ were revealed, together with unexpected 
elements that had not emerged during the preliminary work and would not have emerged 
otherwise. 
In the case of Sierra Leone a ‘culture of violence’ was demonstrated to be indeed 
transmitted and perpetuated throughout society and its institutions. Some ‘spaces’ of 
transmission acted as contextual factors, as in the case of poverty and family. The reality 
of extreme poverty and consequential marginalisation, and the disruption and retreat of 
the family, both contribute to the creation of the context in which practices of violence and 
the values sustaining them can spread and perpetuate. More proximate factors are peers, 
social groups and political factionalism. In these ‘spaces’ violence is directly or indirectly 
promoted. Violence seems to characterise relations between the individual and the group 
and among different groups. Due to the disruption of the family, peers become the main 
influence for youth. In a context of extreme poverty youth mainly socialise on the streets 
where the fighting for daily survival takes place. Youth and children learn violent strategies 
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of survival from other youth like them. Those who can afford to attend school are also 
more influenced by their peers than by the family, and in school too violence characterises 
everyday life. With the reintegration of ex-child soldiers into families, communities and 
schools, youth have been exposed to the influence of peers who have fought in the war 
and often still retain the mentality of military life. The same can be said for the ex-child 
combatants living on the streets where they socialise with fellow youth. Ex-child soldiers 
face difficulties in the shift from military to civilian identities, and as testified by several 
interviewees, they tend to re-enact the logic of ‘take what you want and need with force’ 
that was characteristic of the war. Throughout society, peers represent a crucial vehicle 
for transmission of ideas and practices of violence.  
Even more widespread at all levels of society is the influence of social groups. In 
fact the whole of society tends naturally and traditionally to organise itself in groups. 
Membership of a group is fundamental for social life and for defining one’s own identity. 
From street gangs to university camps (similar to confraternities) through school cliques 
and secret societies, the mechanisms of social grouping are deeply entrenched with 
violence. Most groups demand violent acts by their members as requirements for 
membership or during the process of initiation. The rivalry among different groups is fierce 
and it promotes the use of violence against outer groups and their members. The social 
group is often a means to access resources, receive benefits and achieve power and 
social status. This system promotes favouritism in schools, colleges and university. The 
system itself becomes saturated with structural violence as members of a group are 
guaranteed benefits that others do not have. The same mechanism is at work in the 
political arena where the political élite promotes violence against the opposing party and 
supports the perpetuation of violent practices within and between university camps, and 
now also in secondary schools. Rivalry at the political level is based on the use of violence 
against the adversary; political competition is violent confrontation. The use of violence is 
widely condoned at the highest levels of society and this sends a message to youth, 
telling them that violence has no consequences and ultimately it even pays. 
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Reinforcement in the use of violence also applies to street youth since violent strategies 
guarantee their daily survival.  
On one side there is the violence related to the conditions of extreme poverty and 
marginalisation, scarce resources, lack of education and endemic unemployment that 
push youth to find alternative ways of survival such as petty trade, pick pocketing, 
smuggling, and prostitution. These conditions create frustration and anger which push 
youth toward alcohol and drugs. Daily life is a matter of survival and fellow youth are seen 
as competitors. Violence becomes a means by which to access resources and live yet 
another day. Because of these contextual factors, youth become vulnerable to 
manipulation by the élites who can easily mobilise youth to commit violence on their 
behalf. On the other side there is the violence entrenched in the social systems and 
structures. In this case violence is embedded in the functioning of society at all levels. The 
violent rivalry that characterises social groups from the school level up to the political level 
is the main support for the transmission of a ‘culture of violence’. However, these two 
areas in which violence is perpetuated are not separated and independent of one another. 
The two are constantly reinforcing each other in supporting the preservation of a system 
that is fuelled with violence.  
In the case of post-war Sierra Leone, a ‘culture of violence’ reaches all layers of 
society and characterises values systems as well as institutional structures and 
functioning. The interactions among the various ‘spaces’ of transmission create a network 
of forces; this network perpetuates and supports those practices and ideas which are 
shared within the society and which promote, legitimise and condone violence.  The 
process of transmission takes place at many levels and involves all the ‘spaces’ 
composing the analytical framework, and more. The system that is constructed through 
the interrelations among the various levels spreads its tentacles to all layers of society. In 
this system youth are at the centre. They act and re-enact violent behaviours and attitudes, 
but they also transmit the ideas, values and norms that support violent practices. They 


pass them on to other youth and children, and by embracing them as their own set of 
values, they crystallise them, normalise them. Violence is becoming more and more the 
leitmotif that regulates relations within Sierra Leonean society and therefore it is more and 
more difficult to eradicate it, especially since the younger generations are already deeply 
involved in the perpetuation of violence. Violence is internalised and normalised at a very 
young age in today’s Sierra Leone and children and youth learn early to act upon it. This 
situation was described by many interviewees during the fieldwork as a ‘ticking bomb’, 
especially in view of the coming national elections in 2012. The mix of direct violence as 
perpetrated on the streets or during initiation rituals, and structural violence entrenched in 
the system of social groups and political factionalism, together with poverty and 
marginalisation, has much potential for creating future cycles of violence. If the new 
generations learn that violence is the norm in the ordinary functioning of society they will 
use violence to achieve their goals without questioning it; they will simply act according to 
the rules which they have learnt regulate their own society dynamics.  
The phenomenon explored in this thesis explains how violence survives in post-
war Sierra Leone, but if some elements are specific and unique to Sierra Leone, wider 
lessons can be applied elsewhere in post-war societies. In fact, the way poverty supports 
the use of violence as a means  ensuring survival goes beyond the case of Sierra Leone, 
and in the same way the destruction of the social fabric and of the societal systems occurs 
in most post-war societies and the vacuum that is created can free the ground for violent 
practices and behaviours to spread in all cases. More generally, in societies that have 
experienced prolonged war, violence manifests itself in multiple aspects of the society and 
at many levels, therefore in order to understand the extent of the phenomenon, an 
integrative and comprehensive approach is needed. The norms and values that constitute 
a ‘culture of violence’ are deeply entrenched in society and reveal themselves in different 
shapes according to the space in which they are acted upon. Beyond the case of Sierra 
Leone, the potential consequences of the transmission of a culture of violence resulting 
from a prolonged war can only really be grasped through the consideration of all the loci in 


which the process takes place. The omnipresence of the phenomenon represents a 
serious risk for the stability of a post-war society. This is especially so when children and 
youth play such a crucial role in the perpetuation of a ‘culture of violence’. What can be 
drawn from this study is that in order to restrain the transmission of a culture of violence, 
special attention should be paid to the role of youth and children, and also that to restrain 
the transmission, a holistic and multilayered approach should be adopted. 
Different themes emerged from this research that deserve attention on their own 
and should be further studied. First, there is the role of the media and the influence of 
Western culture, as in music and movies, in shaping youth’s behaviours and sets of 
values. In this paper this element was discussed within the context of erosion of traditional 
values and of formation of social groups using the template of American rap gangs. 
However, the cultural influence that the West has on the current Sierra Leonean society 
and the consequences of the adoption of Western models and values should be further 
explored. Another element that is left to future studies is the concept of masculinity and of 
femininity in the cultural system of Sierra Leonean society, especially in the aftermath of 
war. Rape was widely perpetrated during the war and it is still extremely common today, 
and every time a riot takes place, or some sort of urban unrest, women are raped. This 
seems to suggest how the radicalisation of stereotypes of masculinity that takes place 
during war still exists today. A third element that should be further explored is the situation 
relating to a ‘culture of violence’ and its transmission in the rural areas, as this paper 
focuses on the capital, Freetown, and therefore on urban youth. In this research an 
integrative analytical framework was demonstrated to be an effective tool for the 
understanding of a phenomenon that spreads across the entire society and manifests 
itself in numerous and diverse ways and aspects of people’s lives. Further studies should 
aim for inclusiveness in their approach in order to be able to account for the dynamics of 
the processes at play in society. 


A final note needs to be made. In this thesis I have mainly discussed violent 
elements in Sierra Leonean society. However, it is not my intention to ‘pathologise’ Sierra 
Leonean society as a place where violence rules or where violence is overpowering. 
During the fieldwork, I encountered numerous positive examples of youth who refuse the 
use of violence, who recognise the violence that is entrenched in the way society works, 
and take a stand against it, youth who got out of street gangs and help the former gang 
mates to find alternative ways of living, youth who help fellow youth to find their voices to 
escape marginalisation and disempowerment. However, their efforts might go in vain if the 
structural factors supporting violence are not seriously addressed. 
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Introduction 
1. In Sierra Leone, the youth is the lifeblood of the nation. Every Sierra Leonean between 
the ages of 18 and 35 years old is considered to be a youth. According to a government 
paper of 2003, youths constitute forty-five percent of the country’s estimated 4.5 million 
population. 
2. In the conflict, youths were both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations on 
a massive scale. It was a dual role to which youths had become accustomed in post-
independence Sierra Leone: on the one hand, they were abused; on the other hand they 
became the abusers. In the 1970s and 1980s, as the one-party system became 
increasingly tyrannical, youths formed the only viable opposition to the ruling All People’s 
Congress (APC) because the other political parties had been co-opted and assimilated 
into the government.2 When institutions and their leaders in so many sectors of society 
failed to speak out against the injustices of the APC regime, invariably it was the voice of 
youth that called for accountability. Conversely, though, youths were often the instruments 
of oppression, acting as vicious thugs to influence the outcomes of elections and put down 
anti-government demonstrations. In times of transition, Sierra Leone’s youth has always 
struggled to find its rightful place in society.  
3. Testimonies received by the Commission indicate that the majority of participants in the 
war were youths. Many of them were children at the time of their recruitment. Others 
joined voluntarily in protest against the social and political ills of the day, or in the name of 
defending their communities. They all lost their youth to a career of fighting and violence. 
Some are now exporting 
their combat “expertise” to neighbouring countries in conflict. The experiences and 
prospects of youth in Sierra Leone require careful consideration.   
4. In the course of the war, youths committed brutal and malicious acts against their family 
members, communities and fellow Sierra Leoneans. Their experiences during the war 
have disrupted their lives and traumatised them. Many youths are currently drifting without 
direction, unable to access education or employment. Some are so disillusioned with their 
environment that they are desperately seeking a way out and would readily resort once 
more to violence. 
5. Sierra Leone faces the daunting task of reclaiming a “lost generation” of youth. The 
“youth question” is therefore central to lasting peace and development in the country. This 
examination of youth participation in the war will enable the Commission to make detailed 
recommendations on how to respond to the challenges created by misguided youth in the 
past and how to restore youths as productive members of their communities. 
1 See Ministry of Youth and Sports, Government of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone National 
Youth 


Policy, strategy paper published in July 2003, at page 5. 
2 More detail on the lack of credible opposition to the APC regime, as well as analysis of 
the failures of the wider society to hold the political élites to account, can be found in the 
chapters on Governance and the Historical Antecedents to the Conflict in Volume Three A 
of this report. 
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6. In his statement to the Commission, Brima Vandy, who was 30 years old at the start of 
the conflict in 1991, made this confession: 
“When I was in the bush… I committed many violations and abuses. 
I killed innocent people, took away their property by force… asked 
them to leave their houses for me to sleep inside… and forced their 
women to make love to me.”3 
7. In her testimony to a closed hearing of the Commission, a young woman in the 
Koinadugu District told of her experiences: 
“Upon our arrival (at their base) we were distributed to different rebels 
to become their wives… when we refused, they flogged us. We were 
raped by two or three men daily… when we fought back, they 
threatened to kill us. We eventually got married to them. They gave us 
drugs like marijuana to smoke. When the roads were free, we pleaded 
for them to release us to go back to our relatives… but they refused. 
Commander Sofila pleaded with them to release us but they threatened 
to kill us if we tried to escape. Commander CO Ray inscribed RUF on 
our bodies. They looted properties whilst we carried their 
ammunitions.”4 
8. Similar narratives by youths, both as victims and perpetrators, abound in the 
testimonies, statements and interviews gathered by the Commission. In addition, the 
youth question has stimulated considerable analysis and debate among academics and 
writers on the conflict. One Sierra Leonean historian, Ibrahim Abdullah, has described the 
war as the high point of a rebellious Freetown youth culture of “rarray man dem” that 
started in the 1940s.5 Another Sierra Leonean historian, Ishmael Rashid, has detected a 
strong impetus for the war in the convergence that took place in the 1970s and 1980s 
between these rarray man dem and groups of radical students influenced by leftist 
ideologies.6 British anthropologist Paul Richards has traced the cause of the war to a 
patrimonial crisis, sidelined intellectuals, violent films and a desire by youths to manage 
the resources of the rain forest more equitably.7 Finally Jimmy Kandeh, a Sierra Leonean 


political scientist, has noted that the atrocities committed by youths during the war 
stemmed from the “subaltern” appropriation of what was previously the violence of the 
elites.8 
3 Brima Vandy, TRC statement recorded at 11 Battalion Headquarters, Kambia District, 
March 2003. 
4 TRC confidential testimony received during closed hearings in Koinadugu District, 14 
May 2003. 
5 See Abdullah I.; “Youth Culture and Rebellion: Understanding Sierra Leone’s Wasted 
Decade”, in 
Critical Arts journal, Volume 16, Number 2, 2002 (hereinafter “Abdullah, Youth Culture 
and 
Rebellion”), at page 29. Rarray man dem are streetwise urban youths, subordinated by 
the system. 
6 See Rashid, I.; “Subaltern Reactions: Lumpens, Students and the Left”, in Abdullah, I. 
and 
Bangura, Y. (eds.); Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War, 
Africa 
Development special edition on the Sierra Leone conflict, Volume XXII, Nos. 3 / 4, 1997 
(hereinafter 
“Rashid, Subaltern Reactions”), at page 24. 
7 See Richards, P.; Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra 
Leone, The 
International African Institute, Netherlands / UK, 1995. 
8 See Kandeh, J.; “Ransoming the State: Elite Origins of Subaltern Terror in Sierra Leone”, 
in 
Review of African Political Economy, No. 81, Roape Publications, 1999 (hereinafter 
“Kandeh, Elite 
Origins of Subaltern Terror”). 
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9. Combining these perspectives, it is possible to build a picture of the origins of violent 
behaviour among youths. Members of the political elite deployed “subalterns”, or rarray 
man dem, to silence their opponents during the days of the APC one-party state. Youths 
learned violence from their masters and developed violent reactions to the injustices and 
frustrations they encountered in their daily lives. As the conflict arrived, youths used 
brutality not to prop up the political elites, but to accumulate resources and power that had 
been denied to them previously, attacking the very foundations of the elites’ society. The 
major difference between elite-orchestrated violence and subaltern violence, however, 


was that the latter made no distinction between public and private property. The violence 
of the youths was largely indiscriminate. 
10. This chapter builds on these perspectives and makes use of submissions, testimonies 
and interviews gathered by the Commission to analyse and report on: the nature, causes 
and extent of the violations and abuses perpetrated and suffered by youths; the context of 
these violations; and the impact on of the conflict on youths. The chapter concludes by 
considering current interventions geared towards addressing the youth question in Sierra 
Leone. Youth Categories and Violence  
11. Youth in Sierra Leone can be roughly divided into two categories: mainstream and 
marginalised youths. These categories can be further sub-divided to take into account the 
geographical locations and associated characteristics of youths. Thus there are 
mainstream urban youths and mainstream rural youths. The same distinction can also be 
made for marginalised youths. 
12. The defining characteristic of mainstream urban youths has always been their access 
to formal western-type education. They would typically be secondary school or university 
students, expected to take up white-collar jobs upon completion of their studies.9 They 
belong to the world of the law abiding – those who play by the rules. Rural mainstream 
youths equally abide by long-standing traditions. They respect their elders and work on 
the farms. 
13. In Freetown before the conflict, there was a particular category of marginalised youths, 
referred to above as the rarray man dem. They constituted a predominantly male-specific, 
oppositional sub-culture, prone to violence and other anti-social behaviour such as drug 
dealing, petty theft and riotous conduct. Mostly illiterates, they were economically insecure. 
They survived by moving in and out of casual jobs as domestic hands, night watchmen 
and labourers. They lived on the margins and were alienated from mainstream society. 
The violence they committed was mainly within their potes (enclaves or ghettos for 
marginalised youth) and on festive occasions when they moved around the city with their 
“masquerades”, or processions, known as odelay. Their violence mainly involved chuk 
(stabbing with a knife) and was of a non-political nature. 
14. The utilisation of the violence of marginalised youths for political purposes started with 
the 1969-1970 by-elections, when the APC rallied soldiers, the police and rarray man dem 
to intimidate members of the opposition SLPP. The rarray man dem were mobilised by the 
APC strongman S. I. Koroma,10 who later became Vice President after the promulgation 
of the Republican Constitution in 1971. Koroma’s cynical tactics transformed rarray man 
dem into “thugs”. 
9 See Abdullah, Youth Culture and Rebellion, at page 21. 
10 See Rashid, Subaltern Reactions, at page 24. 
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15. In the common parlance of Sierra Leone at the time, “thugs” came to mean youths 
who were utilised for political violence. The word “youth” itself became a synonym for the 
unemployed young person who was vulnerable to manipulation. Youths were considered 
to be auxiliary troops for political parties. During elections, or crises, they did the dirty work 


for the politicians. Payment was often made in the form of drug supplies or token cash 
handouts. The violence offered youths an outlet for acting out their machismo, which 
although loathed by society was encouraged by the political elites. 
16. A few leaders of the rarray man dem were eventually rewarded with high positions 
(one was made a minister, another an ambassador11), but most thugs were 
unceremoniously dumped after the completion of their violent assignments.12 The 
majority of youths remained unskilled and impoverished.13 
17. In the provinces, marginalised youths were known as “san san boys” and “njiahungbia 
ngornga”. San san boys were marginalised youths eking out a living in the “sandpits” of 
the diamond mines. Most of them never fulfilled their dreams of becoming wealthy through 
diamonds. Instead, they became part of a harsh, greedy and adventurous way of life. 
Later they became easy prey as recruits for the purveyors of state and counter-state 
violence. 
18. “Njiahungbia ngornga” is a Mende phrase meaning unruly youth.14 This group 
included semi-literate youths in the provinces who loathed traditional structures and 
values. They saw “the rebellion as an opportunity to settle local scores and reverse the 
alienating rural social order in their favour.”15 Freetown youths referred to the 
marginalised youths of the provinces who had adopted Freetown lifestyles and world-
views as bonga rarray man dem or upline savis man dem. 
11 The rarray man dem who achieved high positions were: Alfred Akibo-Betts, who 
became a 
Minister of State in the Ministry of Finance; and Kemoh Fadika, who became Ambassador 
to Egypt. 
12 See Ngolo Katta, Director of the Centre for the Co-ordination of Youth Activities 
(CCYA), 
Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, April 2003 (hereinafter “CCYA 
submission 
to TRC”), at page 4. See also Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission 
to the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 8 July 2003. See also Victor Reider, Member of 
Parliament 
and former youth participant in a training programme in Libya, TRC interview conducted in 
Freetown, 
23 October 2003. See also Abdullah I.; “Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and 
Character of the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL)”, in Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: The 
Sierra Leone 
Civil War, Africa Development special edition on the Sierra Leone conflict, Volume XXII, 
Nos. 3 / 4, 


1997 (hereinafter “Abdullah, Bush Path to Destruction”), at page 49. 
13 See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to the Truth and 
Reconciliation 
Commission, 8 July 2003. 
14 See Muana, P. K.; “The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the 
Politics of 
Counter-Insurgency”, in Abdullah, I. and Bangura, Y. (eds.); Lumpen Culture and Political 
Violence: 
The Sierra Leone Civil War, Africa Development special edition on the Sierra Leone 
conflict, Volume 
XXII, Nos. 3 / 4, 1997 (hereinafter “Muana, The Kamajoi Militia”), at page 80. 
15 See Muana, The Kamajoi Militia, at page 126. 
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The Increasing Marginalisation of Youths and the 
Convergence of Educated and Uneducated Youths 
19. The country’s deteriorating economic and political situation from the 1970s onwards 
saw an increase in the number of school dropouts. Education was no longer a right for all, 
but a privilege for the few. Employment and the grant of government scholarships were 
dependent on APC party allegiance and what Sierra Leonean youths referred to as 
“connectocracy”, meaning personal connections to a political patron or senior public 
servant. Most youths could never fulfil their ambitions because they were not “connected” 
to the political system. Only the wealthy could provide a reasonable education for their 
children. The children of politicians and government officials attended private schools, 
often travelling overseas, while the government schools were totally neglected. The 
number of school dropouts increased annually as the education system deteriorated, 
swelling the ranks of the marginalised youths in the potes.  
20. In the provinces, traditional political and judicial authorities served the interests of the 
local elites. Political marginalisation and harsh judicial penalties for the breaching of 
traditional norms pushed many youths to the margins of their societies. Some youths in 
provincial urban settings like Bo and Kono also set up potes akin to those of their 
Freetown counterparts. 
21. The stagnating economy increased the numbers of even well educated youths who 
could not find employment. Western-type education no longer guaranteed employment. 
Graduates found themselves exposed to the same harsh economic realities that had long 
been experienced by the uneducated marginalised urban youth. 
22. This convergence of the material conditions of educated (mainstream) and 
uneducated (marginalised) youths provided a basis for the convergence of their lifestyles 
and world-views. Many of the educated but unemployed youths started frequenting the 
potes. Unemployment induced in them the habits of the marginalised youth. They were 


frowned upon by mainstream society, but their visits to the potes gradually elevated their 
social status amongst their uneducated peers. With the increase in the number of 
marginalised youths came a corresponding increase in the number of potes. The peddling 
of drugs became a form of full-time employment for many youths.16 University students 
also joined the drift to the potes. Student activists began establishing potes on their 
campuses and the drug culture started to gain a grudging acceptance in the society – it 
became a sine qua non for radicalism and non-conformity.17 
23. The newcomers to the potes were au fait with unfolding world events and were more 
politically conscious than the original marginalised youths. Many had read revolutionary 
texts from which they had developed new political ideas. They took it upon themselves to 
“conscientise” their “less fortunate brothers” while in return they were themselves 
gradually absorbing and adopting the style and language of the “ghetto”.18 
16 See Abdullah, Youth Culture and Rebellion, at page 29. 
17 See Abdullah, Youth Culture and Rebellion, at pages 31 and 32. 
18 See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to the Truth and 
Reconciliation 
Commission, 8 July 2003. 
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24. This transformation was also influenced by contemporary music, particularly reggae 
music by Bob Marley, Peter Tosh and Bunny Wailer. The lyrics of their songs depicted 
realities of the day – hardship, degradation and oppression – in a style of social 
commentary known as “system dread”. 
25. The new groups emerging out of the fusion of educated youths and their uneducated 
peers in the potes were not involved in petty theft or political thuggery, at least at first. The 
potes became rallying points for alienated, unemployed youths and an arena for political 
discussion centred on the corrupt practices of the dominant political class and the stifling 
political atmosphere under one-party dictatorship. Repression of Student Demonstrations 
in the 1970s and 1980s and the Evolution of Revolutionary Thinking 
26. Student leaders were conversant in theories of liberation and spiced up their 
discussions with quotes from revolutionaries like Kwame Nkrumah, Marcus Garvey, 
Wallace-Johnson, Fidel Castro, Malcolm X and Steve Biko. Students and school leavers 
read extensively and intensively outside their fields of study in order to contribute 
meaningfully to philosophical debates and discussions that lasted far into the night. 
Another significant influence was the presence of refugees from Zimbabwe, South Africa 
and Namibia on almost all campuses. Their experiences as freedom fighters made them 
influential in student circles and they occupied leadership positions in some student union 
executives.19 
27. Student thinking and the campus climate were ripe for protest action. Hindolo Trye 
was elected president of the Fourah Bay College (FBC) student union in 1976. The 
student motto “The Self” implied the importance of self-esteem and dignity, the awareness 
of the right to liberate oneself and the right of the collective self to initiate liberation.20 The 


students’ first direct confrontation with the APC came in 1977, when President Stevens 
was humiliated while delivering his speech at the annual university convocation ceremony. 
28. The APC organised a counter-demonstration involving rarray man dem led by Kemoh 
Fadika. Supported by the armed Special Security Unit (SSD), these youths were brought 
in to flog, rape and brutalise students. The deployment of such a force foreshadowed 
events to come during the conflict, when youths were pitched against youths in an orgy of 
violence. The government’s backlash led to a nationwide demonstration by students in 
February 1977 following the arrest of their student leader Hindolo Trye. According to one 
participant: 
“They sent thugs and members of the paramilitary to beat us up. They 
destroyed the campus, which led to a national uprising led by the 
students and sparked up by school children. It is what we called the “no 
college, no school” demonstration. It spread countrywide and became 
a national uprising, which lasted for several weeks.’”21 
19 See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to the Truth and 
Reconciliation 
Commission, 8 July 2003, at page 6. See also Victor Reider, Member of Parliament and 
former 
youth participant in training in Libya, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 23 October 
2003. 
20 See Currey, J.; The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: African Guerrillas, 
1998, at 
page 175. See also Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to the 
Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, 8 July 2003, at page 7. 
21 See Olu Gordon, former student of Fourah Bay College in the 1970s who later became 
a lecturer 
and prominent participant in PANAFU, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 11 March 
2003. 
Vol Three B Chapter Five Youth Page 348 
29. The student protests, planned and led by radical students, received popular support 
and forced President Stevens to make certain concessions. A general election was called 
three months later. Violence by APC-sponsored rarray man dem resulted in a massive 
electoral victory for the APC. The hopes of the educated youths for an opening up of the 
political system were dashed. 
30. The 1980s saw the emergence of well-organised radical groups and study clubs on 
university and college campuses, including the Green Book study club (promoting 


Ghaddafi’s ideas of revolutionary mass participation from Libya), the Pan African Union 
(PANAFU), which called for a popular movement,22 and the Socialist Club. Unlike other 
campus clubs, PANAFU brought both categories of youth together and was concerned 
with educating its members about apartheid in South Africa and neo-colonialism in Africa. 
PANAFU operated outside the campuses and had revolutionary “cells” in central and 
eastern Freetown. 
31. Following a student demonstration in 1984, the Fourah Bay College campus was 
closed down for three months and upon resumption of classes, students had to sign an 
agreement for re-admission into the university. This repressive act helped “contain” 
students and brought relative calm to campus. Then, in 1985, Alie Kabba, a keen member 
of several radical clubs, was returned unopposed as president of FBC student union on a 
platform of collective selfadvancement that he referred to as “we-ism”. Kabba’s student 
union executive made no secret of its intentions to put its radical leftist ideologies into 
practice once in power. The student leadership was constantly at loggerheads with the 
university authorities, who perceived Kabba as a subversive firebrand. 
32. Events reached a climax at the end of the second term in 1985 when students refused 
to hand in their dormitory keys. The authorities accused them of planning to bring in 
Libyan mercenaries to oust the APC government. The paramilitary SSD, again called in to 
put the students in their place, used undue force in restraining the students and beating 
them into submission. 
33. The SSD’s actions gave rise to a Freetown-wide demonstration. When the college 
reopened for the third semester in April 1985, forty-one students were declared ineligible 
to register, among them Alie Kabba. The student union protested against this decision. 
The campus demonstration spread to the city centre, where shops were looted and 
vehicles burnt down,23 apparently by unemployed youths who used the political 
demonstration of the students as a chance to wreak havoc and enrich themselves. Such 
opportunism, to many differing degrees, would become a constant feature of the conflict in 
the 1990s.  
34. Alie Kabba and five other students were arrested and detained for two months, while 
three lecturers – Cleo Hancilles, Olu Gordon and Jimmy Kandeh, the original founders of 
PANAFU – were summarily dismissed from the university without a proper explanation or 
compensation up to the present day.24 
22 See Cleo Hancilles, former lecturer at Fourah Bay College (FBC) who later conducted 
ideological 
lessons for trainees in Libya, TRC interview in Freetown, 8 April 2003. See also Abdullah, 
Youth 
Culture and Rebellion, at page 32. PANAFU wanted to link people across diverse social 
sectors. 
23 See Rashid, Subaltern Reactions, at page 36. 
24 See Cleo Hancilles, former lecturer at Fourah Bay College (FBC) who later conducted 
ideological 


lessons for trainees in Libya, TRC interview in Freetown, 8 April 2003. See also Olu 
Gordon, former 
student of Fourah Bay College in the 1970s who later became a lecturer and prominent 
participant in 
PANAFU, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 11 March 2003. See also Gibril Foday-
Musa, 
former student of Fourah Bay College who attended a training programme in Libya in the 
1980s; 
TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 26 September 2003. 
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35. Some of the expelled students eventually found their way to Ghana and gained 
admission into the University of Legon. From Ghana, Alie Kabba made frequent visits to 
Guinea and Libya and was also a regular visitor to the People’s Bureau (as the Libyan 
embassy was called) in Accra. According to Olu Gordon: 
“The idea of the RUF actually came from the expelled students from 
Fourah Bay College, especially Alie Kabba. And the specific reason 
why it was called a “united front” was because they had attempted to 
draw several organisations into their plan, including the organisations 
belonging to the Pan African Union (PANAFU).’”25 
36. Other witnesses, who were part of PANAFU, as well as some members of the RUF, 
have challenged the veracity of this testimony. Indeed, Gordon’s account is not entirely 
accurate, since Alie Kabba’s umbrella idea went by a different name altogether – the 
Popular Democratic Front, with the acronym PDF – and had a non-violent agenda for 
change at its heart. RUF members further pointed out that at the time the students were in 
Libya, no name had been chosen for the movement they joined. The name RUF was 
coined by others in Libya and had no direct connection to PANAFU, which had by that 
time become detached from the revolutionary project. 
Divergence of Youths and the Spiral into Violent Rebellion 
37. The exiled students raised the idea with PANAFU in Freetown of sending members of 
their revolutionary “cells” in the city to undertake training programmes in Libya. Four 
trainees nominated by PANAFU left for Libya during the rainy season of 1987. By the time 
they returned in 1988, leading members of PANAFU were no longer committed to the 
revolutionary project, which led to a split in the movement. One group went underground 
and carried on planning for new batches of trainees, recruiting mainly marginalised youths 
from the city. 38. PANAFU’s withdrawal from the revolutionary project starved it of 
ideologically educated youths and turned it into what one writer has described as: 
“an individual enterprise… any man (no attempt was made to recruit 


women) who felt the urge to acquire insurgency training in the service 
of the “revolution” [could join up]… This inevitably opened the way for 
the recruitment of lumpens.”26 
39. Alie Kabba had assumed the position of co-ordinator of the “revolution” because of his 
pre-existing links with Libya. Many trainees were opposed to Kabba’s leadership, though. 
They objected to his personal refusal to undergo military training. They also accused him 
and his friends in Ghana of “sitting on millions of dollars” and benefiting from their 
recruitment for training in Libya. By the time Kabba left Ghana for Libya, most of the 
trainees had revolted. The bulk of them had returned to Sierra Leone by 1989 or 1990 and 
never assumed roles in the RUF movement, or indeed in any of the factions that fought in 
the conflict.27 
25 See Olu Gordon, former student of Fourah Bay College in the 1970s who later became 
a lecturer 
and prominent participant in PANAFU, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 23 March 
2003. 
26 See Abdullah, Bush Path to Destruction, at page 63. 
27 See Cleo Hancilles, former lecturer at Fourah Bay College (FBC) who later conducted 
ideological 
lessons for trainees in Libya, TRC interview in Freetown, 8 April 2003. See also Abdullah, 
Bush 
Path to Destruction, at page 65. 
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40. Divergence of paths and purposes occurred during the time of the training in Libya. 
Sierra Leone’s original student revolutionaries realised they had little in common with 
some of their countrymen who trained on the camps near Tripoli. Alie Kabba and Cleo 
Hancilles, the two ideological driving forces, grew wary of the direction their project had 
assumed and decided to opt out. Into the resultant leadership vacuum stepped Foday 
Sankoh, an aggrieved former soldier of the Sierra Leone Army who was an anomalous, 
older presence among the mostly youthful trainees. In Libya, Sankoh met Charles Taylor, 
the leader of the Liberian trainees on the camp. The two men forged a joint plan for 
insurgencies in their respective countries, starting in Liberia and moving into Sierra Leone. 
From that moment on, the course of the “revolution” – and with it the destiny of the sub-
region’s youth – changed irreversibly. Sankoh and a handful of cohorts made their way to 
Liberia and joined an insurgency alongside Taylor’s NPFL. Among the youths involved, 
only Abu Kanu, a graduate of Njala University College, had reached a level of higher 
education comparable to the original PANAFU-led group of the mid-1980s. 
41. Foday Sankoh began to assemble more fighters for his RUF rebellion in 1990. He 
used Charles Taylor’s NPFL bases and logistics to train Sierra Leoneans from diverse 
backgrounds who had been caught up in the turmoil in Liberia. Some were migrant 
workers whom Sankoh plucked from prisons in NPFL control areas; others were 


marginalised urban youths and common criminals. They became known as the RUF 
“vanguards”. In March and April 1991, the vanguards entered Sierra Leone with a troop of 
NPFL commandos who outnumbered them by about four to one. The Sierra Leone conflict 
had begun, with youths from unlikely and unsettled circumstances very much to the 
fore.28 
42. After the launch of the armed rebellion, most of the youths who joined the RUF, or 
who were compelled to join the organisation, were marginalised rural youths. Thus 
different categories of youths were involved at distinct stages of the conflict history of 
Sierra Leone. Educated youths were involved in the formulation of ideas for revolution and 
regime change, instigating the training in Libya. Marginalised urban youths were involved 
in the bulk of the military training and the launch of the insurgency. Thereafter the bulk of 
the growing manpower of the RUF consisted of marginalised rural youths. 
43. Youths who joined the RUF could be further distinguished according to those who 
joined voluntarily and those who were forced to join. Some of the youths who joined 
willingly were won over by the simplistic rhetoric of the movement and believed that their 
involvement would help to reform “the system” that had oppressed them for so long. They 
were fed up with the APC and wanted a change of government. According to a resident of 
Pujehun District: 
“We assembled at the barray and they addressed us… “We have come 
to make Sierra Leone a better Sierra Leone… Sierra Leoneans are 
suffering… education is expensive… we have come to get rid of the 
APC rule”… After their address, we were happy and prepared food for 
them… They appointed a town commander… Some of them left after 
they had finished eating.”29 
28 For the Commission’s comprehensive account of the pre-conflict phase and the 
assembly of the 
armed force that launched the insurgency in Sierra Leone in 1991, see the chapter on the 
Military 
and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report. 
29 Alusine Rogers, TRC statement recorded in Kpaka Chiefdom, Pujehun District, 22 
March 2003. 
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44. However, whether by choice or against their will, practically all the recruits soon 
adopted forms of behaviour that characterised marginalised youths – drug addiction and 
violence. Involvement in the rebellion itself became an alienating and marginalising 
process. RUF and NPFL atrocities in Sierra Leone soon drew contempt and opposition 
from the communities they were attempting to win over. Youths who had joined the 
insurgency became completely alienated from their own people, either due to acts in 


which they participated personally or due to their association with the outrages 
perpetrated by the movement as a whole. 
45. The involvement of youth in the conflict became infinitely more complicated in April 
1992, when a band of youths in the Sierra Leone Army overthrew the APC in a coup and 
formed a military junta known as the NPRC. In an attempt to counter the insurgents at the 
warfront, the NPRC engaged in mass recruitment of marginalised urban youths into the 
Army. By 1992, therefore, almost the entire combatant population consisted of youths, on 
both sides of the battle. 
46. It should be recalled that by the eve of the conflict most urban youth had lost all hope. 
They had sunk into an abyss of unemployment and disillusionment. In this state, fighting 
in the war seemed a viable alternative. It presented a means through which youths could 
possibly break out of their despair and transform their lives. Many youth aligned 
themselves with one or more of the factions and swiftly achieved what they considered 
progress: they were able to accrue “wealth” and “status” that otherwise would have been 
unattainable. 
47. More youths joined the war when they saw how “profitable” the experience had proved 
for others. Instead of enduring long periods of unemployment, they looted money and 
goods. Rather than possessing no stake in society, no property and no hope for the future, 
they became “commandos” who could acquire guns, sex, food and drugs at their will. The 
opportunity cost of going to war was very low. War empowered them. Inevitably, such 
youths began to perceive personal benefits in the continuation of conflict. Across all 
factions they became the most vocal constituency resisting efforts to end the war. 
48. Some youths joined the armed factions in order to carry out personal vendettas. 
Statements from Pujehun District indicate that some of the earliest recruits into the RUF 
on its Southern Front were militiamen who had participated in the so-called Ndorgboryosoi 
rebellion against the APC government in the early 1980s, but ultimately failed.30 The 
Commission also heard testimonies from various parts of the country about youths who 
had been ostracised from their communities in the past, only to return during war to lead 
fighters into attacking their people, destroying their communities and humiliating their 
chiefs, elders and members of their traditional authorities.31 
30 More detail on the Ndorgboryosoi rebellion in Pujehun District in the 1980s can be 
found in the 
chapter on the Historical Antecedents to the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report. 
More detail 
on the incorporation of former Ndorgboryosoi militiamen into the RUF in 1991 can be 
found in the 
chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict, also in Volume Three A of this 
report. 
31 See, for example, Ngolo Katta, Director of the Centre for the Co-ordination of Youth 
Activities 
(CCYA), TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 13 August 2003. 


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The Re-convergence of Youths 
49. In the late 1970s and 1980s, there had been a convergence of the educated and the 
uneducated marginalised youths. This convergence initiated discourse on modes and 
means of resistance, or violence, that could be targeted at the perpetrator of their 
marginalisation – the APC government. Their discourse took place in the potes, against 
the background of a non-conflict environment. 
50. In contrast, the re-convergence of youths in the 1990s took place in the course of the 
actual rebellion against the state. On this occasion the youths who converged were mainly 
uneducated and marginalised youths who had joined the RUF or the Army. Those in the 
Army were largely marginalised urban youths, whilst the RUF constituted mainly rural 
youths. It became a convergence of all the groups from the pre-conflict period described 
earlier in this chapter: rarray man dem; upline savis man dem; san san boys; and 
njiahungbia ngornga. 
51. Youths in both the Army and the RUF shared common traits of marginalisation. Most 
were uneducated, heavy users of drugs and had been uprooted or alienated from their 
pre-war communities. The rebellion and counter-insurgency seemed to promise 
marginalised youths that they could continue to engage in their old habits while fulfilling 
the ambitions that were denied to them by society. 
52. Towards this end youths were encouraged by the leadership of the various military 
and political factions. The elites were profiteering from war in different ways from the 
youths, but they had a similar interest in its perpetuation. Youths in turn utilised violence 
not only to please their masters, but also to fulfil their yearnings for material acquisitions. 
In other words, the youths appropriated elite-sanctioned violence for subaltern ends. 
53. Thus the eventual re-convergence of marginalised youths in the midst of the brutality 
that characterised the conflict was perhaps inevitable. Some commentators believe that 
the neologism “sobel” captures this convergence, because soldiers behaved like rebels, 
and vice versa.32 The reality is subtly different, however, since the union of the RUF with 
the AFRC regime that seized power in May 1997 came about through a decision of their 
respective leaderships, rather then any organic merger of the two combatant cadres on 
the ground. Only upon their convergence did the two factions really appreciate that they 
were practically identical in their composition. 
54. The leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) came from subaltern 
social types (rarray man dem) who had become accustomed to deploying violence on 
behalf of the civilian political elites. In seizing power in their coup of 1997, these soldiers 
and civilians were carrying out violence towards their own ends and in doing so they made 
no distinction between public and private targets.33 
55. When the AFRC regime was joined by the RUF, itself composed mainly of 
marginalised rural youths, many ordinary people suspected that it reflected years of 
collaboration between the two factions at the battlefront. It was very common to hear 
Sierra Leoneans saying that they knew that the RUF and the Army were secret lovers and 
that they were now publicly celebrating the marriage. It was not so much a question of 


formalising an existing relationship, though, as of wondering why the two of them had 
failed to get together earlier. 
32 See, for example, Abdullah, Bush Path to Destruction. 
33 See Kandeh, Elite Origins of Subaltern Terror. 
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Community Self-Defence and the Utilisation of Youths 
56. In the mid to late 1990s, civilian communities largely lost faith in the national army and 
sponsored their own youths to become members of the Civil Defence Forces, a militia 
network dominated by Kamajors from the south and east. For many youths, joining the 
Kamajors was a way to earn respectability and honour. Others simply heeded the call of 
their elders to be initiated: 
“The chiefdom elders called upon the youths of all the surrounding 
villages and explained to us that since the situation was getting out of 
hand, they want some of the youths to volunteer to be initiated into the 
Kamajor society as a means of self-defence. Eighty people were 
registered for initiation.”34 
57. In his statement to the Commission, another youth said he joined the Kamajors to 
defend his people from soldiers and the RUF: 
“The government soldiers who were supposed to protect us were the 
very ones who were killing and harassing our people. The RUF were 
also killing our people and burning our houses.”35 
58. The CDF militias started as a reaction to the abuses of the RUF and government 
soldiers. As the war progressed, though, the CDF was transformed into much more than a 
community defence force. This was particularly the case after the 1997 AFRC coup, when 
the CDF became an armed force dedicated to the restoration of the SLPP government. 
According to one CDF fighter: 
“In addition to the carnage and destruction caused by the rebels to our 
people and the land, for these kind of people to rule us was a mockery 
and a shame… My first deployment (as a Kamajor) was to go and fight 
the RUF at their base in Koribundo.”36 
59. As tensions flared, many Kamajor members learned to use the war for private gain. 
Although they were under oaths, taboos and a disciplined code of conduct that forbade 
them from engaging in certain acts, they nonetheless looted, raped, killed innocent 
civilians and conscripted children into their ranks.37 


60. A farmer from Pujehun recounted his ordeal at the hands of the Kamajors: 
“Eight Kamajors attacked me on my farm. They invited me to their 
base, but I refused to accompany them. They maltreated me and while 
I sat on the ground they fired shots around me. As if that was not 
enough, they went on to harvest my pineapple and other fruits. Finally, 
they looted all my property and burnt down my farmhouse.”38 
61. Membership of the Kamajors was in some areas the only way of avoiding such abuses. 
Many youths joined the militia to seek this protective cover: 
“These Kamajors intimidated us so much as civilians that I decided to 
join them in 1997. I did it to gain the freedom of entering and leaving 
our village.”39 
34 Borbor Rambo Kallon, TRC statement recorded in Mano Dasse, Dasse Chiefdom, 
March 2003. 
35 Augustine Musa, TRC statement recorded at an unspecified location, February 2003. 
36 Brima Nallo, TRC statement recorded in Ngiehun, Lugbu Chiefdom, January 2003. 
37 See, for example, Rugiatu Kamara, testimony to TRC public hearings, Freetown, 14 
April 2003. 
38 Mohamed Kebbie, TRC statement recorded in Pujehun Town, 25 February 2003. 
39 Desmond Hindowa Momoh, TRC statement recorded in Tokwama village, 11 
December 2002. 
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Youths as Collaborators in the Conflict 
62. In addition to their active combat roles, youths instigated horrific atrocities by 
collaborating with the factions in times of social tension or when control of a particular 
area changed hands. Youths were often the first residents to be sought out for information 
or local knowledge. By betraying the confidence of their communities and pointing fingers, 
sometimes without any rational basis, they caused many deaths and untold suffering: 
“When the soldiers recaptured Potoru… an indigene of Potoru showed 
the soldiers all the houses the rebels had been dwelling in… 
The houses were then burnt down by an SLA corporal…”40 
63. When the war broke out in the east and the south, some young men who joined the 
RUF pointed out to rebel forces certain individuals they perceived as their antagonists or 
oppressors. Often these persons were tortured and killed. During the ousting of the junta 


in 1998 by the ECOMOG intervention force, irate youths not only formed “mobs” to beat 
up and summarily execute civilians, they also identified suspected AFRC sympathisers or 
disclosed their hideouts to ECOMOG personnel and Kamajors, who dealt mercilessly with 
their victims. Philip Sankoh described what happened to him: 
“Around 16 February 1998, a neighbour named Modupeh came with a 
group of Nigerian soldiers serving under ECOMOG… The soldiers 
attacked my friend and I… and held us at gun point … That same night 
they went over to the place where I had gone to seek refuge… and 
harassed the people, looted their property.”41 
The Impact of the Conflict on Youth 
64. Instead of alleviating the neglect and marginalisation believed to be the prime causes 
of the war, the eleven-year conflict has actually compounded the problems faced by 
youths and had entirely negative consequences on their development. Many youths have 
been left disillusioned and frustrated.  
Youths and education 
65. A whole generation of youths lost their opportunity to advance their levels of education, 
which is so vital to the improvement of their status. Desmond Massaquoi recounted the 
circumstances that have denied him his schooling: 
“I was attending Christ The King College when the war broke out; I was 
in form three. I went for holidays to my village Kanguma, near Serabu 
in the Bumpeh Chiefdom. Rebels attacked my village, burnt our 
houses, looted our property and killed some people. Amongst those 
killed were my father, my sister and her husband. These people were 
the ones paying my school fees… I want to continue my education but 
there is no one to support me as my sister and her husband who 
supported me are dead.’”42 
40 Lahai Kamara, TRC statement recorded in Potoru, Pujehun District, 24 January 2003. 
41 Philip Sankoh, resident of Brookfields community in Freetown, TRC interview, 16 July 
2003. 
42 Desmond Massaquoi, TRC statement, Bo District, 10 April 2003. 
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66. Displacement of the population resulted in high levels of illiteracy and a massive drop 
in the standard of education. As civilians sought refuge in the big towns, overcrowding 


meant that schools had to begin operating double shifts. Class sizes increased and the 
quality of interaction in the learning environment deteriorated. Even the few youths who 
were able to attend school received a lower quality of education. Many had their education 
halted abruptly by their enlistment into the fighting forces or abduction by the RUF. 
67. In post-conflict Sierra Leone many youths who lost out on schooling believe they are 
now too old to return to school. They are destined to remain unskilled. Many are not just 
unemployed; they are unemployable. They can be seen all over the country, many of 
them begging and stealing in order to survive. 
Psychosocial effects of the conflict 
68. Many youths were brutalised and transformed into killing machines. They have been 
deprived of the positive aspects of their youth. Some young people were abducted as 
children and stayed with their captors throughout the eleven-year conflict. Many others 
lost parents and benefactors. In general youths remain bereft of the stabilising ties of 
affection, intimacy and emotional support. Denied these ties, they are vulnerable to 
emotional and psychological insecurity. 
Drugs 
69. Before the war, most youths consuming drugs used cannabis. During the war, they 
were introduced to more dangerous narcotics such as cocaine and heroin. There has 
been a dramatic increase in the numbers of young drug takers and the types of drugs they 
are addicted to.43 
Loss of civic and social skills 
70. The breakdown of community norms and socialisation during the ten-year civil conflict 
created youths without civic or social skills. Those in the fighting forces were inducted into 
a life of burning, looting and killing. They do not possess peacetime skills and are finding it 
difficult to accept and accede to authority. Refugees also had their lives disrupted. Thus 
many among them lack the social, civic and economic skills necessary for a disciplined 
peacetime life. 
71. Youths have become been used to violence as a means of resolving problems. Many 
still hold onto the belief that they should resort to violence to get what they need.44 They 
have been used to committing violations with impunity. 
43 See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, TRC interview conducted in 
Freetown, 
12 November 2003. See also Allan Quee, Director of PRIDE, a non-governmental 
organisation 
dedicated to the reintegration of ex-combatants, TRC interview in Freetown, 21 November 
2003. 
44 See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, TRC interview conducted in 
Freetown, 
12 November 2003. 
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APPENDIX 3 
TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION REPORT, 2004, RECOMMENDATIONS: 
YOUTH 

“PRODUCTIVE YOUTH BUILD BETTER NATION” 
Slogan from the Combat Camp Youth Committee111 
304. Youths112 were the driving force behind the resistance to one-party state rule in the 
1980s. As students, journalists, workers and activists they exposed injustices and the 
bankruptcy of the ruling elite’s ideology. They also bore the brunt of the state’s repressive 
backlash. During the conflict, youths formed the bulk of the fighting forces in all the 
factions. The last twenty years of Sierra Leone’s history are, in reality, the story of Sierra 
Leone’s youths. 
305. Many of the dire conditions that gave rise to the conflict in 1991 remain in 2004. As in 
the late 1980s, many young adults continue to occupy urban ghettoes where they 
languish in a twilight zone of unemployment and despair. 
National Mobilisation 
306. The civil war has aggravated matters for the youth. After ten years of war, thousands 
of young men and women have been denied a normal education and indeed a normal life. 
Their childhood and youth have been squandered by years of brutal civil conflict. Many 
young Sierra Leoneans have lost the basic opportunities in life that young people around 
the world take for granted. These young people constitute Sierra Leone’s lost generation. 
The Commission recommends that the youth question be viewed as a national emergency 
that demands national mobilisation. This is an imperative recommendation. 
307. The Commission has detected a certain energy and resolve among many of the 
youths with which it has interacted in hearings, reconciliation programmes and the 
National Vision for Sierra Leone. This resolve is reflected in the desire to overcome the 
difficulties and traumas of the past and to forge a new and proud Sierra Leone. The 
Commission has detected this resolve among university students, professionals, young 
men and women in Government and among the unemployed in the ghettoes. This energy 
must be harnessed and channelled towards productive ends. The future of Sierra Leone 
depends on this. 
111 Slogan submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC. 
112 For the purposes of this report the age category of youths extends from 18 to 35 
years. 
Recommendations on “Children” are dealt with under a separate heading later in this 
chapter. The 
18-35 category adopted by the Commission is in line with the age category employed by 
the Sierra 


Leone Ministry of Youth. The Youth Ministry has extended the age limit of youth because 
it regards 
the period of the conflict as “lost years” for many youths. 
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National Youth Commission 
308. The Commission recommends that Government work towards the transformation of 
the youth portfolio of the Ministry of Youth and Sports into a National Youth Commission. 
Such a Commission should to be located in the Office of the President. The mission of a 
National Youth Commission would be to address the youth question as a fundamental 
priority in post-war reconstruction. Currently, the Youth Ministry is constrained by an 
overburdened civil service bureaucracy that prevents it from carrying out its basic tasks 
and functions. At present the Ministry is unable to finance its programmes in the provinces. 
In short, the Ministry of Youth does not have the means to address the youth question. 
309. A National Youth Commission would be empowered by its ability to raise funds 
locally and internationally. It would be able to work meaningfully with fundraising agencies, 
while co-ordinating and streamlining the activities of the NGOs working in this field. A 
National Youth Commission ought to be responsible for the implementation of the Youth 
Policy as well as the National Youth Plan. The effective implementation of the Youth 
Policy and National Youth Plan would address the specific issues facing the youth as set 
out in the findings of the Commission. 
310. A National Youth Commission could spearhead public-private partnerships involving 
youth in different sectors including tourism, agriculture, fisheries, housing and mining. 
Industrial sites and service centres could be earmarked for initiatives aimed at providing 
employment opportunities for youth. The National Youth Commission could facilitate 
investment in such schemes and encourage worker – owner schemes which would give 
young workers a stake in the initiative. Over a period of time, youthful workers could 
become coowners and investors in such companies. The Commission recommends that 
the Government of Sierra Leone work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations. 
311. The Commission recommends that, every year, a “State of the Youth” report be 
tabled before Parliament. Pending the creation of the National Youth Commission, this 
should be the responsibility of Ministry of Youth and Sports. Such a report should provide 
an overview of the state of the youth in Sierra Leone for the preceding year. It should set 
out a detailed assessment of all efforts and programmes to develop the youth in the public, 
non-governmental and private sectors. Progress should be measured against a set of 
agreed indicators. This recommendation is made for the serious consideration of 
Government. 
Political Representation 
312. The denial of a meaningful political voice to the youth has had devastating 
consequences for Sierra Leone. More avenues for the youth to express themselves and to 
realise their potential need to be created. Political space should be opened up so that the 
youth can become involved in governance and in the decision-making process. Youths 
must have a stake in governance. 


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313. The Commission recommends that all political parties be required to ensure that at 
least 10% of their candidates for all public elections are youths.113 This includes national 
elections, local government and district council elections. Legislation should be enacted to 
make this a legal requirement. The National Electoral Commission should be required to 
enforce this minimum representation. Such a stipulation will require all political parties to 
nurture and develop meaningful participation of the youth. This is an imperative 
recommendation. 
314. Engagement in electoral politics should be accompanied by political responsibility. In 
this regard the Commission endorses the programme launched by the Ministry of Youth 
and Sports to cultivate political responsibility among the youth. This programme envisages 
the creation of elected Chiefdom Youth Committees that would send representatives to a 
District Youth Committee. The District Committee would act as a clearing-house for youth 
activities and projects. District Youth Committees would send representatives to Regional 
Youth Committees, which would set the agenda for a National Youth Conference. The 
Regional Committees would send representatives to the National Youth Conference that 
would elect members to a National Youth Committee. 
315. Such an initiative would structure youth participation in public affairs and provide a 
training ground for tomorrow’s leaders. The Commission supports this initiative and calls 
on Government to set in place the necessary legislative framework to make it work. The 
Commission also calls on Government and the donor community to resource this 
important programme. 
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APPENDIX 4 
UN PEACEBUILDING COMMISSION REPORT PBC/2/SLE/1 5 07-61810 

A. Youth employment and empowerment 
10. The marginalization and political exclusion of youth was identified by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission as one of the root causes of the civil war and is widely 
perceived to be a threat to peace consolidation today. The Government defines youth as 
persons between 15 and 35 years, who are estimated to represent approximately two 
million people out of a total population of about five million. Close to two thirds of those 
young people are considered to be unemployed or underemployed. Young people also 
tend to have less paid employment and fewer opportunities in the public and formal 
sectors. They face a number of employment constraints, such as low levels of education, 
limited access to land, social capital and credit. Ex-combatants, urban slum youth, poor 
and socially excluded youth in rural areas and youth in squatter settlements in border 
areas of Sierra Leone comprise key sections of marginalized young men and women 
requiring special measures to address their needs. The challenge of youth marginalization, 
however, goes beyond the issue of economic opportunities and employment. It is also 
necessary to ensure the full participation of young men and women in the political process 
and protection of their rights. Ensuring equal participation of women, especially young 
women, within the political process constitutes a specific challenge and requires targeted 
interventions, such as legislative reform and sustained capacity-building. 
11. A few short- and medium-term initiatives are under way to address youth 
unemployment, such as the Youth Employment Scheme launched by the Government in 
2006 with the aim of generating up to 135,000 short-term jobs for young people. The 
Government of Sierra Leone has also developed a National Youth Policy and is setting up 
a National Youth Commission to promote youth empowerment and greater participation in 
decision-making. The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund has also provided support for 
the Government’s Youth Enterprise Development Programme. The World Bank and the 
Government of Sierra Leone have produced a comprehensive study on youth employment, 
noting the need to develop both medium- and long-term solutions to the problem. 
12. The challenge of addressing youth unemployment is closely linked to the creation of 
long-term economic growth, reviving agricultural production and marketing, and creating 
an enabling environment for private-sector development and domestic, diaspora and 
foreign investment. A number of preconditions, such as improved availability of electricity, 
water and other basic infrastructure and support for entrepreneurs and the self-employed, 
would need to be addressed in that context. Although the importance of long-term 
economic growth in the context of peace consolidation is recognized as part of the present 
Framework, specific activities under this sector fall within the purview of the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper. Within this Framework, a more targeted and medium-term 
focus on addressing youth unemployment will be prioritized, in particular in the areas of 
policy reform and youth empowerment through the implementation of the National Youth 
Policy, strengthening of the National Youth Council, District Youth Committees and the 
expansion of the Government’s Youth Employment Scheme.  

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LIST OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE INTERVIEWS: 
 
Affiliation/Organisation 
 
 
Interviewee 
 
Date 
Graduate student Rahim 18 March 2010 
Youth Employment 
Secretariat, Ministry of Youth 
and Sport 
Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, 
Mr. Yusuf Kamara 
23 March 2010 
CCYA  National Coordinator, Mr. Ngolo 
Katta 
23 March 2010 
UNICEF  Project Officer – Child Protection, 
Mrs. Rosina Conteh 
23 March 2010 
COOPI   Programme Manager, Mr. John 
Saidu 
24 March 2010 
COOPI  Programme Manager, Mr. Robin 
Yoki 
24 March 2010 
EMERGENCY  Head of Paediatrics, Dr. Jane 
Babati 
24 March 2010 
CCYA  Programme Officer, Mr. Edward 
Massaquoi 
25 March 2010 
SLYEO  Executive Director, Mr. Charles 
Lahai 
25 March 2010 
Peacelinks  Programme Coordinator, Mr. 
James Hallowell 
26 March 2010 
AYPAD Youth1, youth2 26 March 2010 
YAPAD  National Coordinator, Mr. Bockarie 
Enssah 
30 March 2010 
WarChild Deputy Country Director, Mr. Saidu 
Mansaray 
31 March 2010 
CAUSE Canada Peacebuilding Project Coordinator, 
Mr. Daniel N’bompa-Turay 
31 March 2010 
SALONE YOUTH AND 
ADOLESENT NETWORK  
Youth 1, youth 2, youth 3, youth 4 31 March 2010 
AYPAD  Executive Director, Mr. Philip 
Bangura  
31 March 2010 
ENCISS  Youth Officer, Mr. Ishmael Bash-
Kamara 
1 April 2010 
Fourah Bay College  Ibrahim, Felix, Joseph, Mohamed, 
Omar 
1 April 2010 
PLAN International  Youth Policy Advisor, Mr. Martin 
Sisay Hudson 
6 April 2010 
National Youth Coalition,  President, Mr. Ishmail Al-Sankoh 
Conteh 
6 April 2010 


Black Street Family  Youth1, youth2, youth3, youth4, 
youth5, youth6, youth7, youth8, 
youth9, youth10 
7 April 2010 
iEARN  Youth1, youth2, youth3, youth4, 
youth5, youth6, youth7, youth8 
7 April 2010 
BASE, Aberdeen Youth1, youth2, youth3, youth4, 
youth5, youth6 
7 April 2010 
GTZ Programme Manager, Mr. 
Muhamed Lebbie 
8 April 2010 
SPW Country President, Mr. Farai 
Muronzi 
8 April 2010 
UNIPSIL Youth Employment and Conflict 
Advisor, Mr. Eldridge Adolfo 
8 April 2010 
Graduate student Amin 10 April 2010 
GOAL-Sierra Leone Disadvantaged Children and Youth 
Project Coordinator, Mr. Michael 
Thompson 
12 April 2010 
International Youth Forum Director, Mr. John Paul Bai 12 April 2010 
CORD-SL  Executive Director, Mr. Alfred 
Sandi 
12 April 2010 
WANEP National Coordinator, Mr. Edward 
Jombla 
13 April 2010 
iEARN National Coordinator, Miss. Jane 
Peters 
13 April 2010 
OKADA Association Youth 1, youth 2, youth 3 13 April 2010 
Issa Young entrepreneur  13 April 2010 
Attaya base in Regent street Youth 1, youth 2, youth 3 13 April 2010 
Kissy Dockyard Moses 14 April 2010 
House of braves, youth 
development organisation 
Philip 14 April 2010 
Graduate student  Daniel 14 April 2010 
Grassfield youths Association Youth1, youth2, youth3, youth4, 
youth5, youth6, youth7 
14 April 2010 
King Jimmy youth1, youth2, youth3 14 April 2010 
Bananawater youth1, youth2 15 April 2010 
Oloshoro youth1, youth2, youth3, youth4, 
youth5, youth6 
15 April 2010 
Congo Market youth1, youth2, youth3, youth4 16 April 2010 

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